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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 What does judicial independence mean?  This is the first of two questions that 
have been the driving force behind my doctoral research during the last couple of years. 
When I began reading about the subject, I was amazed at the large quantity of answers, 
their diversity and lack of consensus that I found. Judicial independence has been deemed 
a slippery concept (Rios Figueroa 2006:2). The term “independence” is generally used to 
characterize the relationship of the judiciary to other institutions or agencies. An 
independent judge is one who is not under the influence or control of somebody else. The 
problem arises when one considers that there are several kinds of institutions and 
agencies from which the judge is supposed to be independent. Some even claim that good 
judges must also maintain “independence from ideology” (Kahn 1993:89). So, who are 
the judges supposed to be independent from? One form of independence is what Owen 
Fiss (1993) calls party detachment, which requires the judge to be independent from the 
parties in the litigation. This aspect of independence, Fiss claims, is rooted in the idea of 
impartiality and is uncompromising in its demands (58). A second form of independence 
indentified by Fiss is individual autonomy. This form of autonomy concerns collegial 
relationships or the power of one judge over another. In civil law countries, higher court 
judges exercise control over their lower court colleagues through regular appellate 
procedures. These forms of collegial control do not threaten the independence that rightly 
belongs to a judge. However, other bureaucratic measures that allow higher court judges 
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to review the work of an individual judge and discipline him or her outside the appellate 
procedures may threaten a judge’s independence and his claim for individual autonomy. 
Finally a third form of independence is what Fiss calls political insularity. This form of 
independence requires that the judiciary be independent of political institutions and the 
public in general. However, one must not confuse political insularity with anarchy. While 
the judiciary must be autonomous from other political institutions and the public, to 
safeguard horizontal accountability and the rule of law, the judicial system and all of its 
members are also accountable to the constitution (Kahn Zemans 1999). 
 While defining judicial independence has prove to be a difficult task for both 
lawyers and scholars, measuring it brings a whole new set of problems.  A precise 
measure of judicial independence would require some sort of statistical comparison 
between judicial preferences and judicial results (Linares Lejarraga 2004). This measure, 
however, is very hard to obtain due to the large number of intervening variables that will 
inexorably affect the results, and are not always related to judicial independence. Given 
that, the existing literature has opted for more indirect forms of measurements.  These 
consist on establishing the existence of variables that, according to theory, can impede 
coercion or undue influences on judicial decisions. From these measurements one can 
identify two separate types: Formal or de iure and practical or de facto. The first type 
consists of the identification of formal provisions that are supposed to have a favorable 
impact on the elimination of undue interferences. The problem with formal measures of 
independence is their detachment from reality, since most of these provisions can be 
easily ignored. Moreover, several research papers have obtained clear results on the 
subject. Some claim that formal provisions do not constitute a guarantee for the 
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maintenance of judicial independence (Domingo 2000, Feld and Voight 2003). On the 
other hand, other studies state that it is possible to find judicial independence in some 
countries that do not have the formal provisions to guarantee it (Salzberger 1993, 
Salzberger and Fenn 1999).  The second types of measurements, known as de facto, 
verify the fulfillment of those formal provisions put in place to prevent the influence of 
third parties on judicial decisions. These measurements depart from normative standards 
that have a theoretical justification, which are later compared and contrasted to reality 
through different ways [surveys, expert opinions, subjective valuations] (Linares 
2004:112). 
 The first goal of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of what 
judicial independence is and how we have learned to identify it. Chapter II begins with a 
theoretical discussion on judicial independence. Beyond Owen Fiss’ description of the 
different forms of independence, I look at the separate dimensions of the concept, and 
identify at least three. The first one is autonomy, which is the independence of the 
Supreme Court as an institution, from the other branches of government as well as from 
other private institutions and individuals (Prillaman 2000). The second dimension of 
judicial independence has to do with the judge himself. External independence tackles the 
relationship between individual judges and the other branches of government; it covers 
the rules regarding judicial appointment, tenure, salary and removal. External 
independence exists when a judge is appointed by more than one branch of government 
or by the judiciary itself and when the terms of tenure, removal and salary are clearly 
established in the constitution and do not depend upon the executive (Rios Figueroa 
2006). The third dimension of independence deals with the collegial relations of judges 
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within the judiciary. Internal independence focuses on the interaction between Supreme 
Court judges and their hierarchically inferior colleagues. It exists when lower court 
judges are free to fulfill their administrative, procedural and substantive duties without 
interference from their superiors. 
 The second section of Chapter II explores the different ways in which judicial 
independence has been measured. After discussing previous measurements, I present four 
different indexes of independence; two formal and two practical that I later use as 
independent variables to test the effect of an independent judiciary on corruption 
victimization and on individual attitudes towards the institutions of the rule of law. The 
first de iure measure I use was created by Julio Rios Figueroa (2006) and it taps into the 
different dimensions of independence that I mentioned above. By coding the constitutions 
of several Latin American countries, Rios Figueroa looked at formal provisions that 
would guarantee autonomy, external and internal independence within a country. The 
second formal measure of independence was created by Tate and Keith (2006). The 
authors use judicial independence as an independent variable related to the protection of 
human rights in various countries. Tate and Keith also coded national constitutions to 
devise an index of judicial independence, looking specifically at nine constitutional 
provisions: Guaranteed terms for judges, finality of decisions, exclusive authority, a ban 
against exceptional or military courts, fiscal autonomy of the judiciary, a proclamation of 
the principle of separation of powers, enumerated qualifications for Supreme Court 
judges, judicial review and a hierarchical system within the judiciary.  
 The two de facto measures I present on Chapter II are also existing indexes of 
judicial independence. The first one is based on the US State Department country reports 
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for the protection of human rights. These reports have a short section that deals 
specifically with the judiciary and in it its authors make a short assessment about the 
independence of the judicial system in each country. Replicating what other scholars 
have done before, (Howard and Carey 2004, Yamanashi 2002) I devised a coding scheme 
which assigned each country a value on a scale from 1 to 3, where one indicates low 
judicial independence and three indicates high independence. The final practical measure 
presented in the next chapter is a subjective evaluation of the independence of the 
judiciary in Latin America, made by the people living and working in those countries. 
The World Economic Forum conducts a survey of executives every year, which asks 
them to rank the independence of the judiciary in the countries where they work on a 
scale from 1 to 7, where seven means completely independent and 1 means heavily 
influenced.  
 The third and final section of Chapter II adds a qualitative component to the 
dissertation by focusing on the case of one particular country. The tension between 
qualitative and quantitative works as well as the benefits of multi method approaches and 
triangulation  in the social sciences has been well documented by the existing literature 
(Brady 2004, Goemans 2007, King, et al. 1994, King, et al. 2004). Case studies, like any 
other form of research in the social sciences, have to be used in accordance with the 
researcher’s goals. If a study is aimed at generating a theory instead of testing it, 
prioritizing external rather than internal validity, or is seeking insight into causal 
mechanisms and effects, a case study is a valuable tool to achieve that goal (George and 
Bennett 2004, Gerring 2004). In the case of this dissertation, a more intensive study of a 
single unit [in this case a country] could serve all three functions. This case study will 
  6
advance my understanding of judicial independence, add an element of external validity 
to my research and provide me additional insight into causal mechanisms that lie beneath 
the empirical results. In the social sciences, the cases one chooses can affect the answers 
one gets, therefore the case selection has to be carefully done (Geddes 1990, Hempel 
1965). In this case, I chose Ecuador. I based my selection on a couple of factors. The first 
one is that as a citizen of the country and a former law student, I have a better 
understanding of the legal system as well as easier access to judicial experts and decision 
makers than if I chose to do my fieldwork elsewhere. Ecuador is a country were 
democratic procedures were established before the creation of an autonomous judiciary. 
This has rendered the country’s judicial institutions powerless against strong and even 
weak executives.  
Looking at the formal provisions of judicial independence specified in both de 
iure measures one finds that Ecuador lacks the majority of them, making it a country with 
very low levels of judicial independence according to these indexes. However, there are, 
as I stated above, cases of countries where judicial independence flourishes even without 
the existence of constitutional provisions. Such is the case of Uruguay, a country with 
very low scores on the formal measures of independence that scores very high on the 
practical indexes, and a place where the Supreme Court is generally regarded as 
independent and incorruptible.1 On the other hand, low formal protections for judicial 
independence in Ecuador translate into a heavily influenced judiciary in practice. My 
intention is to go beyond the measures of independence and try to understand the causes 
                                                            
1 Quote obtained from field research conducted by Neal Tate and Fernanda Boidi in Uruguay, during 
August of 2008. 
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for the lack of judicial independence in Ecuador that weren’t captured by the measures I 
presented before, as well as its consequences. To that effect I traveled to Ecuador on 
October of 2007 and met with several judicial experts, including Supreme Court Justices, 
lower court judges, lawyers, legislators and elected members to the National 
Constitutional assembly that was set to begin on January of 2008.  
 As I mentioned before, two rather large and complex questions have been the 
driving force behind my doctoral research in the last couple of years. The first one had to 
do with what judicial independence means. The following chapter attempts to provide an 
answer to that question. However, one more question remains; what is judicial 
independence good for anyway? I am not the first to ask that question, neither am I the 
first to come up with an answer. Other scholars before me have looked at the usefulness 
of having independent judiciaries in consolidating democracies (Beer 2006, Dodson and 
Jackson 2001, Magaloni and Sanchez 2006). Nevertheless, Chapters III and IV provide a 
novel answer to that question. The first one shows the effect that judicial independence, 
at a country level, has on corruption victimization, measured as the paying of bribes by 
individuals in public and private instances, such as a government office or a private 
hospital.   
Corruption in Latin America has been measured on several ways. The most 
common corruption measure in the region is the Corruption Perception Index [CPI] 
developed by Transparency International. The CPI, which is the most widely used 
measure of corruption, is a composite index that measures the perception of corruption in 
a country derived from several different surveys administered to business men in that 
country. Based upon the results of the surveys, the CPI assigns each country a value on a 
  8
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 stands for the highest corruption score and 10 is the lowest. 
As an effort to complement the Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International 
also created the Global Corruption Barometer. This measure of corruption deals with 
actual citizen experiences with bribery. However, the surveys are only applied to 
approximately half the countries in the region and the different sampling strategies used 
in each country result on a somewhat unreliable regional corruption score. The measure 
of corruption used for the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter III is based on the 
corruption victimization series from the Americas Barometer. This battery of questions 
looks at personal experiences with corruption in several public and private instances, 
which include having to pay off a police officer or somebody from their own work. 
Unlike the Global Corruption Barometer, the 2006 corruption victimization index stems 
from nationally representative surveys conducted in 20 countries in the region. 
Finally, using the corruption victimization index and other individual level data 
from the Americas Barometer and the four measurements of judicial independence, 
described in Chapter II, I look at the effects of independence on corruption victimization. 
I explore this relationship in the context of Latin American countries for 2006 and find 
evidence that suggests a positive incidence of judicial independence on the reduction of 
corruption victimization, especially when independence is measured de facto. 
Chapter IV once again uses the four different measures of judicial independence 
to assess its effect on individual attitudes toward the institution of the rule of law in Latin 
America. I define the rule of law based on the institutions responsible for safeguarding its 
standards and on the principles that rule its values. I claim that there are several requisites 
for the rule of law to exist within a country, such as law against private coercion, a 
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congruence of the law with social values, a government that operates under the law and 
an application of the law that gives its citizens certainty and equality.  
Based on that definition, I once again resort to the data on the 2006 round of the 
Americas Barometer to operationalize the dependent variable, which I call “support for 
the institutions of the rule of law”. The variable is an index built upon five questions that 
measure the legitimacy of certain government institutions like the office of the Public 
Prosecutor, the National Police and the Supreme Court, as well as citizen beliefs in the 
justice system and its ability to provide a fair trial. 
The statistical analysis conducted controlling for socio-demographic variables 
such as age, education, sex and size of town produced evidence which suggests that 
judicial independence, when measured by practical indexes, has a positive effect on 
individual feelings of trust for the institutions of the rule of law. A second set of 
regressions that controlled for theoretical variables like presidential approval, evaluation 
of the government’s economic performance, crime and corruption victimization and 
preference for a democratic regime partially confirmed those results, since only one of 
the two practical measures of independence had a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with individual support for the institutions of the rule of law. Meanwhile, the 
formal measures of independence turned out to be insignificant. 
This dissertation hopes to contribute to existing literature on judicial 
independence. Hopefully, the discussion on the various ways of defining independence 
combined with the information provided by the judicial experts I interviewed during my 
field work will advance the discussion on what judicial independence means and move it 
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forward to achieve a general and comprehensive definition. This dissertation also aims to 
broaden the understanding of judicial independence and the scope of its importance. The 
evidence obtained in the following chapters suggests that independence is not a static 
concept but a dynamic one, affected by the actions of other political players and by the 
strength and resolve of its own members. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENTS 
 
Judicial independence is a highly contested concept (2006).  The question of what 
judicial independence means is one that has led scholars to more queries than certainties.  
The problem is that the term is open to almost endless interpretations.  Does it refer to the 
judiciary in general, or only to the Supreme Court, or to the judges themselves, or to all 
of them?  While most scholars and legal commentators portray judicial independence as a 
normative ideal, there are heated debates about its practical and even empirical usefulness 
(Burbank and Friedman 2002, Kornhauser 2002).  This chapter will deal with the many 
components, prescriptions, definitions and measurements of judicial independence. I will 
start by looking at the nature of judicial independence itself, later I will review what 
many argue are the necessary conditions for independence and the definitions that derive 
from those conditions.  Finally I will take a look at the different ways in which judicial 
independence has been measured over the years and analyze a few of those 
measurements in depth. 
After comparing the results of four separate measurements of judicial 
independence in Latin America, I will examine the validity and reliability of these 
indicators by examining how they match up against reality. To that end, I have conducted 
a case study of the country of Ecuador.  I have chosen this particular country for two 
main reasons.  First, its recent history; in the last decade Ecuador has experienced some 
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extreme political turmoil that its judicial system has not been able to escape untouched.  
Second, as a citizen of Ecuador, I had access to interview Supreme Court judges, 
legislators and legal experts who provided invaluable insight into the realities of the 
Ecuadorean judicial system and its struggles with independence.2 
 
What Does Judicial Independence Mean? 
  
While there is no consensus when it comes to formulating a definition of judicial 
independence or an operationalization of the concept, there is a consensus on a few 
requirements of which the ever growing literature on the subject should abide. First, a 
theory of judicial independence must have analytical clarity about the kind of 
phenomenon being referred to when we talk about it (Russell 2001).3   Is judicial 
independence just about the relationship between the judiciary and the executive? Does it 
involve other political institutions? Is it about the way judges relate to one another and 
the public in general? Or is it all these things? Absolute clarity is necessary if we are to 
understand what is being discussed when we talk about judicial independence.  
 A second requirement is to have a clear idea of the purpose of judicial 
independence, which leads me to this important statement:  Judicial independence is not 
                                                            
2 Interviews conducted by author  in Quito and Guayaquil during November of 2007. IRB Certification 
number 071095 
3 Russell makes this statement in advocacy for a general theory of judicial independence. While I do not 
agree with the necessity of a general theory of independence, I do believe that every definition of the 
concept, as different as they may be, should aim for analytical clarity and a lucid description of the 
phenomenon they seek to explain. 
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an end in itself, but a means to an end (Brashear 2006, Burbank and Friedman 2002, 
Rubin 2002, Yamanashi 2002).  It makes no difference whether one looks at 
independence as a vehicle to achieve better human rights protection (Cross 1999, Tate, et 
al. 2006), economic growth (Feld and Voight 2003, Henisz 2000) or even 
democratization (Howard and Carey 2004). If statements about judicial independence are 
to be evaluated and judged, theories on the subject must deal with the reason why 
independence is considered to be a valuable feature of a political regime.   
 The third major task for definitions of judicial independence is to identify the 
components, elements, and factors that influence independence.  If we are to understand 
judicial independence as a relational concept, then it is vital to establish and enumerate 
what these relationships are and what are the factors that influence them.  I do not believe 
in a single general theory of judicial independence.  There are too many relationships to 
unpack, too many dimensions and too many differences among judiciaries around the 
world to come up with one single general theory that can encompass it all.  This 
dissertation is not about creating a single global theory of independence; it is about taking 
a careful look at previous and current definitions and measurements of judicial 
independence and evaluating the effect that independence has in the real world, by 
influencing people’s attitudes and experiences. 
Theodore Becker (1987:144) defined judicial independence as “the degree to 
which judges believe they can decide and do decide consistent with their own personal 
attitudes, values and conceptions of the judicial role, in opposition to what others who 
have or are believed to have political and judicial power think about or desire in like 
matters”. At first glance one might think that this definition sums up judicial 
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independence quite well. The truth is that while Becker’s definition does contain several 
of its core components, it only begins to scratch the surface.  Christopher Larkins argues 
that an important element to be considered when attempting to define judicial 
independence is the scope of the judiciary’s authority as an institution, in other words, its 
relationship to other parts of the political system and society and its legitimacy as an 
entity entitled to determine what is legal and what is not. 
 Judicial independence has been deemed “extraordinarily difficult to ascertain or 
measure” (Rossen 1987:8).  This qualification, however, has not stopped scholars from 
attempting any of those tasks. Formulating a definition of independence is not an easy 
task, which is why scholars have unpacked various traits of this concept. At its most basic 
level, judicial independence is related to the notion of the resolution of conflicts by a 
third and neutral party (Larkins 1996, Shapiro 1981); this means that impartiality is a 
core component of judicial independence. Judges must be independent from the litigants 
who appear before them in court. Impartiality demands that judges base their decisions on 
law and facts rather than on their preference toward one of the litigants. Although this is a 
quality that is not easy to identify, it can be thought of as related to the judges’ attitudes 
and beliefs toward others. The violation of impartiality as the result of a bribe or a claim 
of kinship would compromise  the second trait of independence, which Owen Fiss (1993) 
called “party detachment”. This attribute requires the judges to be autonomous from the 
parties involved in the litigation process.  If we assume that independence is partly rooted 
on impartiality, then the more detached a judge is from the parties, the better. 
A third concept identified by Owen Fiss is that of collegial relationships, or the 
power of one of more judges over another.  Fiss calls this “Individual Autonomy”. This 
  15
principle cannot be violated by the power of an appellate court to review the decisions of 
a trial judge, or by one judge deferring to the precedents established by other judges.  
Instead, the individual autonomy of a judge can be violated by  
“the exercise of power by one or more judges over another judge to mandate a 
decision that, in the estimation of the subordinate judge, is not required by precedent or 
by a reasonable interpretation of substantive or procedural laws.” (Jackson 1999:9) 
 
  A fourth component of judicial independence; and one that Fiss considers “the 
most difficult to understand” is what he calls “political insularity”. This refers to the 
judiciary as part of the state as a whole and the autonomy that the judicial power must 
have with respect to other government entities. Political insularity requires that the 
judiciary be independent of political institutions and the public in general, or as Larkins 
explains: “…the notion that the judges should not be used as tools to further political 
aims and that they should not be punished for preventing their realization.” (1996:609). 
While the courts, as governmental institutions, are supposed to be free of influence or 
control, some kinds of influences may be quite appropriate.  In the case of the United 
States, for example, nobody denies the propriety of the briefs and arguments presented by 
the Solicitor General of the United States (the government’s advocate before the Supreme 
Court), which certainly have an influence on the members of the Supreme Court. Political 
insularity, thus, means that judges should be free only of improper or illegitimate sources 
of influences. 
 The requirement of political insularity overlaps with the aforementioned requisite 
of party detachment whenever one of the litigants before the court is one of the other 
branches of the State. If the government as a whole, or a governmental institution or 
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official, receives favored treatment in court, both party detachment and political 
insularity are violated. However, Fiss claims, political insularity is a requirement that 
must be present even when a case is only between private parties so it should be seen as a 
separate component of independence. A high degree of judicial independence, then, can 
be achieved by judges who are neutral and detached from parties before them, who have 
sufficient individual autonomy to make their own decisions based on the law and facts of 
the case, and who are insulated from any form of illegitimate influence or control from a 
third party, be it governmental or particular. It is not a judge’s obligation to choose the 
best public policy or the most popular course of action, but to be fair and act according to 
what is mandated by the law. 
 
Separate Dimensions of Judicial Independence 
 
Autonomy 
 
To better understand judicial independence, it is not enough just to look at the 
nature of the term.  In order to provide a coherent definition of judicial independence, one 
must look at the different elements that should be present in an independent judiciary.  It 
is clear that the term judicial independence does not only apply to the judiciary itself, but 
also to the judges that serve in it. The first differentiation, then, must be done between the 
independence of the judiciary as a body and the independence of individual judges 
(Prillaman 2000). The independence of the judiciary as an institution from the executive 
and the legislative has also been termed autonomy (Rios-Figueroa 2006).  An 
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autonomous judiciary is one with enough power to make, uphold and execute their own 
decisions without external interference from the other branches of government.  This 
does not mean that the judicial power is free to do what it wants without regard for the 
public or fear of consequences. In a democratic setting, there should always be a system 
of checks and balances that holds the judiciary and its members accountable for their 
decisions.  It is here where the concept of accountability, which will be discussed a bit 
later, comes into the picture.   
External Independence 
 
When it comes to the independence of individual judges, the categorization is a 
bit more complex.  Rios-Figueroa calls external independence to the relationship between 
Supreme Court judges and the other branches of government. External independence 
covers the rules for establishing judges’ salaries, terms of appointment, methods for 
removal and punishment, etc. Simon Shetreet (1985) takes this classification a step 
further.  He claims that there are at least two essential elements to the independence of 
individual judges.  The first is what he calls substantive independence; this means that in 
the making of judicial decisions and in the exercise of other official duties, individual 
judges are subject to no other authority than the law.  Substantive independence is to 
individual judges what autonomy is for the judiciary in general. Still, it must be noted 
that substantive independence does not grant individual judges unlimited rights and 
protections. Like I mentioned above, judicial independence is meant to protect the judges 
only against illegitimate or inappropriate influence.  In a democratic setting, with a 
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system of checks and balances, the judges must be accountable when acting outside their 
realm of authority. 
 The second element is personal independence; which means that the judicial 
terms of office and tenure must be adequately secured.  Personal independence is secure 
by clear terms of judicial appointment and by the safeguarding of judicial salary.  To 
ensure personal independence, executive controls over appointment, tenure, salary and 
sanctions must be prevented.  Ideally, it should be the job of the judiciary to handle all of 
this, but if this is not possible, there has to be at least one institution that is not 
exclusively under executive control to take care of these issues. Judicial appointment is 
one of the key factors for personal independence. If the executive is exclusively in charge 
of appointing Supreme Court Justices, even the appearance of independence will be lost.  
In the United States, for example, Supreme Court Justices are nominated by the 
President, but subject to approval by the Senate.  The obvious question that comes to 
mind is, if the party of the President has a majority in the Senate, is there not a major 
violation to the principles of judicial independence?  The answer to this question brings 
me to the second major element in personal independence; tenure. The term of service of 
a Supreme Court judge must be longer than the one of those who appointed him in order 
to safeguard independence.  Supreme Court Justices in the United States are appointed 
for life.  After a few years, however, the President who nominated a confirmed Justice is 
gone and the balance of power in the Senate may have shifted. This effectively eliminates 
some of the threats for direct interference and maintaining a relatively high level of 
judicial independence. Finally, the issue of salaries is an important determinant for 
personal independence.  There are two distinct factors that matter here. First, that the 
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judges have a salary in accordance with the relevance of their position. Second is that the 
remuneration they receive must be secured and not subject to sudden changes by entities 
outside of the judicial branch. 
Internal Independence 
 
There is one other element of judicial independence, however, that has not 
attracted much attention.  While the majority of scholars focus their studies of judicial 
independence in the relationship between the high courts, their members, and the 
executive and legislative bodies, few remember to look the interactions between lower 
court judges and their superiors.  In an independent judiciary, it is key that lower court 
judges be independent from directives or pressures from their fellow judges regarding 
their adjudicative functions. This final element is known as internal independence. 
Judicial adjudication has three main components, administrative, procedural and 
substantive.  The first means that judges have an administrative responsibility for 
managing their case load, setting dates for hearings and expediting resolutions.  Judges 
also have procedural functions that allow them to conduct the resolution of trials 
according to the rules of evidence and procedure.  Finally, judges have to resolve the 
case, which involves the determination of the findings and the application of the 
appropriate legal norms dictated by the facts and the evidence.  Internal independence 
exists when lower court judges are able to exercise these functions without fear of 
interference or influence from colleagues in higher courts.  Finally, it is important to 
remember that the requisites for the independence of Supreme Court judges, such as 
protection of tenure and salary, also apply to their lower courts counterparts. 
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Judicial Independence vs. Accountability 
 
One of the most controversial features of judicial independence is the delicate 
balance between independence and accountability.  The tradeoff between independence 
and accountability has been the subject of heated discussions between legal scholars as 
well as political scientists. No institution can operate without being answerable to 
society; this means that the judiciary must be accountable.  Judicial independence cannot 
be maintained without judicial accountability (Cappelletti 1985, Fiss 1993).  While there 
is no direct connection between the common citizen and the judiciary, given that judges 
are not elected but appointed, there are several legal mechanisms to enforce judicial 
responsibility. 
According to Toharia (1999), an exaggerated emphasis on judicial independence 
has been distorted to a point where it is no longer conceived that the judicial power needs 
to be controlled and where it is not compatible to have a simultaneoulsy independent but 
responsible judiciary. However, the notion that independence and accountability are two 
analytically discrete concepts is wrong. In fact, when appropriately conceived and 
executed, accountability poses little or no threat to judicial independence (Griffen 1998, 
Lubet 1998). Stephen Burbank (1999) claims that independence and accountability are 
not opposites, but two sides of the same coin. If independence is conceived as the 
possibility of a judge to rule according to the norms of the state without influence from a 
third party and accountability is the obligation of this judge to adhere to his functions, 
with the possibility of a penalty for failing to do so, there should be no room for 
incompatibility.  As Hammergren claims, 
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“The two developments are not contradictory; at least in the current environment, more 
independence seems to require more accountability, and accountability in some instances 
can be seen as enhancing independence (Hammergren 2001:155) 
  
Accountability as a concept can be defined by two attributes (Schedler 1999). 
First, answerability, or the obligation of public officials to inform the public about their 
activities and decisions and to provide explanations that justify those decisions in a 
responsible manner. The second attribute is enforcement, which consists of the possibility 
of sanctions for those who ignore the law or choose not to abide by it. According to 
Ramos Rollon (Ramos Rollon, et al. 2003), accountability is a concept that is democratic 
in its origin. Democracy demands that the exercise of power by the state be mandated by 
the people and can be traced back to it. This means that there is no title or position in 
which the exercise of power can be released from the demand of democratic legitimacy.      
 In a democratic setting, accountability has to exist in two dimensions.  Vertical 
accountability is the obligation that democratic institutions have to answer to the people 
that elected them (Kenney 2003, O'Donnell 1999, O'Donnell 2003).  This dimension of 
accountability exists in almost every democracy with free and fair elections, where 
citizens can decide to keep or replace a public servant according to his performance in 
office.  Horizontal accountability, however, is much harder to obtain.  According to 
Guillermo O’Donnell,  
“Horizontal accountability is the existence of state agencies that are legally 
enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able to take actions that span from 
routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relations to actions or 
omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful.” 
(1999:38) 
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 This definition is vital in the context of judicial independence, because in Latin 
America there is no vertical accountability between the judiciary and the electorate, given 
that there is no instance in which judges are elected by popular vote.  So, how does the 
state achieve horizontal accountability?  For this kind of accountability to be effective 
there must be agencies that are authorized and willing to oversee, control and even 
sanction illegal actions of other state agencies. Things however are not that simple. For 
horizontal accountability to exist there are at least two necessary conditions. First, these 
agencies of control and oversight must be autonomous enough to act swiftly and without 
interference.  Second, there has to be a well endowed judiciary, with a budget that is 
independent from the executive and legislative and highly autonomous in its decisions so 
that it can enforce the rulings of these oversight agencies.  If the judiciary becomes an 
enforcing agent of horizontal accountability, and provided the great deal of autonomy 
required, who does it answer to?   
 A great example of the tension between independence and accountability is 
provided by Kommers (2001), who describes the Deckert trial of 1994 in Germany. 
Gunter Deckert was an anti-Semite who publicly vilified Germany’s Jews for their claim 
about the Holocaust. A criminal court found Deckert guilty of fomenting racial hatred, 
but let him off with a light sentence, because, in the court’s view he had been an 
upstanding citizen and a good family man. The judge who wrote the opinion, Rainer 
Orlet, had been impressed by Deckert’s political activity and the fact that he sincerely, 
although wrongly, believed in his anti-Jewish campaign, which was prompted by the 
defendant’s understandable –according to the judge- irritation with continued Jewish 
demands for compensation fifty years after World War II. 
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 The decision frustrated the public and the media, who begun a relentless 
campaign to discredit judge Orlet. There was also dissention among the judiciary, which 
opposed Deckert and deplored his actions. Also outraged, the Parliament passed the 
“Auschwitz Lie”, a statue that explicitly bans the denial of the Holocaust. The media 
agreed that the new statue was a justifiable rebuke to the judiciary for its lack of 
democratic accountability. However, the principle had been severely violated, according 
to the view of some observers. Representatives in the Parliament of Baden-Wurtenberg 
threatened to impeach Judge Orlet if the judiciary didn’t internally discipline him, even 
though his behavior could not be regarded as impeachable offense under the state’s 
constitution. In the prevailing view of these observers, judicial independence would have 
been flagrantly violated if an otherwise able judge could be dismissed for imprudent 
remarks in the course of an otherwise competent judicial work product, especially in 
response to outside political pressure. 
In the end, over the objection of two of Judge Orlet’s colleagues, the full court 
issued an apologetic press released disassociating itself from any far right or anti-Jewish 
views that might have been conveyed by the judicial opinion. Nevertheless, the court also 
deplored all attacks on the principle of judicial independence. In the end, however, Orlet 
was reassigned to another panel of the trial court and would later take an early retirement. 
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Measurements of Judicial Independence 
   
Measurements of judicial independence  are as diverse as the attempts to define it. 
Scholars have designed several measures of JI to serve a wide variety of purposes. Some 
have used independence as a component of a larger dependent variable, such as judicial 
review or the power that policy makers give to the judiciary (Clark 1975, Ishiyama and 
Ishiyama 2000). Others have used judicial independence as an independent variable in an 
attempt to find its effects on human rights protection, economic growth or even 
democratization (Cross 1999, Feld and Voight 2003, Howard and Carey 2004). If one 
wants to categorize existing measures of judicial independence, however, the best way to 
do it would be to divide among those which measure judicial independence de iure and 
those which measure it de facto. The former look at formal provisions established in the 
Constitutions and laws of every country. The latter, on the other hand, focus on the reality 
of these countries and the practical application of independence in the judiciary. In the 
next paragraphs I will illustrate this distinction by providing a brief review of some of the 
previous efforts to measure judicial independence. 
As mentioned above, one way of measuring judicial independence is to look at the 
formal provisions established in the Constitutions and laws of the countries one wants to 
study. These measures are known as de iure indicators. One of the first formal 
measurements of judicial independence was formulated by David S. Clark (1975).  Clark 
was interested in judicial review in Latin American countries and he devised several 
possible indicators to measure it.  One of these included what he called structural 
determinants of effective judicial review. Among these determinants were judicial 
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independence, restrictions in making constitutional complaints against the government 
and the effects of constitutional ruling. To measure judicial independence, Clark analyzed 
the Constitutions of Latin American countries and coded them according to three criteria. 
First, the appointment of the Supreme Court Justices. Second, the tenure of these Justices 
and, third, the salary or the aforementioned judges.  According to Clark, a more 
independent judiciary would appoint its own Supreme Court Justices, who would have 
lifetime tenure and would earn an equal or greater amount than an executive minister. 
Clark would then go on to claim that independent judicial review had a positive and 
significant relationship with economic growth.   
A measure of judicial power created in order to analyze court designing in post-
communist politics helps to illustrate another formal indicator of judicial independence. 
John and Shannon Ishiyama (2000) looked at the power that policy makers choose to give 
to the judiciary.  They claim that the power of a judiciary can be measured by adding up 
two components: the extent to which the constitutional courts posses judicial review 
powers and the extent to which the constitution extends independence of action to the 
constitutional or Supreme Court from other institutional actors. To develop an indicator, 
the authors ask six questions and then code the answers as variables that are then added 
up to obtain a number for judicial power.  These questions look at: 1) The possibility that 
the decisions taken by the judicial body for determining constitutionality are overturned. 
2) The provisions for judicial review, is it a priori or incidental. 3) Tenure of Supreme 
Court Justices. 4) Number of actors involved in the nomination and confirmation process 
of constitutional and Supreme Court judges. 5) Who has the control of judicial procedure; 
and 6) the degree of difficulty in removing judges from office.    
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Formal measures of judicial independence have often been criticized for not 
matching reality and for failing to capture the real mechanisms that determine judicial 
independence (Larkins 1996, Verner 1984). In an effort to better capture the essence of 
independence, scholars have devised many measures of judicial independence de facto. 
One of these efforts was carried out by Gonzales Casanova (1970), who looked at nearly 
4,000 decisions by the Mexican Supreme Court between 1917 and 1960 and discovered 
that in cases involving the executive, the Supreme Court ruled against the executive less 
than 40% of the time. This led him to the conclusion that the Mexican Judiciary was 
relatively independent. While this was a valuable effort, authors like Rossen or Larkins 
have pointed out that the percentage of rulings against the government is not that 
important if one does not know the political relevance of those cases. 
Other attempts to come up with an adequate measure of judicial independence 
have relied mainly on scholarly and technical reviews of the matter over the past few 
decades. Joel Verner (1984), for example, constructed a typology of independence based 
mostly on theoretical and single country studies. Verner argued that courts can be 
classified in six different categories.  The first category is independent-activist courts. 
These are courts which have consistently and successfully resisted encroachments upon 
its independent authority and have been able to say no to other governmental agencies 
and “make it stick”.  The second category includes attenuated-activist courts.  Countries 
were considered to be in this category if their courts have had a long tradition of 
independent and vigorous activism that was severely attenuated by military coups that 
took place in the 70s.  Then came what he called stable-reactive judiciaries.  These are 
courts that have not experienced direct assaults on their integrity and have a semi 
  27
independent status. They are reactive and not activist because they mostly set general 
limits to the other branches of government but do not attempt to change public policy. 
The fourth type is reactive-compliant courts.  These exhibit uneven and disjointed 
histories mirroring the political environments in which they are located and tend to 
become compliant especially during time of instability or military leadership.  The last 
two categories include minimalist and personalist courts.  The former are characterized 
for their lack of popular support and the minimal policy functions they perform vis-a-vis 
other governmental agencies.  The latter, on the other hand, are completely dependent 
and usually serve a strong unitary government. 
Like the majority of de facto measurements of judicial independence, Verner’s 
typology is based on a subjective interpretation of observable evidence.  Other scholars 
have also relied on subjective evaluations to construct indexes of judicial independence. 
Witold Henisz (2000) for example, constructed a dichotomous measure of judicial 
independence based on data from the ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) and the 
Polity dataset.  Henisz was looking to uncover the institutional settings that would 
facilitate economic growth and believed an independent judiciary was one of them.  In 
order to construct a measure of judicial independence that would cover his wide sample 
size, he decided to use one of the components for the political risk indicator in the ICRG.  
Henisz then selected the cases that had a high score in the rule of law variable of the 
political risk component.  Since the rule of law can be kept in place by way of democratic 
actions but also by way of threats and repression of an authoritarian government, Henisz 
then turned to the Polity dataset.  He selected those cases in which the database indicated 
at least “slight to moderate limitations to executive authority.”  Based on this coding 
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scheme, countries with high scores in the rule of law variable in the ICRG data and some 
limitations to the executive were determined to have independent judiciaries.  While this 
is a creative and coherent way to operationalize judicial independence, lots of variation 
within the sample is lost by considering independence to be a dichotomous variable. 
A more widely de facto measure of independence stems from the US State 
Department Human Rights Reports. These reports rely not only on constitutional 
provisions but also on assessments of the independence of the judiciary in practice.  As 
evidence of independence, the authors usually rely on freedom from pressure from other 
branches of government, particularly executive control, and freedom from acts of bribery 
and corruption.  These reports have been subjectively coded by different authors to 
construct indexes of judicial independence (Howard and Carey 2004, Stephenson 2003). 
The ratings given by these reports are based on a number of sources that include Amnesty 
International reports, United Nations reports, the World Human Rights Guide (Humana 
1992), and major periodicals like the New York Times and The Economist.   
Finally, another way to measure de facto judicial independence has been survey 
research. Staats et al. (2005) conducted a survey of Latin American legal scholars and 
practitioners in seventeen countries in order to ascertain the efficiency with which 
judiciaries in these countries worked.  Feld and Voight (2003) conducted a survey of 
experts in over seventy countries worldwide in order to obtain a measurement for judicial 
independence de iure and de facto, using two separate questionnaires to capture each 
scope of judicial independence. A similar undertaking was carried out by Kenneth 
Johnson (1976), who in another survey of experts in Latin American politics designed to 
assess the state of democracy in that continent, asked about judicial independence as one 
  29
of the measurements of political and democratic consolidation.   Keith Rossen stated that 
“perhaps the only people who comprehend the degree to which they really are actually 
independent are the judges themselves” (1987:9). A survey study of trial courts in Bolivia 
(Perez-Linan, et al. 2006) attempted to tap precisely that resource. Their work presented 
evidence of when and under what circumstances inferior courts judges defer to other 
judges from higher courts in order to further their career goals.  This study found that 
lower court judges in Bolivia issue their sentences depending on the underlying political 
environment, fearing reversal of their sentences by higher ranked judges and 
manipulation of their judicial careers. This same phenomenon, called “strategic 
defection” was also uncovered in a study of the Argentinean Supreme Court (Helmke 
2005, Helmke 2002).   
After reviewing various ways in which judicial independence has been measured 
during the years, in the next section I will replicate four separate measures of judicial 
independence that have been used for Latin American countries.  These measures were 
not mentioned in the previous discussion, but they will be described in detail in the 
following pages.  I chose them because of the accessibility of the data and the variation 
among them. Two of the measures are formal indicators or de iure and the remaining two 
are practical, or de facto. The indicators measure judicial independence in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries for the year 2006.   
 
 
 
  30
Judicial Independence in Latin America 
 
Formal or De Iure Measures of Independence 
 
Rios-Figueroa 
 
 The first measurement to be replicated in this section was conducted by Julio Rios 
Figueroa (2006).  He argues that there is more than one type of independence. The first 
one he addresses is autonomy, or the relationship between the judiciary as an institution 
and the other branches of government.  An autonomous judiciary would then be one in 
which the constitution did four things: a) Specify that the number and jurisdiction of the 
courts is to be decided by the judiciary itself, b) establish the number of Supreme Court 
Justices, c) provide a fixed percentage of the GDP for the judiciary; and d) establish that 
effective judicial review lies within the judiciary. When a given country’s constitution 
contains all of these provisions it scores a 4 and its judiciary is considered autonomous.  
Conversely, countries without any of these provisions have a score of zero, which means 
that their judiciaries are heteronomous. 
 The second dimension of judicial independence studied by Rios-Figueroa is what 
he calls external independence, or the relationship between the judges themselves and the 
other branches of government.  According to his criteria, complete external independence 
is achieved when the Constitution of a country specifies that a) Supreme Court judges are 
appointed by the judiciary or by at least two organs of government, b) their tenure is 
longer of that of their appointing authorities, c) they can only be impeached by the 
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judiciary or a supermajority of congress and d) that their salary will not be reduced while 
in office. Again, he created a scale going from zero to four to establish a measurement for 
external independence. 
Finally, the third dimension of independence measured by the author is internal 
independence, which looks at the relationship between lower court judges and their 
higher court counterparts.  To measure internal independence, Rios-Figueroa repeats the 
utilization of variables such as tenure, salary and appointment, but also adds promotions, 
transfers and sanctions.  In a scale going from zero to six, countries would then obtain a 
higher score for internal independence if their Constitutions prevent hierarchical 
authorities from participating in appointment processes, tenure or salary setting, 
promoting or sanctioning lower court judges and transferring them without their consent.4  
Table II-1 summarizes the results of the coding for autonomy, external 
independence and internal independence. The table indicates that countries like Costa 
Rica, Guatemala and Honduras are the closest to having a completely autonomous 
judiciary, with three of the four provisions in their current constitutions. At the other end 
are countries like Ecuador, Peru and Colombia, whose constitutions lack every provision 
of autonomy specified by Rios-Figueroa. It is important to note that, according to the 
data, no country has a completely autonomous judiciary, since the six countries that had a 
score of three were lacking at least one provision. When it comes to external judicial 
                                                            
4  Rios-Figueroa also looks at the institutional location of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, claiming that 
countries where the Public Prosecutor lays within the executive branch have less independent judiciaries 
than countries where this office is part of the judicial branch or altogether autonomous. However, he does 
consider this variable when creating his models of institutional independence, and so I have also excluded it 
from this analysis. 
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independence, only one country’s constitution –Brazil- explicitly establishes the four 
protections prescribed by the author. It stands out that Brazil had been at the bottom of 
the list when it came to having an autonomous judiciary, now shows up as the country 
with the best constitutional provisions for external independence.   Finally, the table 
illustrates the levels of internal independence, or the autonomy of lower court judges 
from his hierarchically superior colleagues. According to Rios-Figueroa, Bolivia is the 
country with the most constitutional provisions to guarantee internal independence. At 
the other stand almost half the countries in the sample, which do not provide any 
guarantees for internal independence. 
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Table II-1. Latin American countries ranked by score on each component of judicial 
independence.5 
Autonomy (0-4) External independence  
(0-4) 
Internal Independence 
(0-6) 
Costa Rica (3) Brazil (4) Bolivia (4) 
Guatemala(3) Mexico (3) Colombia (3) 
Honduras (3) Panama (3) Brazil (2) 
Mexico (3)  Chile (2) Guatemala (2) 
Nicaragua (3) Colombia (2) Peru (2) 
Paraguay (3) Costa Rica (2) Mexico (1) 
El Salvador (2) Ecuador (2) Paraguay (1) 
Panama (2) El Salvador (2) Uruguay (1) 
Venezuela (2) Guatemala (2) Chile (0) 
Bolivia (1) Paraguay (2) Costa Rica (0) 
Chile (1) Venezuela (2) Dominican Republic (0) 
Uruguay (1) Bolivia (1) Ecuador (0) 
Brazil (0) Dominican Republic (1) El Salvador (0) 
Colombia (0) Honduras (1) Honduras (0) 
Dominican Republic (0) Nicaragua (1) Nicaragua (0) 
Ecuador (0) Peru (1) Panama (0) 
Peru (0) Uruguay (1) Venezuela (0) 
Guyana (NA) Guyana (NA) Guyana (NA) 
Haiti (NA) Haiti (NA) Haiti (NA) 
Jamaica (NA) Jamaica (NA) Jamaica (NA) 
                                                            
5 This table is similar to the one reported by Julio Rios-Figueroa in his dissertation, page 67. Also, the table 
does not reflect the most recent constitutions for Ecuador and Bolivia, but included the ones that 
correspond to the time period of the analysis ahead. 
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While Table II-1 shows the countries ranking on the individual categories of 
independence, Figure II-1 illustrates how these Latin American countries are ranked after 
aggregating all of the individual components and calculating an individual measurement 
of judicial independence for each country.  The graph shows that on a scale from zero to 
fourteen, no constitution in Latin America has gone beyond specifically prescribing more 
than seven provisions to safeguard judicial independence in the three different 
dimensions. However, every country has at least one provision out of the fourteen 
described above. According to this measurement, Mexico, Guatemala and Brazil have the 
region’s most independent judiciaries, while the Dominican Republic has the least 
independent judicial system in Latin America and the Caribbean, closely followed by 
Ecuador, Chile and Uruguay. 
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Figure II-1. Judicial Independence de iure in Latin America. 
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Keith, Tate and Poe 
 
 A second institutional measurement of judicial independence stems from Keith, 
Tate and Poe’s work on human rights protection (2006).  In an institutional analysis of 
human rights protections, they created and analyzed 22 formal indicators of the existence 
of constitutional provisions relevant to the promotion and protection of fundamental 
human rights for a worldwide set of countries.  These indicators are divided into personal 
rights and liberties, limits on the declaration and exercise of the state of emergency rule 
and elements of judicial independence.  The authors constructed their index of judicial 
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independence primarily based on provisions established by the United Nations and a 
Special Rapporteur for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Cumaraswamy 1995, OUN 1985)6, which produced a basic criteria for an independent 
judiciary.  These criteria established that; a) terms of office and remuneration should be 
constitutionally guaranteed, b) the decisions of judges must not be subject to any revision 
outside procedures dictated by law, c) courts should have exclusive authority to decide 
their own competence as defined by law, d) courts have jurisdiction over all matters of a 
judicial nature, e) they should be adequately funded, f) the executive and legislative 
powers should ensure that judges are independent and g) the selection of judges should be 
based on certain qualifications. 
 On top of these considerations, however, the authors added two rather 
controversial elements they consider to be necessary to achieve an independent judiciary.  
The first one is the exercise of judicial review.  This is a controversial element because 
there is no agreement on whether judicial review contributes to an independent judiciary 
(Blasi and Cingranelli 1996) or if independence is a necessary component for the real 
exercise of judicial review (Clark 1975, Rosenthal 1990). 
 The second contested element has to do with establishing a hierarchical system in 
which the judiciary is structured in multiple layers with the highest level court exercising 
final control over lower court decisions.  The argument behind this provision is that 
compared to higher court counterparts, lower court judges tend to be more numerous, less 
qualified in terms of experience, less socialized towards judicial norms and less well 
                                                            
6 For complete text of these documents please see appendixes. 
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paid, making them more susceptible to bribes.  Therefore it is important that high court 
judges, less susceptible to external influences, have the authority to review some 
decisions that could have been made considering elements that go beyond the extension 
of the law.  Although this element seems to be in complete opposition to internal 
independence (Guarnieri and Pederzoli 1999, Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2000), it is not 
without its supporters, who claim that a hierarchical structure within the judiciary is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the principles of independence (Blasi and Cingranelli 1996, 
Rossen 1987). 
 Based on all the considerations above mentioned, the index for judicial 
independence is constructed by coding constitutional provisions using a three point scale. 
Coders were instructed to give a zero when there was no constitutional provision 
regarding a given element, a one in where there was a qualified or incomplete provision, 
and a two for explicit and full provisions regarding the following nine elements of 
judicial independence.7 
Guaranteed Terms: The constitution guarantees terms of office, regardless of whether 
appointed or elected and restricts removal of judges. 
Finality of Decisions: The decisions of a judge are not subject to any revision outside 
any appeals procedures as provided by law. 
                                                            
7 The authors consider three additional provisions which they do not use in the index. These are the right to 
a fair trial, the right to a public trial and the right to habeas corpus.  They believe that these provisions are 
somewhat linked to the judge’s behavior and the concept of judicial independence, particularly to its 
principle of impartiality 
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Exclusive Authority: The courts have exclusive authority to decide on their own 
competence, as defined by law. Their decisions are made without any restrictions, 
improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, 
from any quarter or for any reason. 
Ban against Exceptional or Military Courts: The courts have jurisdiction over all 
issues of a judicial nature.  Civilians cannot be tried by military or exceptional courts.8 
Fiscal Autonomy: The courts are fiscally autonomous.  Their salaries and/or budgets are 
protected from reduction by the other branches. 
Separation of Powers: The courts are housed in a separate branch from the executive 
and legislative powers. 
Enumerated Qualifications: The selection and career of judges are based on merit: 
qualifications, integrity, ability and efficiency. 
Judicial Review: Courts exercise judicial or constitutional review of legislative and 
executive branches.9 
Hierarchical System: Courts are structured in multiple layers with the highest level 
court exercising final control over lower court decisions. 
                                                            
8 This measure has an additional score beyond 0, 1 and 2. A score of -1 is given to any constitution that 
explicitly condones trying civilians in military or exceptional courts. 
9 A score of -1 is given to constitutions that explicitly forbid courts from exercising judicial review. 
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 Figure II-2 shows how the countries in the sample are ranked according to this 
formal measure of judicial independence. Of the twenty countries in the sample, 
Guatemala was the one that had a full and explicit constitutional provision guaranteeing 
terms of office, finality of decisions, exclusive authority of the courts, banning   
exceptional or military tribunals for civil parties, granting fiscal autonomy and separation 
of powers, enumerating judge qualifications, granting judicial review and establishing a 
hierarchical system. On the other end, Ecuador is ranked as only having one qualified or 
incomplete provision for the nine variables portrayed ahead. 
Figure II-2. Formal Provisions for Judicial Independence in Latin America  
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 A comparison between the two formal measures of independence presented in this 
chapter does not reveal much consistency between them. Although Guatemala is regarded 
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as a highly independent country on both measures, and with Ecuador and the Dominican 
Republic are portrayed as nations struggling to consolidate the autonomy of their 
judiciaries. At the other end there are some substantial differences between one measure 
and the other.  Brazil, for example, is regarded as having a highly independent judiciary 
according to one formal measure of judicial independence and a weak judiciary according 
to the other. The same happens with Mexico, ranked as the country with the highest level 
of formal judicial independence according to one measure and located in the middle of 
the sample according to the other. 
 
Practical or De Facto Measures of Independence 
 
U.S. State Department World Human Rights Reports 
 
 While there have been multiple efforts to measure judicial independence for a 
large set of countries by going beyond formal provisions, these evaluations have been 
hard to replicate (La Porta, et al. 2004, Landes and Posner 1975).   As I mentioned above, 
the State Department’s reports on human rights across the world are a tool that academics 
trying to measure judicial independence have found very useful. These reports, which 
begun in the 1970’s, are published annually and their goal is to describe the efforts that 
every country makes to put in practice their commitment to protect the human rights of 
its citizens.  Each country report is individual and contains a detailed description of 
human rights violations that were reported by affected individuals or by national or 
international media outlets.  These violations are then analyzed in different contexts, one 
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of which is due process.  Within this analysis, the reports evaluate the strength of each 
country’s judicial system and the main problems that they face.  Although these 
chronicles are subject to the criteria of their authors, this is one of the few systematic 
sources of information about judiciaries in Latin America.  Various academic studies 
written about the judicial system in the region ratify the validity of these reports (Cross 
1999, Dakolias 1994, Howard and Carey 2004, Yamanashi 2002).  
Since these reports only give a descriptive narration of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the judicial system in each country, it was necessary to devise a coding 
scheme in order to systematize the information.  Based on previous work by Howard and 
Carey (2004), Keith, Tate and Poe (2006) and Cingranelli and Richard’s CIRI Project, I 
have created a trichotomous measure that qualifies the level of judicial independence in 
Latin American countries based on the text of each individual report.  The scoring was 
assigned as follows: 
0.- Low: The judiciary is not autonomous or independent. The interference from the 
executive is constant and judges can be removed without warning.  There are high levels 
of corruption and other outside influences. 
1.- Medium: The judiciary is described as partially independent. Executive interference 
is less notorious but judges do not enjoy full protections.  Occasional reports of 
corruption and other outside influences. 
2.- High: The judiciary is generally independent. The courts can rule against the 
executive without fear of repercussions and judges enjoy full constitutional protections.  
There are no mentions of corruption or other outside influences. 
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 The classification I assigned to each country based on the criteria described above 
is depicted on Table II-2. There one can see that according to the US State Department 
Human Rights Reports, only three countries in the region, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
have generally independent courts that can rule against the government without fear of 
prosecution and exhibit low levels of judicial corruption. On the other hand, countries 
like Ecuador and Haiti are consistently classified as struggling to obtain judicial 
independence. Perhaps the most notorious fact, however, is that Guatemala, a country 
ranked at the top by both measures of formal independence, received a score of zero for 
de facto independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  43
Table II-2. De Facto Judicial Independence in the Americas according to the US 
State Department Human Right Reports 
 
HIGH 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Uruguay 
 
 
 
MEDIUM 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Dominican Republic 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Panama 
Peru 
 
 
LOW 
Bolivia                 Nicaragua 
Ecuador               Paraguay 
El Salvador         Venezuela 
Guatemala           Haiti 
Honduras 
 
World Economic Forum 
 
 The fourth and final measure of judicial independence to be replicated in this 
dissertation comes from the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey (WEF 
2006).  This is a yearly survey conducted in every country in the region to help establish 
a measure for economic competitiveness. An average of 94 Chief Executive Officers or 
top level managers are polled in each country from a sample of companies including 
domestic firms that sell in foreign markets, units of foreign firms that operate in the 
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domestic market and enterprises with significant government ownership. The question is 
stated beneath: 
The judiciary in your country is independent from political influences of members of 
government, citizens or firms. 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
1= No, heavily influenced                                                 7= Yes, entirely independent 
  
 Although this is a measure based on the perception of the elites, which do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of the broader population, this is a global, replicable 
evaluation of judicial independence. The executives who responded to this survey often 
represent their companies and have dealings with the judiciaries of their host countries.  
Figure II-3 shows how the countries in the sample are ranked according to the World 
Economic Forum. Consistent with the State Department reports, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
stand at the top of the ranking followed closely by Chile. Also consistent is the presence 
of Ecuador and Haiti at the bottom of the rankings, depicting them as countries that have 
the weakest and most dependent judiciaries in the region. 
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Figure II-3. Judicial Independence in Latin America according to the World 
Economic Forum 
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 In reviewing at all four measurements of judicial independence it is difficult to 
find consistency among them. The starkest differences occur between the formal and the 
practical measures of independence. Countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica, which are 
considered to have weak institutional provisions to safeguard judicial independence, are 
also regarded by practical measures as the nations with the strongest and most 
independent judiciaries. The contrasting results are a testament to the amplitude of 
judicial independence as a concept in political science. Table II-3 depicts a comparison of 
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the four measurements of independence in Latin America described in the previous 
pages. In order to better represent the differences between one measure and another, all 
scores have been normalized to one, which corresponds to the highest degree of 
independence. 
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Table II-3. Comparison Between Measures of Independence in Latin America 
Country Rios-Figueroa Tate and Keith Cingranelli & 
Richards 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
Mexico .462 .706 .500 .417 
Guatemala .462 1.0 .000 .250 
El Salvador .231 .706 .000 .350 
Honduras .231 .824 .000 .233 
Nicaragua .231 .588 .000 .033 
Costa Rica .308 .824 1.0 .667 
Panama .308 .824 .500 .250 
Colombia .308 .765 .500 .400 
Ecuador .077 .000 .000 .033 
Bolivia .385 .824 .000 .200 
Peru .154 .765 .500 .167 
Paraguay .385 .824 .000 .067 
Chile .154 .765 1.0 .517 
Uruguay .154 .588 1.0 .700 
Brazil .462 .588 .500 .333 
Venezuela .231 .588 .000 .050 
Dominican 
Republic 
.009 .412 .500 .233 
Haiti NA .412 .000 .017 
Jamaica NA .471 .500 .517 
Guyana NA .176 .500 .233 
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To further illustrate the different dimensions of independence captured by each of 
the measurements of judicial independence explained above, Table II-4 show the 
correlation matrix of these four measures. The coefficients show a high level of 
correlation between the two formal methods to measure judicial independence, as well as 
the two practical ones. On the other hand, the correlation between de iure and de facto 
measures of independence is substantially lower. What stands out from the matrix, 
however, is the negative correlation between Rios-Figueroa’s institutional way of 
measuring independence and Cingranelli and Richard’s de facto measure based on the US 
State Department Human Rights Reports. 
Table II-4.Correlation Matrix Between Measures of Judicial Independence 
 Cingranelli & 
Richards 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
Rios-Figueroa Tate & Keith 
Cingranelli & 
Richards 
1.000    
World 
Economic 
Forum 
.7521 1.000   
Rios-Figueroa -.0515 .1236 1.000  
Tate & Keith .1624 .3470 .7053 1.000 
 
The disparities between formal and practical measures of independence speak to 
the real differences that exist between the written law and the common political practices 
in Latin America. On the other hand, in countries like Ecuador, an extreme case which 
will be further discussed in the next few pages, it is clear that sometimes the lack of 
formal provisions for the protection of judicial independence do translate into weak 
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judiciaries, incapable to stand up to a strong executive or even to a weak legislative 
power. The following chapters of this dissertation will explore how these differences in 
measurements affect the impact that independence has on corruption victimization and 
trust in the institutions of the rule of law. 
 
Judicial independence: The Case of Ecuador 
 
 Creating and maintaining an independent judiciary is not an easy task.  
Throughout this chapter I have been looking at the many conditions, formal and practical, 
that have to take place in order to obtain a judicial branch that is strong and autonomous.  
Ecuador has been struggling with this problem since its beginning as an independent 
republic.  Earlier I talked about the importance of institutional stability in creating an 
autonomous judiciary.  Many scholars and experts agree that judicial independence 
begins with the constitution and the provisions it must contain.  Since its independence 
1830, Ecuador has had nineteen different constitutions, with each constitution lasting 
approximately eight years, on average (Salgado 2005).  The one that stood the shortest 
amount of time was the Constitution of 1851, Ecuador’s fifth constitution.  It lasted one 
year.  The 1978 Constitution marked the return of democracy to Ecuador after almost 15 
years of uninterrupted military dictatorships. It was the longest lasting constitution in the 
country’s republican history, lasting 20 years. It was replaced by the one drafted in 1998 
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by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente.10 As the reader can plainly see, it is impossible 
to conceive of having an independent judiciary when the rules of the game keep changing 
so abruptly.11 As stated by a current Supreme Court Justice put it “Constitutional 
dispositions reflect the hopes of the people. Those have not changed, however, our 
constitutions keep changing.  The principle of judicial independence has been painfully 
broken many times in Ecuador”12 
 The Constitution of 1978, drafted with the intention of creating a judiciary that 
was to be autonomous from the military power, gave birth to a judicial branch that was 
instead subject to the constant manipulation and interference by political parties.  This 
constitution established that the members of the Supreme Court were to be elected by 
Congress, according to the proportion of representation that each party held in the 
legislative camera.  This made the Supreme Court an extension of the political parties.  
Its rulings became subject to the ever changing balance of power in Congress, as judges 
could be and were removed merely by political will. In 1997, President Abdala Bucaram 
was impeached by Congress and replaced by then president of the legislative branch, 
Fabian Alarcon. Alarcon assumed a temporary presidency, during which its most 
significant event was a call to elections for a National Assembly to draft a new 
constitution.  
                                                            
10 The Constitution of 1998 is still in place, but in November of 2007 Ecuador elected a new Constitutional 
Assembly, which is drafting what will be the 20th Constitution in the history of Ecuador. It is expected to be 
ready by the end of July 2008 and then it will be submitted to referendum for its approval. 
11 There were also several authoritarian and military regimes during that lapse, which also hindered what 
little autonomy the judicial power could have had in those days. 
12 Interview conducted by author in Quito, on November 13th 2007. 
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In terms of the safeguard of an independent judiciary, the 1998 constitution has 
been the most advanced in Ecuador’s history. It was the first constitution to guarantee the 
judicial career, offer job protection and stability and establish a mechanism called 
“cooptacion”, by which the Supreme Court could elect its own members. These 
advances, however, could not protect the sitting Supreme Court judges from the 
continuing political pressures by the ever changing majorities in congress.   
Judicial Crisis and new Supreme Court:13 
 
In early December 2004, the party of then President Lucio Gutierrez worked out a 
majority in congress and drafted a resolution ousting all thirty one members of the 
Supreme Court. The argument was that the court had been for years under the control of 
Gutierrez’s political adversary and former President, Leon Febres-Cordero.  The new 
court was appointed in its entirety by the new majority in congress and was known as the 
“Pichicorte” because of the name of President Guillermo Castro Dager, nicknamed 
“Pichi” by his friends. 
The “Pichicorte” was viewed negatively by the majority of the population. There 
were constant manifestations outside of the building where the Supreme Court 
functioned. During its short three month tenure, the “Pichicorte” annulled several 
criminal proceedings that were pending against former elected and appointed officials 
that had fled the country during the midle and late nineties.  The straw that broke the 
                                                            
13 The following description of the events occurred between 2004 and 2006 are based on the report by the 
United Nation’s Special Rapporteur  Leandro Despouy and the testimony of current and former Supreme 
Court Justices, some of whom were members of the court that was dissolved by congress on December 
2004 "Informe De Seguimiento Presentado Por Leandro Despouy, Relator Especial Sobre La 
Independencia De Magistrados Y Abogados. Mision De Seguimiento Al Ecuador,"  (Naciones Unidas, 
2006).   
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camel’s back, however, was the nullity declared in a high profile embezzlement case 
against former President Abdala Bucaram, who was impeached in 1997 and was also a 
close friend of Castro Dager. These actions resulted in the return of Bucaram, who had 
been exiled in Panama since his ousting nearly eight years before.  The results were 
catastrophic for both the “Pichicorte” and for President Gutierrez. After Bucaram’s 
return, rioting began to break out in Quito and in neighboring cities of the highlands. In a 
desperate attempt to bring the situation under control, Gutierrez signed a presidential 
decree dissolving the Supreme Court.  Despite the last minute maneuver, Gutierrez’s fate 
was sealed the moment Bucaram arrived in Ecuador. In April of 2005 Gutierrez fled the 
presidential palace and sought refuge in the Brazilian embassy in Quito. What followed 
was an eight month period in which Ecuador had no Supreme Court. 
In May of 2005, in order to expedite the selection of new members for the 
Supreme Court, the new Organic Law for the Judicial Branch established the creation of 
an independent selection committee. This ad hoc mechanism was designed to compensate 
for the vacuum that existed in the judicial branch, since the constitution mandated that the 
Supreme Court itself was the institution responsible for the selection of new members 
through “cooptacion”. Among other things, the new law signaled the necessity of national 
and international observers for the process. 
The selection committee functioned from early June to late November 2005 and 
was integrated by four members. One member named by the country’s law schools, one 
by the Superior Courts and Tribunals, another by humans rights organizations, and a final 
person was named by civil organizations, specifically women’s rights groups.  According 
to the mandate of the law, the committee approved a statute that detailed the process of 
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application, grading, and appeals for the candidates of the new Supreme Court.  Of the 
310 applications received, 181 passed all of the formal requisites and advanced to the 
selection stage. The criterion for the selection of applicants was based on a careful 
analysis of applicants’ experience, academic degrees and publications. Finally, exams 
were administered to all applicants by hired consulting firms. The final results were made 
public on November 22nd 2005. 
Originally, the organic law mandated that the new members of the Supreme Court 
were to come from three sources in almost equal proportion. Eleven were to be selected 
from applicants in the judicial career, ten from university professors and the last 10 from 
professionals in private law.  However, drastic differences in scores from members of all 
three pools caused to committee to amend the law and select the thirty one applicants 
with the higher scores, regardless of where they came from.  In the end, the Supreme 
Court was comprised of eighteen former university professors, eight applicants from 
private practice and only five from the judicial career. The new justices assumed their 
offices on November 30th in a ceremony attended by representatives of the United 
Nations, the Organization of American States and various Supreme Court Presidents from 
Latin America and Europe. 
The new Supreme Court started to work under high scrutiny from the general 
population and the media. However, the advances made in the 1998 Constitution 
regarding judicial protections and the attempts to permeate judges from political 
influence seem to have worked. The Supreme Court has shown its ability to purge itself 
when the probity of some of its members has been in doubt. This was the case of a Judge 
dismissed when evidence was found that he requested money to a known politician in 
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return for a favorable ruling by him and two other colleagues. The members of the court 
took no chances and also dismissed his two chamber partners even though they denied 
their involvement in any wrongdoing.14 Other incidents have occurred, but the court has 
swiftly dismissed the offenders and replaced them through “cooptacion” in an effort to 
maintain their image of an independent and uncorrupted institution. During my 
interviews, a long time judge and member of several Supreme Courts, including the 
current one told me “This is the first independent Supreme Court Ecuador has had since 
the return of democracy. There are no political links in this court”.15 This new found 
autonomy has allowed the current Supreme Court to become more efficient.  In the first 
two years of its tenure, the court issued more than 11,000 sentences, substantially above 
the historical average of the country’s highest court. In 2007, the Supreme Court also 
spearheaded an aggressive restructuring process that attempted to eliminate much of the 
unnecessary bureaucracy in the justice sector, maximizing efficiency and reducing 
corruption in the lower courts. Although the Supreme Court has the authority to do all of 
these things, the process has ironically been delayed by legal maneuvers utilized by 
members of the Justice Servants Union. 
Obstacles to independence: 
 
 To some legal experts and members of the judiciary, constitutional provisions and 
autonomy in the selection process are not enough. According to a renowned attorney and 
law professor, the constitutional protections awarded to the judicial branch are almost 
                                                            
14 The Ecuadorian Supreme Court is comprised of 10 chambers of three judges each.  These chambers are 
specialized, meaning that the judges that comprise them will only deal with either civil, criminal, labor or 
administrative cases. 
15 Interview conducted by author  in Quito, on November 15th 2007. 
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fictitious because the constitution is never applied in real life16. As an example he cites 
the ad hoc selection process utilized for the conformation of the new Ecuadorian 
Supreme Court, which was not even contemplated in the mother law. This is just one of 
many infringements. He claims that the constitution fails to secure adequate pay to those 
who work in the judicial sector. While lower court judges are started at a decent salary, it 
does not improve as the judge gains seniority and does not adjust to inflation and other 
economic considerations. Furthermore, the salaries of over 5,000 workers in the judicial 
sector have not been adjusted in over five years.  
Another obstacle lies in the vulnerability of judges, especially those in the lower 
courts, who are not only subject to interference from colleagues in the higher courts but 
also from civilians. The Ecuadorian constitution guarantees the internal independence of 
lower court judges and forbids the influence of interference of high court judges in any 
ruling issued by first instance magistrates (Constitucion Politica De La Republica Del 
Ecuador 1998). It was reported to me by a Superior Court judge, however, that this is 
hardly the case17. He claims that it is not uncommon for Supreme Court Justices to place 
calls to lower court colleagues and attempt to interfere in their rulings, especially in high 
profile cases. Moreover, the law also fails to protect judicial independence by granting 
citizens the possibility to sue lower court judges if they are not satisfied with the outcome 
of their trial. According to a constitutional law expert and member of the constitutional 
assembly, these interferences could be avoided by eliminating the hierarchies from the 
                                                            
16 Interview conducted by author in Quito, on November 8 2007. 
17 Interview conducted by author in Guayaquil, on November 12 2007. 
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judicial system18. This can be achieved in two ways. First, renaming the courts so that 
their names do not reflect a hierarchical order. Second, by granting the National 
Judicature Council –CNJ-19 the right to appoint judges for ordinary and appeal courts. 
Constitutional law experts coincide in the belief that these steps are as important as the 
selection process for the Supreme Court and the only way to guarantee internal 
independence. They also agree that there is no need to specify those processes in the 
constitution as long as those attributes are clearly assigned to the CNJ in its text. 
Reviewed above are some of the legal obstacles that Ecuador faces in creating an 
independent judiciary. All of them are contemplated in the measurements of 
independence presented in the first part of this chapter and can be overcome via better 
institutional design. However, there are other factors that come into play that are not easy 
to quantify or even measure (Brady 2004). Some of these variables have been considered 
in theories of judicial independence, but are hard to operationalize. In the following 
paragraphs I will these barriers to judicial independence as described and exemplified to 
me by experts in judicial politics, lawyers, legislators and even Supreme Court Justices. 
A Judge’s character and personality: 
 
 In the previous sections I have talked about the importance of the selection 
process of a Supreme Court to judicial independence. An autonomous Supreme Court 
must be comprised of judges without a history of political linkage. That is why it is 
                                                            
18 Interview conducted by author over the phone, on November 13 2007. 
19 The National Judicature Council (Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura) is an institution designed to oversee 
the judicial power and sanction judges if necessary. In the current constitution, however, the CNJ is headed 
by the President of the Supreme Court, which takes away from its ability to enforce any accountability. 
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imperative that the selection process is conducted with the participation of the other two 
branches of government or left to the judiciary itself. However, an appropriate selection 
process cannot guarantee independence if the judges appointed to the Supreme Court lack 
the power to stand up to the executive and fend off interference from third parties. Such 
is the case of the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, according to several experts. 
 While the controversial selection process that took place in 2005 was closely 
scrutinized by national and international organizations, its outcome was accepted by all  
since the 31 jurists with the highest scores went on to be appointed as the new members 
of the Supreme Court. However, Ecuador’s highest court has been far from independent, 
according to outside members of the judiciary and other experts, and a part of the 
problem has to do with the personality of some of the judges.  A former Supreme Court 
justice told me “In the end, what matters is how much power the Supreme Court has. In 
other places, like the United States, the Supreme Court is very powerful, while here in 
Ecuador, the President raises his voice and the justices’ legs begin to shake”.20 
 Two examples mentioned to me by several experts illustrate how the lack of a 
strong personality in a Supreme Court judge can undermine judicial independence. The 
first one was the result of the dismissal of 57 legislators by the Electoral Tribunal in 
2007. President Rafael Correa drafted a decree that called a general election to vote on 
whether or not to convene a Constituent Assembly that would be in charge of drafting a 
new constitution, which had been his main electoral promise and the basis for his 
campaign. A majority in Congress disagreed with some parts of the document and  
                                                            
20 Interview conducted by author in Guayaquil, on November 12 2007. 
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delayed its approval until some changes were made. After a couple of days, the Electoral 
Tribunal, under immense pressure from the executive, made use of an obscure 
constitutional interpretation and dismissed 57 of the 100 legislators in Congress21. In the 
following days many of the dismissed legislators filed what is known as a constitutional 
“amparo”, a petition to a judge to declare that the action executed against them violated 
their constitutional rights. Many of the 57 legislators were granted “amparos” by first 
instance judges. This caused an outrage of the executive, who had massive popular 
support. The pressures of public opinion and the executive proved to be too much for the 
Supreme Court, which overturned all of the “amparos” and upheld the decision made by 
the Electoral Tribunal, despite the fact that they had legal backing for the “amparos” 
granted. Furthermore, the President of the National Judicature Council, who also serves 
as President of the Supreme Court, dismissed the judges who had granted those 
“amparos” and threatened to do the same to others who interfered with the call for 
elections. Although the Supreme Court interpreted that the Electoral Tribunal had been 
right to uphold the dismissal of the legislators, it is clear that the high court buckled under 
the pressure from the President and public opinion. As a law professor whom I spoke to 
stated; “It is true that some judges have used “amparos” to profit illicitly, but you cannot 
have the executive ordering the Supreme Court not to grant any more of them. Where 
does that leave judicial independence? Every judge that has granted an “amparo”, right or 
wrong against the government, has been removed by the National Judicature Council”. 
                                                            
21  The Constitution states that during electoral periods the Electoral Tribunal is the country’s maximum 
authority and has the right to dismiss any public official who interferes with an election process. The 
problems were that legislators are not public officials but elected ones and that since Congress had not 
approved the President’s call to elections yet, Ecuador was not in an electoral period. 
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 While a powerful executive can sometimes intimidate Supreme Court Justices and 
undercut the autonomy of a judiciary, sometimes it is the lack of temerity of the judges 
themselves which hinders judicial independence. The struggle of the Ecuadorian 
Supreme Court against its manipulation from the National Constituent Assembly 
illustrates another way in which the character and personality of a judge can have a direct 
effect on independence.  
Even before the National Constituent Assembly started, some of its elected 
members spoke about the necessity to restructure the judiciary in general and the 
Supreme Court specifically. These steps, some politicians claimed, were necessary 
because of the inability of the Supreme Court to efficiently and swiftly prosecute former 
banking executives identified as being responsible for the collapse of Ecuador’s banking 
system in 1999. The ruling party, which had won a majority of seats in the Assembly, 
accused the Supreme Court of delaying necessary extradition documents required for the 
repatriation of suspects who had been caught in foreign countries. They suggested that in 
some cases these delays were due to linkages between the suspects and some members of 
the Supreme Court.  
The reaction of the high court to the threat to its autonomy was immediate. A 
majority of judges claimed that while the Constituent Assembly had the power to modify 
the judiciary through the new Constitution, pending its approval by referendum, it had no 
business interfering with the Supreme Court or the structure of the judicial system 
directly, as the assembly was not conceived to be a legislative organ. However, not every 
judge was willing to stand up to the assembly. As I found out through conversations with 
court insiders and a Supreme Court Magistrate, several members of the court were 
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indifferent to the interference of the assembly in the judiciary and some even welcomed 
it, claiming that they could finally go back to private practice, where they had been 
making more money. According to this magistrate, some members had taken part in the 
selection process simply for the prestige of being named Supreme Court Justice, but were 
not committed to the court. I learned that some judges complained about the long work 
hours and sometimes delegated the vital task of writing sentences to their private 
secretaries. Other judges, who lived outside of Quito, where the Supreme Court is 
located, did not agree with five day work weeks and returned to their cities on Thursdays 
to tend to their private practices and businesses, even though the law strictly forbids 
Supreme Court Justices to pursue other professional activities other than teaching while 
in office. These judges had gotten to the Supreme Court by demonstrating their 
knowledge of the law in the selection process, they had been able to purge the court when 
its incorruptibility was in doubt and the majority of them profoundly disagreed with the 
intentions of the assembly to meddle in the affairs of the judiciary. However, their 
reticence to forego of certain personal privileges and their lack of willingness to take on 
the National Constituent Assembly definitely affected the Supreme Court’s ability to 
effectively assert its independence.22 
Judicial Independence and the Media: 
 
 The pressures from the executive and legislative branches, as well as those from 
interest groups and individuals are not the only strain that judges have to face in their 
                                                            
22 In the end, the National Constituent Assembly decided, via decree, to restructure the Supreme Court after 
the referendum to approve the new constitution, in what the assembly called the “transition regime”. The 
number of Supreme Court Justices was downsized to 21 and ten of the current magistrates will be 
dismissed at random in a raffle system. 
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struggle to maintain their autonomy and secure the impartiality of their decisions. The 
media also plays a key role, especially when it considers that a judicial decision might 
jeopardize the public interest. In a survey administered to judges in Central America in 
2005, the majority of judges identified the media as the most important external obstacle 
to judicial independence (Diaz Rivillas and Linares Lejarraga).  
The relationship between judicial independence and the media is not one that has 
been overlooked by scholars (Bright 1997, Paletz 2002, Perry 1999). However, it is not 
easy to quantify the effect that media coverage on one issue or another has on the level of 
judicial independence in any given country, and that is why it is complicated to 
incorporate a component of media influence in measures of judicial independence.  
 The media and the judiciary often clash when it comes to their opinions and 
interpretations of the law (Bybee 2007, Wood and Rudd 2004). In the opinion of one 
judicial expert, the media often has a negative impact in the independence of the 
judiciary, especially because of its advocacy for what is popular instead of what is legal. 
He believes that “The media can be a powerful deterrent for judicial independence.  
Reporters are constantly passing judgment on the judiciary’s decisions without 
completely understanding their scope or the spirit of the law applied in such decision”.23 
Instances where media pressure interferes with judicial independence usually occurs with 
high profile cases or particularly sensitive issues, like the Deckert case in Germany, 
described earlier in this chapter.24  
                                                            
23 Interview conducted by author in Quito, on October 18 2007. 
24 See section on judicial independence and accountability. 
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 The influence of media is especially palpable in countries with a shaky history of 
judicial independence. As an elected member of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Assembly 
reported to me during an interview “Of the de facto threats to judicial independence, the 
one of the media is the most dangerous one.” A case in point is the controversial subject 
of “detencion en firme” in Ecuador. On 2003, Congress passed a law allowing a suspect 
to be indefinitely detained while their case made its way through the legal system. The 
reasoning behind this decision was that many criminals use dilatory tactics in order to 
hold up their sentencing ("Registro Oficial" 2003). Although controversial, this law was 
upheld by the Constitutional Tribunal and applied until October of 2006, when it was 
again reviewed by the same tribunal and deemed unconstitutional ("Registro Oficial" 
2006). The practical consequence of this ruling was the imminent release of thousands of 
jailed men and women who had been held without sentencing for a year. 
 Public opinion opposed this measure and the sentiment was echoed by the media, 
which intensified its coverage of criminal acts in the big cities and questioned what 
would happen to citizens’ personal safety upon the release of hundreds of “criminals”. 
According to one expert, the media focused exclusively on the issue of public safety and 
completely ignored the human rights aspect of the controversy, turning public opinion 
against the judges who declared the law of “detención en firme” unconstitutional, placing 
immense pressure on the legislature to draft a new law. Ultimately, Congress drafted, 
debated and passed a law which upheld “detención en firme” in less than a week. The bill 
was ready one day before the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling was to go into effect and 
the prisoners scheduled to be released a day later remained in jail without a judicial 
sentence against them.  
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 “Judicial independence is not about right and wrong. There certainly was a 
normative debate on the legitimacy of the ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
However, that is not the issue. The fact is that a ruling by the ultimate authority in 
constitutional law cannot be ignored just because a fraction or even a majority of the 
media considers it wrong” concluded this expert. 
 
Conclusions 
  
The focus of this chapter has been judicial independence as a concept and the 
attempts that have been made at measuring it. It is clear that there is little to no consensus 
as to exactly what is judicial independence. Some scholars define independence solely by 
looking at the relationship between the Supreme Court and the executive, while others 
unpack several dimensions of independence and explore various ties between the 
judiciary, the other branches of the State and external sources of possible influence. The 
measures of independence presented in this chapter, two formal and two practical, reflect 
the lack of consensus in the field of judicial politics when it comes to analyzing and 
assessing judicial independence in Latin America.  
The presentation of the Ecuadorian case and the struggle of its judiciary to fend 
off outside influences also lead me to a couple of conclusions. First, the situation of the 
Ecuadorian judiciary is better understood by looking at it through practical measures of 
judicial independence. Formal provisions of independence do not contemplate the 
political dynamics of democratic countries, especially ones struggling to consolidate. The 
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sacking of two Supreme Courts in three months cannot be reflected by formal measures 
of judicial independence. On the other hand, practical assessments of judicial 
independence are based precisely on these events, and therefore do a better job in 
transmitting the real state of the judiciary in a country. Second, formal measures of 
judicial independence are still important. The events in Ecuador were the result of various 
political maneuvers and could not have been avoided by having better constitutional 
provisions of independence. Nevertheless, the institutional weakness of the judicial 
system in Ecuador does result from weak institutional design and a history of instability. 
Even though the 1998 Constitution made great advances in the protection of judicial 
independence, the judiciary in Ecuador has been historically weak, in great part because 
it was never protected institutionally by the laws of the land. Throughout the years, weak 
formal provisions of independence translated into weak institutions that have proven 
incapable to fight of political attempts to control it. 
In the next chapters, I will be assesing the effect that context can have on personal 
attitudes and experiences. Using the four measurements of judicial independence 
described earlier in this chapter, I will evaluate the influence that the presence or absence 
of an autonomous judiciary can have on personal experiences with corruption, as well as  
the attitudes of trust towards institutions of the rule of law in Latin America. I believe 
that countries with higher levels of judicial independence will have citizens that trust 
more in the institutions of the rule of law. Also, I hypothesize that corruption 
victimization will be lower in countries where judicial independence is high.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
 In the previous chapter I argued strongly that judicial independence itself should 
not be considered as an end but as a means to an end. This chapter will test whether or 
not independence is useful in the reduction of corruption in Latin America. Corruption is 
considered by Latin American citizens as a major threat to democracy in their countries. 
According to Rose-Ackerman (1997), widespread corruption is a clear symptom that the 
state is not functioning properly, a claim that the Americas Barometer survey 
corroborates in the Latin America and Caribbean regions. In fact, data show that along 
with crime victimization, high levels of corruption are one of two reasons that would 
prompt large proportions, even majorities of citizens, to support a military coup (Cruz 
2007).  Surveys find that acts of corruption are present in every strata of society. 
Moreover, in the last decade, several elected and appointed officials, including 
Constitutional Presidents, as in the cases of Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru and Ecuador, have 
faced criminal charges for acts of corruption committed during the exercise of their 
public mandate.  
 The judiciary is often said to be the last defense for citizens and the State in the 
fight against corruption. When the internal control system between politicians and 
bureaucrats does not work to prevent corruption, it is up to the judicial system to 
intervene in order to find administrative illegalities and repress them. Often, however, the 
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discovery of widespread illegality in the public brings about criticism of the judicial 
system as having been inadequate in the fight against corruption (Della Porta and 
Vannucci 1999). Other times, the judiciary itself becomes involved in acts of corruption. 
 Transparency International defines judicial corruption as “the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain” ("Global Corruption Report" 2007:11). This definition, however, 
is not limited to material or financial profits, since it also includes non-material gains 
such as the furtherance of political ambitions, and non-material favors from sexual to  
agreements to lower the sentences of the guilty or even exonerate them. Judicial 
corruption also includes any inappropriate influence by a third party or any 
noncompliance by a judge regarding court dates and deadlines (Dakolias 2003).  TI 
divides judicial corruption into two types. One source of judicial corruption is political 
interference in judicial processes. Despite several efforts for institutional reform in Latin 
America and elsewhere, judiciaries continue to face pressure to rule in favor of powerful 
political and economic elites. 25 Political interference also comes about by the 
manipulation of judicial appointments, salaries and conditions of service. A former 
legislator in the Ecuadorian Congress reported to me that several appointments of lower 
court judges took place after legislators acted as “padrinos” to them and use their 
influence to get them appointed by the National Judiciary Council.26 The second type of 
judicial corruption has to do with bribery. In Latin America, bribery in the judicial system 
                                                            
25 One example is provided by a controversial ruling by a Menem appointed judge in Argentina on 2006. 
The judge ruled that excess campaign expenditures had not violated financing laws because parties were 
not responsible for financing of which “they were unaware”.  See “Global Corruption Report” 2007, By 
Transparency International.  
26 Interview conducted by author on October 19th 2007 in Quito, Ecuador 
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is one of the most common forms of corruption victimization. (Donoso 2007, Zephyr 
2007). Bribery can take place during any phase of the judicial process. Judicial 
employees may solicit bribes to speed up the citation processes, lawyers can request 
kickbacks to influence a decision and judges can also ask for a sweetener to guarantee a 
favorable ruling.  
 The existing literature identifies several causes for judicial corruption. A judiciary 
may become corrupt, for example due to undue influence by the executive and legislative 
branches. Even though constitutional guarantees exist to protect the judiciary from these 
influences, in countries with a history of weak institutions and a frail rule of law, the 
executive and the legislature often control the judicial branch. Judges in weak judiciaries 
are often deferential to politically connected individuals in the executive or legislature 
(Di Tella 2007, Pepys 2007). Fear of retribution by political leaders can also compel a 
judge to make politically acceptable decisions that may not be based strictly on the law.27  
Another source of judicial corruption is the social tolerance that countries with 
weak institutions develop for corrupt acts (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Citizens in 
countries where the bureaucracy is highly inefficient come to regard corruption as an 
everyday occurrence and as a necessary means to get things done (World Bank 2000). 
These attitudes transform corruption into a useful tool and even a positive trait in an 
inefficient system (Heidenheimer, et al. 1989).  The idea that corruption helps “grease the 
wheels” of progress in developing countries was famously summed up by Huntington, 
                                                            
27  Di Tella et al. (2007) note that  political infuence in the real world can go beyond bribes and lobbying 
and into threats and punishment, as was the case with the Colombian judges who often received messages 
saying their option was to take “plata o plomo” which meant to take the bribe or take a bullet. 
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who claimed that “the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, 
dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy” 
(1968:69). 
Finally, there are sources of corruption that come as a consequence of poor 
institutional design, such as low judicial and court staff salaries, poor training, especially 
to lower court judges, and inadequately monitored accountability and administrative 
procedures(Voigt 2007). Although high salaries cannot completely eliminate the risk of 
corruption, low and uncompetitive salaries in the judicial sector definitely act as an 
incentive for corrupt acts.28 Poor training of low level judges enhances corruption by 
producing low quality decisions in the judiciary. These decisions are usually appealed in 
higher level courts, where bribes and kickbacks are paid to accelerate the process and 
guarantee outcomes. Lastly, inadequate processes for accountability and administrative 
control protect those corrupt agents from getting caught and punished for their illegal 
acts. Judges who are poorly paid, have received little or no training and are not 
accountable to their superiors or the society in general feel as though their acts of 
corruption are justified by their low income. These judges lack the ethical behavior to 
change their ways because of their insufficient training and feel immune to any 
punishment because of the inadequate processes of control. 
The relationship between judicial corruption and judicial independence is easy to 
identify but not easy to assess. Independence is directly correlated with the majority of 
                                                            
28 In the last few years, Ecuador has significantly raised judicial salaries in an attempt to control corruption 
in the sector. However, this measure has not yet had the desired effect, since the perception of corruption 
among the citizenship is high and bribery in the judicial system is one of the forms of corruption 
victimization in this country. 
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the factors that cause judicial corruption. Autonomy is supposed to protect the Supreme 
Court from undue influences from members of the executive and legislative branches by 
regulating methods of appointment, tenure and impeachment and protecting the jobs of 
judges who refuse to submit to pressures of parties outside the litigation. External and 
internal independence secure an appropriate level of income, which decrease the 
incentives for corruption; and protect lower level judges from possible threats and 
punishments from their hierarchical superiors. However, the effect of independence on 
judicial corruption is not easy to determine. While on one hand, independence in the 
methods of appointment can prevent the manipulation of judges by other political 
entities, on the other hand an excessive level of internal independence [the autonomy of 
lower court judges from their superiors], combined with inadequate processes of 
administrative control, can encourage judicial corruption because of the lack of 
accountability (Rios-Figueroa 2006, Rose-Ackerman 2001) 
The problem of using independence as a tool to fight judicial corruption is that the 
direction of the relationship is not completely clear. In some cases, independence has 
been identified as one of the potential sources for judicial corruption. The literature 
speaks to the effects that improved methods for selection and appointment as well as 
better salaries for judges and employees could have in decreasing judicial corruption. 
However, judicial corruption can also affect the level of judicial independence. Previous 
studies of judicial reform in Latin America have identified corruption as one of the main 
causes for institutional inertia in the region (Buscaglia and Dakolias 1996, Buscaglia 
2001, Buscaglia, et al. 2000). The studies look at institutional reform in Latin American 
judiciaries and the inertia that stems from the long term benefits of the reforms, such as 
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job stability and judicial independence, in contrast with the short term costs of these 
reforms. In other words reforms promoting independence, uniformity, transparency and 
accountability, which would benefit most segments of society in the medium to long 
term, are often blocked or delayed because the enforcement of these reforms would 
diminish the court personnel’s capacity to seek extra income through bribes.  
Corruption in the judicial branch has also been used as a component for measures 
of judicial independence. Howard and Carey (2004), for example, created a measure of 
de facto judicial independence by coding the paragraphs on the judiciary included in the 
US State Department Human Rights Reports. In the description of the content of these 
reports, the authors stated that “As evidence for independence, the authors usually rely on 
freedom from pressure from other branches of government, particularly executive 
control, and freedom from such acts as bribery and corruption” (287). Just like Howard 
and Carey, other authors have included judicial corruption in their coding of judicial 
independence when using the US State Department Reports (Donoso 2007, Tate and 
Keith 2006)29 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
29  In fact, judicial corruption is considered as a component in my measure of judicial independence that 
codes the US State Department Human Rights Reports.  
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Corruption in Latin America 
 
While I have, thus far, focused exclusively on the judiciary, corruption is a much 
broader problem. Recent studies claim that democracy in the region is threatened by the 
expansion of corruption that started precisely after Latin American countries made their 
transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes (Weyland 1998).  Corruption, defined 
as the misuse of private office for public gain, reflects a failure of the political institutions 
within a society (Jain 2001). However, corrupt acts can be the outcome of beneficial rules 
as well as harmful policies. For example, one can pay a bribe to avoid the penalty for a 
committed infraction; but corruption can also be stimulated by inefficient institutions and 
individuals attempting to get around them (Svensson 2005). 
Countries with high levels of corruption share similar characteristics. According 
to Svensson, the majority of countries suffering high levels of corruption are developing 
countries or countries in transition. They are also nations currently or recently governed 
by socialist leaders and have low levels of income. Many countries in Latin America fit  
that profile. The majority of countries in the region suffer from low income levels. Also, 
many Latin American nations are still considered to be transitioning democracies. 
Corruption has also been associated with a presidential system of government (Rose-
Ackerman 2001), high levels of state centralization (Weyland 1998), federalism and civil 
law traditions. In the specific case of Latin America, however, Treisman (2000) 
concludes that once controls are introduced for low levels of income and unstable 
democracies, countries in this regions are not significantly more corrupt that countries on 
Western Europe and North America. 
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Measuring corruption in the region 
 
 Corruption is a concept that is easy to define but difficult to measure. In a sense, 
corruption is like democracy, we know it when we see it, but the concept remains 
essentially contested. The secretive nature of corruption only makes it that much harder 
to measure. We know that corruption exists, but direct witnesses are few and those with 
direct knowledge of corrupt acts usually have an interest in keeping them secret. 
Difficulties in measuring concepts of this nature often end in reification, or thinking 
about operational measures as though they were the concept itself (Babbie 1995:116). 
 However, in order to effectively fight corruption one must first be able to measure 
it. Kaufmann et al (2007:318-23) address several issues of corruption measurement in the 
Global Corruption Report produced by Transparency International.  In a brief paper, the 
authors identify various myths that are often cited about measuring corruption and 
compare them with reality. 
• Myth: Corruption cannot be measured  
o Reality: There are several ways to measure corruption. Be it by gathering 
the informed views of relevant stakeholders, tracking countries’ 
institutional features or by careful audits of specific projects. 
• Myth: Subjective data reflect vague and generic perceptions of corruption rather 
than specific objective realities. 
o Reality: Because of the nature of corruption, perceptions based on 
experiences are sometimes the only and best information available. Also, 
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survey based questions of corruption have become increasingly specific, 
focused and quantitative. 
• Myth: Subjective data are too unreliable for use in measuring corruption. 
o Reality: All efforts to measure corruption are susceptible to some kind of 
uncertainty and error, no measure is ever 100% reliable. 
• Myth: We need hard objective measures of corruption in order to progress in the 
fight against corruption. 
o Reality: Because of the clandestine nature of corruption, it is virtually 
impossible to come up with a precise objective measure of it.  
• Myth: Subjective measures of corruption are not actionable and so cannot guide 
policymakers in the fight against corruption. 
o Reality: Several surveys of firms and individuals ask detailed and 
disaggregated questions about corruption. While these questions may not 
always point to specific reforms needed, they do help in identifying 
priority areas for action. 
• Myth: Many countries with high corruption also had fast growth. 
o Reality: While there have been countries, such as Bangladesh, that scored 
poorly on corruption measures yet grew impressively over the last decade, 
one must not confuse these exceptions with the stronger empirical 
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evidence suggesting that corruption adversely affects growth in the long 
run. 
While the authors make a solid case in favor of measures of corruption, there are 
two omissions that I would like to address. First, besides the informed views of 
stakeholders, the tracking of institutional features and the auditing of specific projects, 
corruption can be measured by looking at the experiences of the victims themselves. By 
omitting the experiences of the common citizens with corruption, researchers make the 
assumption that much of corruption arises primarily within the context of business deals. 
When analyzing the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, Seligson 
points out, 
“The great strength of these data sources is also a weakness. They tap into the perceptions 
of individuals engaged in international business and thus are good at evaluating business 
transactions, but they are weak at tapping into the whole range of activities pursued by 
the citizens of the countries being evaluated” (2006:384-85) 
 
The second omission is related to the first, and it refers to the assertion by the authors that 
perceptions based on experiences are sometimes the only and best information available. 
While the nature of corruption is indeed clandestine, it is more so for witnesses and 
offenders than for victims of corruption. By ignoring the victims of corruption, measures 
of corruption are losing vital information about the nature of corruption and its 
consequences on democratic countries. In the next few pages I will talk more about 
measures of corruption utilized in Latin America. I will introduce the measure of 
victimization that will be used to test the relationship between judicial independence and 
corruption in the region. 
  75
Corruption Perception Index 
 
One of the most commonly used measures on corruption worldwide is the 
Corruption Perception Index [CPI] by Transparency International. Starting fourteen years 
ago, the CPI is a composite index that makes use of surveys of business people and 
assessments by country analysts. In 2006, the CPI ranked 163 countries based on 12 
different polls and surveys from nine independent institutions, including Freedom House, 
the World Economic Forum and the United Nations, among others (Graf 2007). The 
index assigns a score to each country based on the information compiled from all of the 
gathered sources. The scores range from a 10, which means “highly clean” to a 0, for 
countries that are considered to be “highly corrupt”. Table III-1 illustrates how the 
countries pertinent to this dissertation fared on the Corruption Perception Index. 
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Table III.1 Corruption Perception Index 2006 
Country Surveys Used 2006 CPI Score 
Chile 7 7.3 
Uruguay 5 6.4 
Costa Rica 5 4.1 
El Salvador 5 4.0 
Colombia 7 3.9 
Brasil 7 3.3 
Mexico 7 3.3 
Peru 5 3.3 
Panama 4 3.1 
Dominican Republic 5 2.8 
Bolivia 6 2.7 
Guatemala 5 2.6 
Nicaragua 6 2.6 
Paraguay 5 2.6 
Guyana 5 2.5 
Honduras 6 2.5 
Ecuador 5 2.3 
Venezuela 7 2.3 
Haiti 3 1.8 
 
 Of the 163 countries that were included in the 2006 CPI rankings, the Latin 
American country with the lowest level of corruption was Chile, ranking in the 20th place. 
Haiti, on the other hand, was at the bottom of the list, in 163rd place. It is interesting that 
only two countries in the region, Chile and Uruguay, scored better than a five, meaning 
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that the rest of the countries in Latin America are perceived to be more corrupt than 
clean. Also, the difference between Costa Rica, the third place in the ranking, and 
Venezuela, the second to last, is fewer than two points, which does not show a drastic 
difference between one country and the other.  Another point of interest is that while 
Transparency International used up to twelve different sources to grade each country, in 
the case of Latin American countries no more than seven sources were ever used to 
evaluate a country and in the case of Haiti there were only three available data sources. 
Finally, as Seligson (2006) pointed out, the results of the CPI may be strongly influenced 
by factors other than direct observation by participants. Consider the case of Ecuador. In 
2006, Ecuador scored a 2.3 on the 0-10 scale by TI. The scored reflected a high rate of 
corruption victimization, which at the time was over 30% in the country. In 2008, 
Ecuador’s score on the CPI was 2.0, even though corruption victimization had decreased 
to 25% (Cordova 2008). The disparity between the two indexes may be due to the fact 
that the CPI is based on perceptions by the business elites, who are openly opposed to the 
incumbent President of that nation, and so the fall in the CPI may not have been 
reflecting an increase in corruption, but an increasing discontent of the business elites 
with a left wing government.  
Global Corruption Barometer 
 
 Another effort by Transparency International, the Global Corruption Barometer 
seeks to understand how and in what ways corruption affects ordinary people’s lives, 
providing an indication of the form and extent of corruption from the view of citizens 
around the world (Lavers 2007). In 2006, the Barometer consisted of public opinion 
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surveys carried out in 62 low, middle and high income countries. In total, over 59,000 
respondents were interviewed in this effort. 
 The Barometer explores incidences of petty bribery, presenting information on the 
institutions and public services most affected by bribery, the frequency of bribery, and 
how much people have to pay. Also, the Global Corruption Barometer looks at 
perceptions about the governments’ efforts to fight corruption in these countries. For the 
purpose of analysis, individual countries are grouped into regions.  
 A brief overview of the results tells us that Latin America is a region highly 
affected by corruption. According to the Barometer, over 30% of Latin American citizens 
reported paying a bribe in the year prior to the survey. This percentage almost doubles the 
sample’s mean which is 17% and is only surpassed by Africa, where 55% of the 
respondents were victimized by corruption in the 12 months that preceded the survey. But 
perhaps the more telling results stem from the citizens’ perceptions of their government’s 
performance in the fight against corruption. When asked how they would assess their 
government’s actions against corruption, only 7% of Latin American respondents 
believed it was very effective. Conversely, 29% stated it was not effective, 19% said their 
governments do not fight corruption at all and 23% of Latin American citizens responded 
that their governments actually encourage corruption in their countries. 
The results presented by the Global Corruption Barometer represent a step 
forward in the efforts by Transparency International to measure corruption in the world 
and are certainly useful in the design of public policies against corruption. However, the 
Barometer is not without problems. For the 2006 round, only ten countries, fewer than 
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half of the countries in the region, were analyzed in what was called the Latin America 
regional grouping. Notably absent from the grouping was Brazil, the region’s largest 
country. Also, there was only one Central American country, Panama, and only one 
country from the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic.  
But perhaps the biggest problem with the Global Corruption Barometer has to do 
with sampling. In six out of the ten Latin American countries surveyed for the study, the 
data were gathered exclusively from urban areas. Furthermore, in the Dominican 
Republic, surveys were only carried out in two cities, Santiago and Santo Domingo. Only 
Argentina, Mexico and Peru had nationally representative samples. Also, in countries like 
Colombia and Panama, where only residents of urban areas were interviewed; the surveys 
were conducted via telephone (Hodess and Lavers 2006). These sampling decisions 
present two problems. One is the automatic exclusion of every low income family in 
urban areas without a phone line and another is the over-representation of women, who 
are usually the ones at home during work hours. All of these shortcomings conspire 
against a truly representative sample of the region in the Global Corruption Barometer. 
AmericasBarometer’s Corruption Perception Measure 
 
 The Latin American Public Opinion Project’s [LAPOP] AmericasBarometer is 
the most comprehensive series of surveys about democratic values and attitudes in the 
region. The 2006-2007 round, which I am using for the purpose of this study, includes 
public opinion surveys conducted in 22 countries in the continent, including Latin 
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America, the Caribbean, Canada and the United States.30 In all, over 28,000 respondents 
were included in nationally representative samples over the course of one year.   
 In order to get at the perception of corruption that citizens have, the 
AmericasBarometer asks the following question: 
Considering your experience and what you have heard, corruption among public 
officials is: (1) Generalized (2) Somewhat generalized (3) Not to extensive (4) Not 
extensive at all. 
 Figure III-1 shows a country ranking based on the individual answers of 
respondents to this question.  For the purpose of the graph, the answers were recoded to a 
scale from 0 to 100, where 100 is the highest level of perceived corruption and zero the 
lowest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 Although Canada and the United States are included in the 2006 round of the AmericasBarometer, I will 
not include them in the quantitative analysis that follows. The main reason is a disparity in the 
questionnaires, since the surveys in the United States and Canada were conducted over the phone and the 
questionnaires had to be much shorter. 
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Figure III-1. Perceptions of Corruption in Latin America 
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A first glance at the results shows that the distribution of the countries is relatively 
similar to the CPI. Chile and Uruguay are at the bottom of the graph, which means that 
their citizens perceive their public officials to be less corrupt. At the very top of the list is 
Ecuador, a country that has one of the lowest scores on the Corruption Perception Index. 
However, there are also some drastic differences between the two measures. Countries 
like Bolivia and Haiti, which ranked at the bottom of the list according to TI, are depicted 
in this graph as having citizens that perceive only moderate levels of corruption of their 
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public officials. Several studies conducted on these data (Donoso 2005, Seligson 2006, 
Zephyr 2007), however, show that sometimes these perceptions have little to do with the 
actual levels of corruption in their countries and more to do with other factors. 
Perceptions of corruption are sometimes influenced by how citizens perceive the efficacy 
of their government, their personal economic situations and even how they relate to 
others. Also, perceptions of corruption are swayed by the citizens’ own experiences. 
Respondents who have been victimized by corruption usually tend to perceive higher 
levels of public official corruption than those who have not personally experienced 
corruption.   In any case, Figure III-1 illustrates the tendency of citizens in Central and 
South America to believe that the public officials who serve them are dishonest and 
corrupt. 
AmericasBarometer’s Corruption Victimization Index 
 
 Inspired by crime victimization surveys, originally created by criminologists to 
deal with the problem of manipulation of official data regarding criminal violence, 
LAPOP created an index that focuses on actual citizen experience with public sector 
corruption. To that effect, a module of questions on corruption experience was 
developed. In this approach, citizens are asked about their personal experience with 
corruption over the year immediately prior to the survey. Although a study of longer time 
frames can be attempted, it is not advisable, since the memory of respondents tends to 
become less reliable with time (Tourangeau, et al. 2000).  In order to create the 
corruption victimization index, the following questions were asked: 
1. Has a police officer requested a bribe from you in the last year? 
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2. Has a public official asked you for a bribe in the last year? 
3. Have you had any dealings with your city hall in the last year? If so, were you 
required to pay any additional fees other than those required by law? 
4. Do you work? If so, have you been asked for an inappropriate payment at work in 
the last year? 
5. Have you had any dealings with the courts in the last year? If so, were you ever 
asked to pay a bribe in the courts? 
6. Did you use the public health services in the last year? If so, did you have to pay a 
bribe to be seen by a doctor? 
7. Have you had a child in school in the last year? If so, were you asked to pay a 
bribe in your child’s school? 
The AmericasBarometer index of corruption victimization compiles the number of 
ways in which citizens experienced corruption during the year prior to the survey. Figure 
III-2 shows the percentage of citizens who were victimized by corruption at least once in 
the 12 months before the surveys were administered. 
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Figure III-2. Corruption Victimization in Latin America 
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The first thing that is striking about these findings is the disparity between the 
perception of corruption and actual corruption victimization in Bolivia and Haiti. In 
Figure III-1, Haiti and Bolivia were described as two of the countries in the region with 
the lowest levels of corruption perception. In reality, however, one out of every two 
Haitians had to pay a bribe at least once in the year prior to the survey, and almost 35% 
of Bolivians had the same experience. As mentioned earlier, this disparity is mainly due 
to external factors that affect a respondent’s perception of corruption but are not 
necessarily related to it. I will explore this further than the line when I analyze the effect 
of judicial independence on individual perceptions of corruption. On the other hand, 
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Uruguay and Chile have consistently shown to be the countries with the lowest levels of 
corruption in the region, both in perceptions and in actual citizen experience. 
 While measuring corruption victimization opens new avenues for research on 
corruption and contributes to the identification of the sources of corrupt behavior, 
identifying areas of priority for policy makers, there are two limitations that accompany 
these types of measurements. One is that questions on bribery do not always allow the 
researcher to isolate the respondent as the victim of corruption. In some instances, the 
respondents are willing participants who deliberately seek to circumvent the norms in 
order to advance their own objectives (Seligson 2006:389). Another limitation is that 
these types of measurements fail to tap into high level corruption. Though this is a valid 
criticism, one must not assume that low level and high level corruption are not related. 
Usually corruption at the street level is the consequence of corrupt behavior trickling 
down from the higher spheres of government (Becker 1999). 
 
Judicial Independence and Corruption 
 
 The focus of this section is to explore the relationship between judicial 
independence and corruption in Latin America. While it has been established that there is 
a connection between independence and corruption within the judiciary, it is not clear 
whether the connection is maintained when corruption is measured at the street level. In 
an attempt to answer this question, I interviewed several judicial experts, legislators and 
decision makers, in order to find out what, if anything, makes judicial independence 
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important in the fight against corruption31. The answers I received were as diverse as the 
experts who gave them. Some spoke of a strong relationship between independence and 
corruption. A lawyer and member of the constitutional assembly told me that “there is a 
clear relationship between independence and corruption and I would say so without any 
data backing me up”. A member of the Supreme Court also believes that the two are 
clearly related “Corruption is fueled by impunity. An independent judge doesn’t answer 
to anybody but himself and the law. Therefore, there will be less impunity and in turn less 
corruption”, he said. On the other hand, another Supreme Court Justice thinks believes 
the association is more complex than that. He reports that “the relationship between 
corruption and judicial independence is one that must be looked at carefully. At the 
highest levels of a political sphere, this is an easy relationship to weed out; however at 
the lower level the connection is not so clear or direct, because the common citizen is too 
far from high political spheres”. In the end, I found that although a majority believes that 
there is a relationship between judicial independence and corruption, there is no clear 
consensus among the experts on this subject. 
 After listening carefully to the opinions and experiences of experts, I have 
identified two ways in which judicial independence affects corruption at the ground level. 
One is by making the citizens resort to corruption as an alternative solution and the other 
one is by forcing citizens to pay bribes in order to obtain a public service.  The judiciary 
is conceived as a mechanism for conflict resolution between parties, be them public or 
private. If this mechanism is not working properly, it fails to accomplish its goals and 
                                                            
31 All the interviews were conducted by the author in Quito and Guayaquil during the months of October 
and November of 2007. 
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citizens are left with the option of seeking alternative methods to resolve their problems. 
Corruption is one of the more common alternative solutions. In order to function the way 
it is supposed to, a judiciary must be accessible, efficient and independent. When one of 
these requisites is missing, the judiciary cannot supply the citizens with timely justice and 
citizens are left to look for other ways to obtain it. It is easier to imagine corruption as the 
result of lack of access or efficiency than as a result of a dependent judicial power, but 
one has to understand that efficiency, access and independence are not mutually 
exclusive concepts. The problems of access or efficiency are more often than not directly 
related to the lack of judicial independence. For example, the lack of fiscal independence 
of the judiciary in any given country is going to affect this judiciary’s capacity to 
maintain a physical presence in remote areas of the country, thus affecting access to 
justice. Also, the lack of qualifications of a Supreme Court judge, a vital requisite for 
judicial independence, will undoubtedly affect his performance and efficiency when it 
comes to the timely and appropriate emission of rulings. 
 An illustration of how the lack of independence forces the common citizen to 
resort to corruption was given to me by an experienced lawyer. He gave me the example 
of a traffic accident between two uninsured private parties. Under a working judiciary, 
both parties would be subject to the decision of a judge, based on a police report 
describing the accident. However, usually parties involved in a traffic accident will 
automatically assume that the judge is not independent, meaning that his decision will not 
only be influenced by the law and the facts, but can also be swayed by the intervention of 
a third party. The result is that both parties agree to pay the police officer a bribe to leave 
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the scene without filling a report on the accident. That way a private solution can be 
reached between drivers, avoiding lengthy litigious procedures. 
 Another way in which independence affects corruption is by forcing citizens to 
pay for services for which they are not meant to pay. The most common example given to 
me was the one of the citador, or process server. This is the person in charge of 
delivering the citations and subpoenas to the parties involved in a lawsuit. When party A 
sues party B, the citador must deliver the citation to party B’s pre-determined judicial 
locker. However, because of the lack of internal independence, lower courts cannot 
assign any resources to cover the expenses of these clerks. The result is that party A 
becomes responsible for the transportation of the clerk as well as for compensating him 
for his services. If party A refuses, he will simply be unable to carry out the lawsuit. 
However, is there a direct empirical connection between the independence of a 
judiciary and corruption? In the pages that follow, I argue that in countries with strong 
and independent judiciaries, experiences with corruption are less frequent than in 
countries where the judiciary is weak and heavily influenced by other sources. Figure III-
3 shows the bivariate relationships between the four measures of judicial independence 
used in this study and corruption victimization in Latin America. According to the 
graphic, all four measures of judicial independence are negatively related to corruption 
victimization in the region. The bars show that on average, citizens that were not 
victimized by corruption in the year prior to the survey live in countries with higher 
levels of judicial independence than respondents who had to pay some sort of bribe. The 
results are consistent across all four measures of independence, showing higher average 
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values of independence for citizens who were not forced to pay bribes in public or private 
instances. 
Over the following pages, I will use individual multilevel models to test the 
multivariate relationships between judicial independence and corruption and discuss the 
consequences that the different ways of measuring independence have on this variable’s 
effect on corruption victimization in Latin America. 
Figure III-3. Judicial Independence and Corruption 
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Dependent Variable: 
 
 The dependent variable is corruption victimization, measured based on the 
experiences of citizens with corruption in several public and private settings. An index of 
corruption victimization was built based on the seven questions I enumerated earlier. 
These questions look at bribery with the police, public employees, within the court 
system, in schools, hospitals and at work. Of the 30,000 respondents in the 2006 round of 
the Americas Barometer, 22% were victimized by corruption at least once in the year 
prior to the survey. However, very few people reported being a victim of corruption two 
or more times. Using the index of corruption victimization would decrease the precision 
of the coefficients, due mainly to the decreasing number of observations in the categories 
that measure multiple experiences with corruption. That is why I have decided to use a 
dichotomous variable of corruption victimization as the dependent variable. This means 
that a value of zero will be assigned to the respondents who did not experience corruption 
in the year prior to the survey, and a value of one will be assigned to those who were 
forced to pay a bribe. 
Independent Variable: 
 
 The independent variable is judicial independence. I use four different measures 
of independence, two de iure and two de facto. The first formal, or de iure measure of 
independence from Rios-Figueroa. As I described earlier, this measure is based in several 
formal constitutional provisions grouped into three categories. Autonomy, measured as 
the institutional level independence of the Supreme Court regarding the other branches of 
government. External independence, which refers to the individual autonomy of Supreme 
Court Justices, their appointment, removal and tenure and internal independence, looking 
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at the relationships between lower court judges and their hierarchical superiors. The 
second formal measure of judicial independence comes from Tate, Poe and Keith and it 
also looks at constitutional provisions that are supposed to guarantee independence. This 
measure focuses on nine specific stipulations. Guaranteed terms for Supreme Court 
Justices, exclusive authority of judges to decide on their competence, finality of the 
decisions of the Supreme Court, fiscal autonomy for the judicial branch, a constitutional 
guarantee for separation of powers, enumerated qualifications for Supreme Court Justices 
a ban on exceptional and military courts, the power of judicial review and finally the 
existence of a hierarchical system within the judiciary. 
 Two measures of practical judicial independence are also used in this section. The 
first measure is the result of analyzing the 2005 State Department’s Human Rights 
Reports for every country in the region. Their analyses of these reports contain several 
paragraphs that address the judicial branches of these countries and an assessment of their 
independence. The autonomy of the judiciary is measured on a three point scale that goes 
from low to high based on the descriptions given in the reports. Finally, a second de facto 
measure of judicial independence is based on a survey of Chief Executive Officers and 
top economic managers conducted by the World Economic Forum. The survey asks a 
question about the independence of the judiciary. The measure is based on a seven point 
scale that goes from heavily influenced to totally independent. 
Control Variables: 
 
 I have introduced several socio-demographic factors as control variables, given 
that corruption, especially in the form of bribery, does not discriminate based on political 
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or ideological preferences.  Based on prior studies of corruption victimization (Seligson 
06, Zephyr 07) I have introduced the following control variables. 
• Education measured by number of years. Education tends to be positively 
correlated with corruption, meaning that those who are more educated have a 
larger probability of being victims of corruption than those who are less 
educated. At first glance this assertion may sound counterintuitive, since one 
would expect more educated people to be less susceptible to bribery. However, 
the difference may be due to an underreporting on the part of less educated 
people, who tend to justify corruption and view it as normal. 
• Age measured in different groupings. LAPOP’s data shows that adults between 26 
and 35 are in the age group with the highest probability of being victimized by 
corruption. This is not surprising, since adults in that age group make up the 
majority of the economically active population in Latin America and because of 
that they are more exposed to corruption. As age increases, the probability of 
being victimized by corruption decreases.  
• Gender. Because of traditional gender roles in Latin America, males are usually 
more exposed to corruption than females, especially in the work place, in the 
court system and in instances involving public officials. The only instance were 
women are more susceptible to corruption according to LAPOP’s data is in their 
children’s schools. 
• Size of the town. Usually people living in large cities have a larger probability of 
being victimized than people living in small towns or rural areas. There is usually 
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little to no presence of the state in small and rural towns, which drastically 
reduces the probability of corruption victimization. 
• Wealth measured by the ownership of material goods. A variable closely 
associated with education, wealth is also positively correlated with corruption 
victimization, meaning that as wealth increases so does the probability of being 
victimized by corruption. 
• Number of children. As one would imagine, a larger number of children increases 
the probability of corruption victimization, especially in public hospitals and 
schools. 
Results and Analysis: 
 
 The nature of my data requires that I combine information at the level of the 
respondents but also at a country level. This means that my data has a multilevel structure 
where one unit of analysis [individuals] is nested within the other [countries] (Bryk and 
Raudenbush 1992). To estimate my models, I rely on a statistical technique developed 
specifically for modeling multilevel data structures (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 
Steenbergen and Jones 2002). In multilevel models, the dependent variable [corruption 
victimization] varies at the lowest level, taking on different values for different level-1 
units [individual respondents] within the same level-2 cluster [countries]. However, 
explanatory variables can either vary at level 1 or at level 2. For instance, while education 
can change from one individual to the next, judicial independence is constant between 
individuals of the same country (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). 
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 Prior to the regression analysis, a test of variance was conducted. The goal of the 
test was to find out if variation in the dependent variable occurs only at the individual 
level or if there is any variation at the country level. The results indicated that 
approximately 7% of the variation in the dependent variable happens at the country level, 
and that this percentage is statistically significant. This means that multilevel analysis can 
be conducted with these data. Table III-2 shows the result of the logistic multilevel 
models that regressed corruption victimization on judicial independence in Latin 
America. All four models are consistent in respect to the effect that the individual level 
control variables have on the dependent variable. As I explained earlier, education and 
wealth have a positive and significant relationship with corruption victimization. This 
means that citizens that are more educated or own more material goods have a higher 
probability of being victimized by corruption than their favored counterparts. Conversely, 
age and the size of the city were the respondents live have a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with corruption victimization. Older citizens and citizens living in 
small size towns are less susceptible to corruption victimization than younger citizens and 
respondents living in large cities. Finally, females have a smaller probability than males 
of being demanded a bribe in private or public instances. 
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Table III-2. Corruption Victimization Regressed on Judicial Independence, Age, 
Education, Wealth, Urban/Rural, Size of Town and Number of Children (Multilevel 
Model) 
Corruption Regressed on Judicial Independence and Control Variables 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Coef. Std. 
error 
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error
P>|z|
Age -.100 .012 .000 
.000 
-.100 .013 .000 
.000 
-.099 .013 .000 
.000 
-.099 .013 .000 
.000 
Education .037 .004 .000 
.000 
.037 .004 .000 
.000 
.037 .004 .000 
.000 
.037 .004 .000 
.000 
Wealth .081 .009 .000 
.000 
.081 .009 .000 
.000 
.081 .009 .000 
.000 
.081 .009 .000 
.000 
Urban/rural .100 .056 .076 
.037 
.100 .056 .075 
.037 
.100 .056 .075 
.037 
.101 .056 .074 
.037 
Size of 
town 
-.083 .016 .000 
.000 
-.084 .016 .000 
.000 
-.083 .016 .000 
.000 
-.083 .016 .000 
.000 
Number of 
children 
.054 .008 .000 
.000 
.054 .008 .000 
.000 
.054 .008 .000 
.000 
.054 .008 .000 
.000 
Female -.486 .030 .000 
.000 
-.486 .030 .000 
.000 
.485 .030 .000 -.485 .030 .000 
.000 
Indep. RF -.101 .070 .150 
.075 
         
Indep. Tate    -.063 .035 .074 
.037 
      
Indep. 
HRR 
         -.409 .182 .025 
.012 
Indep. 
WEF 
      -.265 .113 .019 
.009 
   
Const. -1.20 .304 .000 -.819 .449 .069 .845 .347 .015 -1.24 .218 .000 
N 28422 28422 28422 28422 
 
 Table III-2 shows mixed results when it comes to the effect of judicial 
independence on corruption victimization. The columns showing the P values have two 
numbers after each coefficient. The first number indicates the P value obtained after 
conducting a two-tailed test of significance, the number below indicates the results of a 
one-tailed test. The latter is a slightly less robust test of statistical significance that is 
conducted when the researcher has a concrete hypothesis regarding the direction of the 
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relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  The results indicate that 
the two de iure measures have a negative impact on corruption victimization, but they are 
not statistically significant when the two-tailed test of probability is applied. However, 
the one-tailed test of probability shows slightly different results. While the effect of 
judicial independence on corruption victimization continues to be negative, one of the 
measures, the one formulated by Tate and Keith, becomes statistically significant.  Since 
both measures are the result of several components, I also regressed corruption 
victimization on each of the components that make up the measurements, with almost no 
variation in the results. Rios Figueroa’s formal measure of judicial independence was 
formed by three separate dimensions of independence, autonomy, external independence 
and internal independence. I analyzed each one separately. Autonomy and external 
independence are negatively related to corruption victimization, but their impact is not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the regression coefficient of internal 
independence was positive, meaning that more internal independence, which is the 
autonomy of lower court judges regarding their hierarchical superiors, increases the 
probabilities of corruption victimization. However, this coefficient was not statistically 
significant either.  
 The second formal measure of judicial independence also contained several 
components. The statistical analysis on each of these components showed that only one 
constitutional provision of judicial independence, enumerated qualifications, had a 
significant effect on corruption victimization. The enumerated qualifications provision 
requires the constitution to establish that the selection and career of judges are based on 
merit, qualifications, integrity, ability and efficiency. In other words, good judges that 
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base their decision exclusively on the law and show themselves to be independent and 
free from outside influences have an impact on the reduction of corruption in the region. 
 Other dimensions of formal judicial independence, such as the explicit statement 
in a constitution about the separation of powers, and the fiscal autonomy of the Supreme 
Court had a negative impact on corruption victimization that was statistically significant 
at the .1 level and became statistically significant at the .05 level when a one tailed test 
was conducted. On the other hand, qualifications such as judicial review and the 
establishment of a hierarchical system within the judiciary were positively related with 
corruption victimization. Overall, formal measures of judicial independence proved to be 
an ineffective predictor for corruption victimization. This means that constitutional 
provisions do not translate into an effective reduction of corruption victimization in Latin 
America. This is a significant finding, considering the importance that Latin American 
countries have placed in their constitutional texts lately, so much so that in the last five 
years, three countries in South America, Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela drafted new 
constitutions that included among their many objectives a drastic reduction of corruption 
in their territories. 
 While formal measures of independence did not have the expected impact on 
corruption victimization, both de facto measures of independence did. The multilevel 
logistical regression results show that beyond the individual characteristics that make a 
person more or less susceptible to corruption victimization, context also matters. A young 
educated male in Uruguay, for example, has a smaller probability of being victimized by 
corruption than a person with the same characteristics in Ecuador, a country with very 
low levels of judicial independence.  Figure III-4 illustrates the effect of judicial 
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independence on corruption victimization. The dots to the right of the zero line represent 
a positive and statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable while the 
dots to the left of the line represent a negative and statistically significant relationship. 
The graph shows that except for the urban/rural variable, all of the other individual level 
factors significantly affect a respondent’s probabilities of being victimized by corruption. 
The confidence interval around the judicial independence dot is larger than the others 
because independence is a level two measure, and so the number of observations is 
reduced from 30,000 individuals to 20 countries. 
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Figure III-4. Corruption Victimization Regressed on Number of Children, Wealth, 
Education, Age, Size of Town, Urban/Rural, Sex and Judicial Independence 
Judicial Independence HRR
Female
Urban/Rural
Size of town
Age
Education
Wealth
Number of children
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2
95% C.I. 
 
 
 Figure III-5 shows the effect of judicial independence at the country level, 
measured by the World Economic Forum, on corruption victimization controlling for all 
other individual level variables. Uruguay and Costa Rica, the countries with the highest 
level of judicial independence according to this measure, are also the countries with the 
lowest levels of corruption victimization. At the other end of the spectrum are countries 
like Haiti, Venezuela and Ecuador, countries with weak and politicized judicial systems 
and significantly higher levels of corruption victimization in the region. 
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Figure III-5.Judicial Independence and Corruption Victimization in Latin America 
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 The statistical analyses, as well as the insights given to us by several experts in 
the judicial field, provide empirical support to the idea that context matters. The data has 
shown that in countries where judicial independence is not only written into the 
constitution but can actually be observed by the country’s citizens and international 
observers, incentives for corruption decrease and individual citizens are better protected 
against bribery in public and private sphere. On the other hand, while formal provisions 
for judicial independence fail to produce a direct effect in corruption victimization in 
Latin America, their importance should not be diminished. Beyond the empirical 
evidence linking the importance of designating qualified and efficient judges and a 
reduction of corruption victimization, formal guarantees for judicial independence protect 
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judges from external influences and help set the ground rules for a more efficient 
judiciary that can effectively assist in the fight against corruption in the region. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 This chapter of the dissertation has attempted to expand on the knowledge of the 
connection between judicial independence and corruption. The first section of this 
chapter looked exclusively inside the judiciary and concluded that widespread tolerance 
for corruption in modern societies; mediocre institutional design and constant influence 
by the other two branches of government are among the main sources for judicial 
corruption. In the next section I went beyond the scope of the judiciary and looked at 
corruption in general in Latin America. I also presented some of the most common 
measures of corruption in the region, including Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index and their newer effort, the Global Corruption Barometer. 
The chapter next turned to the development of an innovation in the way judicial 
independence is linked to corruption, by attempting to uncover the effects of 
independence on corruption victimization in 20 Latin American countries. The results 
showed that independence only has a direct effect on corruption victimization when it is 
measured de facto. Countries where judicial independence is an observable phenomenon 
have greater success in the fight against corruption than countries where the judiciary is 
constantly subject to external influences. The encouraging preliminary results suggest 
that extending the dataset in time would be a worthwhile enterprise, given that while 
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formal measures of judicial independence show little variance over time, practical 
measures, which produce an observable effect on corruption victimization, do vary in 
shorter time spans give their susceptibility to political events, especially in a turbulent 
region like Latin America.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
 The efficacy of the rule of law is based on the ability of the State to enforce and 
comply with the laws of the land in an appropriate, efficient and timely manner. A 
functioning judiciary is a crucial element in the maintenance of the rule of law, since it is 
the enforcer of the norms and the principal vehicle used to resolve conflicts between the 
State and its citizens. Judicial reform and the consolidation of the autonomy of the justice 
system have been top priorities in Latin America when it came time to design new public 
policies.  These reforms have been aimed to strengthen the judicial power with respect to 
the Executive and the Legislature, but also to improve the way the case load is managed, 
the competence of the judges and the overall mechanisms of conflict resolution.  The 
relevance of justice reform, however, may seem diminished when the system overall 
lacks legitimacy among the population. This chapter explores the effects that judicial 
independence has on the personal attitudes of citizens. It explores the consequences of 
those attitudes on the consolidation of liberal democracy in the continent. The first 
section of this chapter will look at the rule of law, its definition and its importance in a 
democratic system. The second section will deal with the effect that justice reforms in 
Latin America have had on the rule of law. Finally, I will explore the empirical 
relationship between judicial independence and individual citizen support for the 
institutions that enforce the rule of law in Latin America. 
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What is the Rule of Law? 
 
 Democracy cannot exist without the rule of law. A constitution is useless without 
a judiciary that supports it. A law is ineffective without officials to uphold it and an 
election is empty if the winners do not respect the rights of all citizens. The ability of a 
nation to create a rule of law helps determine a democracy’s character and future 
prospects. The rule of law makes constitutional rights a reality, and adopting measures to 
create it is therefore one of the biggest steps towards democratic consolidation (Ungar 
2002). Without rule of law, the undemocratic patterns rooted in the history of Latin 
American countries will flourish under the cover of democratic institutions eventually 
undercutting them. 
One question that arises from the above paragraph is “What does it take to 
construct the rule of law?” The first element most commonly identified by the existing 
literature is an accountable, law abiding state whose agencies cooperate with judicial 
procedures, carry out court rulings and follow constitutional norms in good faith (Dorsen 
and Gifford 2001, Maravall and Przeworski 2003). But, why would governments, with 
ready access to multiple means of repression, be induced to make their behavior 
predictable and cooperate with other agencies? To answer this question one might have to 
look back all the way to Machiavelli. His thesis, essentially, is that governments are 
driven to make their own behavior for the sake of cooperation (1985). Governments tend 
to behave as if they were bound by law, rather than using the law unpredictably as a 
means to discipline subject populations. They do this less because they fear rebellion than 
because they have specific goals that require a degree of voluntary cooperation from 
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specific social groups possessing various skills and assets. Assuming that a political ruler 
is internally coherent, acts upon rational calculations and is in full control of the means of 
repression, the only reason to submit to regularized constraint is the perception of the 
benefits of doing so. This position, first stated by Machiavelli, was later defended by 
Tocqueville, who stated that “if remote advantages could prevail over the passions and 
needs of the moment, there would have been no tyrannical sovereigns or exclusive 
tyrannies” (1969:210). In order to maintain a self-sustaining system, however, some 
constitutional rules restraining rulers must be crated, always allocating power to 
individuals with a strong incentive to keep the system in place. 
The Machiavellian analysis, while, suggestive, remains incomplete, because a 
political authority that submits to constitutional restraints to obtain voluntary social 
cooperation has no incentive to treat all groups equally, since it needs the cooperation of 
some groups more than the cooperation of others (Holmes 2003). The second part of the 
answer of why the rulers subject to the rules is provided by Rousseau. He claimed that if 
we define the rule of law in such a way as to exclude disproportionate influence of 
organized interests on the making, interpreting and applying of the law, we have 
identified a system that has never existed and will never exist. This does not mean, 
however, that we should dismiss the concept as useless for descriptive purposes. If we 
identify the rule of law as a point of ideal justice, says Rousseau, then we must admit that 
the rule of law can never be achieved, but it can be approximated. The circle of those able 
to protect their interests can be expanded. According to Rousseau, the rule of law can be 
approximated in those societies where various roughly equal groups making up a large 
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proportion of the population all gain some leverage over the government and its 
privileged social partners (Rousseau 1969). 
The second element in the constriction of the rule of law is a functioning 
judiciary. This judiciary must first be accessible, meaning that impartial mechanisms of 
conflict and grievance resolution, primarily but not exclusively in the judiciary, must be 
available to all individuals. The judiciary must also be an autonomous one, where judges 
and officials make binding decisions on cases and interpretations of the law, with 
necessary logistical and material support and without undue interference from 
governmental or private interests (Abraham 2001, Ungar 2002). Weakness in this 
element has grave consequences. When judiciaries are biased, corrupt and excessively 
bureaucratized, they are prevented from meeting their own procedural standards and 
constitutional obligations. Even if they are efficient, those judiciaries may be inaccessible 
to the vast majority of citizens, discriminatory against certain social sectors, or lacking 
rudimentary channels, such as the notification of defendants’ families. Going back to the 
Machiavellian argument, it is also in the ruler’s convenience to grant full autonomy to its 
judiciary, and take no credit or blame for its actions, thus giving the ruling party the 
option of deniability.  
 The following pages will further explore the importance of judicial independence 
not only as an element of the rule of law, but also as a core ingredient of its definition. 
Judicial independence is a necessary component for the subsistence of the rule of law in 
Latin America, a region that in the recent years has started to build a history of strong, 
dominant executives and judiciaries struggling to ascertain themselves as a valid 
counterweight to executive power.  
  107
Defining the Rule of Law: 
 
A question preliminary to any attempt to define a concept in the social sciences is 
why we seek to define it in the first place. In the case of the rule of law, there are two 
reasons. The first reason is that one obviously  wants to be clear about what is meant by 
the phrase, rule of law. The second reason is that it is necessary to spell out the 
ingredients of the rule of law in order to demonstrate that it is a genuine and living 
principle and not just merely a vague political aspiration (Walker 1988:7). There are 
many ways to define the rule of law. One could do it in terms of the values that it is 
supposed to serve, such as human dignity or individual fulfillment through the 
development of one’s capacities. The rule of law can also be defined in term of the 
principles whereby the institutions that enforce it need to be safeguarded, such as the rule 
that a legal basis must be shown for every government action interfering with the rights 
of the citizens; or in terms of the procedures which those institutions use to serve their 
purpose, such as public hearings, trials, habeas corpus, etc (Dietze 1973). 
In this chapter, I base my definition of the rule of law on the institutions 
responsible for safeguarding those standards and principles that the rule of law values, as 
well as for executing the procedures that enforce it. By examining a country and seeking 
to identify the institutions that serve to maintain its rule of law, we can make an 
assessment on whether or not the rule of law prevails in that country. The point of view 
taken here is that the rule of law does prevail to a greater or lesser degree in countries 
with the appropriate institutional settings. 
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The institutional description of the rule of law I am about to present is a 
summarized version of the definition formulated by Geoffrey Walker (1988:24-42). This 
is one of the most comprehensive definitions of the rule of law and it encompasses the 
institutions and procedures necessary for its safeguarding.  The definition begins by 
accepting a preliminary proposition made before by Joseph Raz (1977), who claimed that 
most of the content of the rule of law can be summed up in two points. One is that people 
[including the government] should be ruled by the law and obey it. The second point is 
that the law should be such that people will be willing and able to be guided by it. From 
these two basic propositions, Walker deduces twelve requirements which I list and 
explain below. These points have been repeatedly stressed as essential by scholars, such 
as Rawls (1973) and Jowell (1985) practitioners and judges. 
• Laws against private coercion: There must be substantive laws prohibiting private 
violence and coercion and of such character as to give the citizen protection 
against general lawlessness and anarchy. 
• Government under law: The government must be bound by substantive law, not 
only by the constitution, but also as far as possible by the same laws as those that 
tie individuals. This includes criminal laws, which, for example, by penalizing 
homicides committed by government authority, protects citizens from any form of 
state terrorism. 
• Certainty, generality and equality: The substantive law must be guided by the 
principle of normativism. Certainty means that all laws should be prospective, 
open and clear, and that they should be relatively stable. This principle condemns 
  109
the enactment of excessively vague laws that delegate to administrators and 
judges the power to deal arbitrarily with citizens. Generality requires that while 
laws should be specific about what they prohibit, they should also not 
particularize the subjects to whom they apply. Unless the law is specific in terms 
and general in application, and remains so over time, it ceases to be a system of 
norms and gives the government scope to become arbitrary in its behavior. 
Finally, the equality principle is in a sense a corollary to the idea of generality. It 
is the main basis for protecting the general interest against influence by pressure 
groups and other special interests. It restrains a legislature from enacting bills 
which unilaterally benefit or injure particular individuals or groups. However, one 
must remember that certainty, generality and equality are relative concepts in the 
legal context. Certainty, for example, must be weighed against the need for 
flexibility, otherwise there will be a danger that the law will move too far out of 
line with public opinion and will become a barrier to progress. 
• General congruence of law with social values: There must be some mechanism 
for ensuring that the law is, and remains, reasonably in accordance with public 
opinion. Otherwise, there may be widespread disrespect for the law and pressures 
for violent change may build up and find expression in arbitrary acts of hostility. 
This mechanism could take a variety of forms. Where the law consists of 
recognized custom, what is needed is a willingness in the part of the courts to give 
due recognition to new customs as they become established and displace old ones. 
Where the statute is an important source of law, some other form of consultation 
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with the people may be required, in the form of direct or representative 
democracy. 
• Enforcement of laws against private coercion: The fundamental requirement here 
is for institutions and procedures that are capable of speedily enforcing the 
substantive laws mentioned above, those which prohibit private violence, 
coercion and anarchy. The rule of law depends on the existence of an effective 
government capable to maintaining law and order.  
• Enforcement of government under law principle: There must be effective 
procedures and institutions, such as the judicial review of executive action, to 
ensure that the government action is also in accordance with law. Without this 
enforceable reciprocity, law cannot operate as a restraint power.  
• Independence of the judiciary: An independent judiciary is an indispensible 
requirement of the rule of law, indeed of all known methods of controlling power. 
It implies freedom from interference by the executive whether by way of threats 
or by way of bribery, such as the offering of the prospect of a successful career 
(Tsang 2001).  Nor should there be any interference by the legislature with the 
exercise of the judicial function. Perhaps the usefulness of judicial independence 
is best described by the following quote by political scientist Ralf Dahrendorf: 
“The power of the law, and of the judiciary, is in its independence. There are 
excellent reasons why notions like respect and dignity should be associated with 
the law above all. There are equally good reasons why the appointment of judges 
and their tenure of position, should be arranged in such a way as to emphasize that 
they are not dependent on any other branch of pubic authority, at least once they 
have been appointed. The power of the law and those who administer is in the 
very fact that they are not competing with the more partisan powers of the 
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executive and even the legislature. Such independence of the judicial department 
may indeed be regarded as the very definition of the rule or law: it is certainly an 
important part of it. If the law and the judiciary come under government control, 
they cease to be necessary as such; if courts become a part of political struggles, 
they merely simulate parliament and parties and lose their function. Either way 
the partisan administration of law is in fact the perversion of law, and the denial 
of the rule of law” (Dahrendorf 1977:9) 
It is in the dispute with the executive or the legislature that judicial independence 
matters the most. Impairing independence undermines confidence in the courts as 
dispute-settling mechanisms. This can threaten the stability, and eventually the 
existence of the social order. While the rule of law requires that judges be 
independent, they must also be bound by law, their function being to interpret the 
law and the fundamental principles and assumptions that underlie it (Wesley-
Smith 2001). If there are no limits to the power of judges to make law we would 
be under the mercy of what Walker calls a judicial oligarchy. 
• Independent legal profession: Some system of legal representation is required. 
This should take the form of an organized and independent legal profession. In 
criminal cases it is particularly important that the accused should have the 
opportunity to be represented.  Even when the independence of the courts has 
been compromised by government pressure, an independent bar can remind the 
judges of their duty and generally keep the rule of law ideals alive.  
• Natural justice; impartial tribunals: The principles of natural justice, as the term is 
understood in law, must be observed in all trials. Whether truly natural or not, 
these principles are certainly very old. The rules of natural justice are defined 
today as including the requirement of an unbiased tribunal, the hearing of both 
sides of the case and open courts with the possibility of press reporting. In 
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criminal cases, there should be a presumption of innocence and denial of a charge 
must not be held against a party in a criminal matter or any other case.  The 
principles of natural justice are closely associated with the requirement for an 
independent court. Their function is to legitimate the court as a dispute-settling 
mechanism by requiring rational procedures that demonstrate a concern for an 
individual and his problems. 
• Accessibility of courts: The courts should be accessible, so that a person’s ability 
to vindicate legal rights is not vanished by long delays or excessive costs. The 
cost of litigation has been a deficiency of judicial systems in a large part of the 
region and that must be overcome, at least in part, by legal aid and by the creation 
of alternative sources of conflict resolution such as mediation and arbitrage 
centers. Along with the costs of litigation, the physical absence of the courts in 
remote areas of several Latin American countries is another grave problem that 
must be solved in order to grant all citizens equal access to justice.  
• Impartial and honest enforcement: The discretion of law enforcement agencies or 
of other government officials or of political office holders should not be allowed 
to pervert the law. Nor should perjury by police officers, a particularly serious 
problem in regimes with strong executives that demonstrate authoritarian 
tendencies. 
• An attitude of legality: While the other eleven items embody the main 
requirements of the rule of law in terms of substantive law, procedures, practices 
and institutions, this one element is difficult to articulate with precision. It is there 
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to remind us that the health and strength of the rule of law does not ultimately 
depend on the efforts of lawyers, judges or police, but on the attitudes of the 
people.  What this requirement of spirit means, therefore, is that having defined 
the concept explicitly, we are still left with an important residue of meaning that 
cannot be translated into words.  The rule of law has a dimension of spirit that 
does not fit into the framework of constitutional and legal concepts. But since 
emotion is the spring to human action, this dimension is what gives the previously 
mentioned concepts their practical force. When the rule of law is defined this 
way, its fundamental importance becomes clear. It is plainly the essential 
precondition of the whole legal, constitutional and perhaps social order. For 
unless the law can command obedience, there is no legal system, unless those in 
power abide by the rules of law laid down for the exercise of power, there is no 
constitution, and unless all parties accept the results of political processes 
undergone in accordance with the law, there is no democracy. The rule of law is 
not a complete formula for the good society, but there can be no good society 
without it. 
In its concluding section, this chapter will take a closer look at the attitudes of citizens 
in Latin America with regards to the rule of law. While the attitudes and beliefs of 
citizens with respect to the institutions that make up the rule of law might be its most 
important component, it is important to realize that they are also influenced by the 
performance of these procedures, practices and institutions. With the empirical analysis 
conducted in this section, I will explore the effect that the independence of the judiciary, 
an indispensible ingredient for the rule of law, has on individual support for the 
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institutions that represent it in Latin America. The next section of the present chapter, 
however, deals with the impact that the judicial reforms conducted in several countries 
throughout the region during the last two decades had on the state of the rule of law and 
ultimately in the consolidation of liberal democracies Latin America. 
 
Judicial Reforms and the Rule of Law in the Americas 
 
When writing about the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville commented on the 
role of the judiciary system in the construction of the rule of law. When referring to the   
U.S. Supreme Court, he stated that “a more imposing judicial power was never 
constructed by any people” (Tocqueville cited in O'Donnell 2000). Tocqueville was 
impressed by the fact that judges were obeyed even when they contradicted the 
preferences and policies of public officials. In the absence of a regular security force, the 
courts’ decision for a reason that he found very difficult and at the same time very simple 
to explain: Most people just felt that the courts decisions had to be obeyed, and there rests 
one of the strongest pillars of democracy in the United States. 
 Many years after Tocqueville would write about democracy in the United States, 
the nations of Latin America reversed a tendency of authoritarian and military 
governments and started a complicated transition towards liberal democracy. A transition 
that, in several countries, is still going on and although usually obscured by more 
prominent actors, the judiciaries of some of these Latin American countries have played a 
crucial role, especially in the beginning of these transitions.  In Argentina, for example, 
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by asserting itself as an independent body, the judiciary was the first branch of the new 
government that took decisive steps to extirpate the image, deeply rooted in Argentine 
society that the citizens had no protections against the State and that important public 
officials were above and beyond the reach of the law. This was achieved mainly by what 
has come to be known as the “Trial of the Military Juntas”, which concluded with several 
convictions, thus starting the vindication of human rights in that country (Alfonsin 1993). 
Although the extent of the convictions for the members of the military juntas was not the 
one hoped by the majority of the population, given the power that the military still had 
even after the transition, the convictions served to show that a democratic regime had 
been put into place and that its judicial system would protect its citizens against unruly 
force by the State. 
 Another judicial institution that played a relevant role in transition periods was the 
office of the prosecutor (Orentlicher 1993). This was true especially in countries where 
the rights of its citizens had been openly violated by the authorities, which was the case 
of many South American and Central American countries, where the government been at 
war with its own people (Dodson and Jackson 1997, Dodson and Jackson 2003). In Chile, 
for example, the office of the prosecutor faced an uphill battle against a Supreme Court 
that, although independent throughout the dictatorship (Correa Sutil 1993), had been 
politically insulated, socially isolated, and had not been accountable to the Chilean 
people. 
 The role of the judiciary in transitional processes was in fact so important that 
some of these processes failed when the judicial system could not adequately perform its 
duties. Such was the case of Haiti, where after finally democratically electing a president 
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in February 1991, the judiciary failed to prosecute cases of corruption, failed to bring 
State terrorists to justice and even failed to establish itself as a functioning branch of the 
State. The weakness of the judiciary and the power of the military gave way to the coup 
that overthrew Aristide and reinstated authoritarian rule in that nation (Aristide 1993). 
 The crucial role of the judiciary in the transition from authoritarian governments 
to democratic regimes would reprise itself years later, with Latin American democracies 
struggling to consolidate, eroding the rule of law so eroded that some even wondered if 
liberal democracy could be achieved at all (Lagos 2003). When Guillermo O’Donnell 
(1996) evaluated the state of the democracies emerging from the third wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991), he observed what he called several “illusions” about 
the prospects of democratic consolidation in the region.  For one, he claimed that the idea 
of reaching Dahl’s classic polyarchy (Dahl 1971) was not within reach given the 
institutional setting of many Latin American democracies.  According to O’Donnell, the 
polyarchies in the region had not yet reached a sufficient degree of institutionalization. 
O’Donnell cites was lack of horizontal accountability within Latin American 
democracies.32 In these regimes, the executives often succeed in their efforts to weaken, 
discredit and delegitimize the institutions that enforced horizontal accountability, 
particularly the judiciaries. 
In the last few years, however, the majority of these democracies started 
aggressive judicial reforms with the hopes of establishing strong and independent 
judiciaries that could serve either as counterweights to strong executives or as stabilizing 
                                                            
32  More on horizontal accountability can be found in Chapter II, in the section dealing with judicial 
independence and accountability. 
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forces in countries with volatile political environments.  One of the major challenges for 
the rule of law in new democracies is to establish credible mechanisms of accountability. 
The judiciary is a key institution in the task of horizontal accountability and 
constitutional control, and so the role of courts is vital to democratic consolidation.  It is 
the judiciary that underpins the establishment of the rule of law and legal accountability 
to constitutional norms. The judiciary is also crucial in the process of building regime 
legitimacy, which increasingly in Latin America is dependent on the capacity of these 
regimes to create credible mechanisms of accountability, public responsibility and the 
effective advancement of citizen rights (Domingo 1995). This is why optimizing judicial 
independence has become a main objective of the legal reforms throughout Latin 
America. 
Judicial independence is critical for courts to have the capacity to fulfill their 
functions of constitutional control, legal accountability and justice administration. 
Autonomy of the courts is necessary to achieve impartiality in the task of adjudication 
and to ensure advancement of the rule of law. However, there are several obstacles that 
must be overcome to achieve the desired level of independence, especially in countries 
with strong executives. When looking at the case of Argentina, for example, Rebecca Bill 
Chavez (2004:23-27) identified several indicators of executive subordination of the 
judiciary. These indicators are related to common political practices used not only in 
Argentina but in other Latin American countries and are useful to understand why 
constitutional provisions just are not enough to ensure an independent judiciary.  
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• The executive uses an opaque process to appoint pliant judges: This often results 
on unqualified appointees or appointees with strong ties to the political party that 
controls the executive branch or with personal ties to the administration. 
• The executive violates judges’ tenure protection: This practice creates obscure, 
political removal processes and noncompliance with formal and constitutional 
impeachment rules. 
• The executive violates judges’ salary protection: The result is usually a reduction 
in judges’ real salary. 
• The executive packs the Supreme Court: The result is an unstable and politicized 
Supreme Court created as a result of frequent changes in the number of Supreme 
Court Justices. 
• Judges are unwilling to endure the costs of ruling against executive interests: The 
consequences of this unwillingness are rulings that uphold government acts of 
dubious constitutionality and rulings in favor of executive officials suspected of 
committing acts of corruption during their tenure. 
Besides these political obstacles, judicial reforms also face institutional, 
infrastructural and organizational obstacles along the way. There are serious structural 
problems regarding court administration, resulting of high levels of inefficiency. In many 
countries, administrative tasks are concentrated in the high courts. Courts are also facing 
the consequences of fiscal dependency. Budget allocations often fall short of what is 
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needed to run a fully autonomous judiciary and low resources usually result in inefficient 
practices, corruption and inaccessibility for the general population. 
Given the nature and the sources of the challenges faced by judicial reformers in 
Latin America, mixed results are to be expected. In the case of Argentina, for example, 
although the Peronist party was induced to initiate constitutional revisions to strengthen 
the judiciary, the party then proved unable to accept the costs of an independent judiciary 
and failed to implement these changes, via a legislative enactment. Only once the 
Peronists believed they were unlikely to maintain power did they implement the 
constitutional revisions initiated by themselves year before (Finkel 2004). The results of 
the implementation have also been mixed. Looking at two provinces of Argentina, San 
Luis and Mendoza, Bill Chavez (2004) found that judicial reforms did break some 
patterns of executive dominance in Mendoza, but failed to do so in the province of San 
Luis. The survival of those patterns, however, should not always be blamed on the 
reformers, but also on the members of the judiciary themselves. One of the perils of 
independent judiciaries is that they are free to side with whom they want, and that means 
that they are free to side with the executive as well. According to Gargarella (2004), 
Supreme Court Judges are usually from the same background. They are members of the 
elite, educated at the same schools and belonging to the same social circles. So, they may 
be independent, but they can still sympathize with the executive.  
Another relatively failed experiment is the case of Ecuador. According to several 
legal and constitutional experts, as well as current and former members of the Supreme 
Court, the 1998 Ecuadorian constitution enacted several positive reforms that 
strengthened the independence of the judiciary. However, it did not stop the Supreme 
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Court from making unpopular and controversial decisions, nor could it even stop a 
relatively fragile executive from disbanding the Supreme Court and creating a new one 
with pliant judges.  As Gargarella claims “Politically independent, well-educated and 
well equipped judges could still write many questionable decisions, particularly, but not 
only, in legally and politically unstable communities” (2004:195). 
New judicial reforms were introduced on 2008, when a new constitution, written by 
an assembly with a majority that demonstrated clear affinity with the executive, was 
approved. These reforms attempted to create a separate institution for constitutional 
review and ratified the independence of the judiciary. However, the same legislators who 
drafted the constitution attempted to disobey it only a few weeks later when the members 
of the new Supreme Court [the one created by the 2008 constitution] rejected the 
constitutional reforms and decided to resign from their posts. The new Congress, in an 
attempt to avoid a vacuum in the judicial branch, offered to reinstate the old Supreme 
Court [which had the same members, but different attributes], in clear violation of the 
constitutional reforms they initiated. In the end, the members of the high court declined 
and the result of the latest judicial reforms in Ecuador was the dismantling of the 
judiciary. 
Although judicial independence needs to be the main focus of judicial reforms, the 
scope of the reform must go beyond it to obtain observable results. Changes must include 
internal procedures, codes of ethics and administrative systems and penal reforms that 
modernize the prison system (Binder 1991, Hammergren 1998). Only a structural change 
will produce the changes necessary for the participation of a functioning judicial branch 
in a state where citizens’ regime  commitment is high and the rule of law works equally 
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for both the privileged and the underprivileged (Holston and Caldeira 1998, O'Donnell 
1999). It is in that environment an independent judiciary will thrive and fulfill its role as a 
vital element in the consolidation of democracy. 
 
Judicial Independence and Support for the Institutions of the Rule of Law 
 
Judicial independence has been identified as a pillar of the rule of law  (McNollgast 
1995, Mendez, et al. 1999, Russell 2001, Schwartz 1999). In order for the State to be able 
to apply the law of the land effectively it is necessary to have an autonomous judicial 
body to enforce the law. When the government is strong a self reliant judiciary is also 
necessary to keep it in check and make it accountable to its citizens.  So far this chapter 
has focused on the rule of law as a complex social science concept and on the effect that 
strengthening the judiciary might have on the ability of the state to maintain the rule of 
law within a country. The recent political history of Latin America suggests that although 
constitutional reforms definitely have their merit and are the foundation for judicial 
independence, in practice, political actors step over those reforms all the time to achieve 
their personal objectives. However, do political reforms or do actual observable 
independent behavior by the judiciary have an effect on citizens’ attitudes towards the 
institutions that represent the rule of law in any given country? This question is the basis 
for the current section. In the following pages, I will present a measure of support for the 
institutions of the rule of law based on data obtained in the 2006 round of the Americas 
Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project. Using that same survey data, 
as well as the four country level measures of judicial independence introduced in Chapter 
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II, I will attempt to uncover the relationship between the independence of the judiciary 
and individual level attitudes towards the institutions that are in charge of safeguarding 
the rule of law in Latin America. 
Measuring support for the rule of law: 
 
 The study of the stability of democratic regimes has generated a substantial 
amount of theory and empirical evidence whose center of attention is the importance of 
support for the political system. The dynamics of this support depend in part on the 
relationships between the State and the citizens of a country. The fundamental 
assumption of this relationship is that citizens have certain expectations regarding the 
State’s performance and that said performance is judged by the citizens individually. 
Positive or negative evaluations result in feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the performance of the State’s institutions, which in turn lead to the willingness of the 
individual to support those institutions. Based on this reasoning, scholars have found that 
support for the political system is an important element in a democracy, not only owing  
its relevance to the stability of a democratic regime but also because it is a vital element 
for the political process. A democratic political system cannot survive for long without 
the support of the majority of its citizens (Miller 1971). 
 Low levels of support for political institutions are considered a threat against the 
stability of democracy and the rule of law because the consequences of long term 
dissatisfaction with public institutions can generate the feeling of a power vacuum and of 
the absence of regulations (Anderson and Guillory 1997). Dissatisfaction with the State’s 
performance transforms into low levels of system support, which can later be channeled 
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through actions that are detrimental to the stability of a democratic regime (Bastian and 
Luckham 2003, Weatherford 1992).  
 In speaking about the erosion of system support, Dalton (2004) claimed that 
among several factors that generate changes in support for the system,  trust is one of the 
most relevant individual characteristics. Trust in the institutions of the political system is 
crucial to generate satisfaction with the performance of a democratic regime. Multiple 
studies show compelling evidence that political trust is a fundamental part of system 
support. The fact that citizens consider their institutions and the people in them 
trustworthy has an influence on, among other things, levels of individual participation in 
politics as well as electoral preferences, levels of social cooperation and individual 
support for specific government politics (Easton 1975, Easton 1976, Hetherington 1998, 
Levi and Stoker 2000).  
I base my measurement index of support for the institutions of the rule of law on 
trust. The questions used to create the index were designed to measure trust in the 
institutions that represent the rule of law in Latin America. The items I chose are based 
on the principles of the rule of law described earlier in this chapter. The index was built 
upon these five questions from the 2006 questionnaire from the Americas Barometer.33 
1. On a scale from one to seven, where 1 means “not at all” and seven means “a lot”, 
how much do you trust that the courts in your country will guarantee a fair trial? 
2. How much do you trust your country’s justice system? 
                                                            
33 All answers were measured on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 meant “not at all” and 7 meant “a lot”. The 
answers were then recoded to a 0 to 100 scale. 
  124
3. How much do you trust the Office of the Public Prosecutor? 
4. How much do you trust your National Police? 
5. How much do you trust your Supreme Court? 
The above five items were chosen for theoretical reasons. I argue that these five 
questions include the identified principles that the rule of law is supposed to uphold, as 
well as the institutions that represent it inside a country. The first question measures 
confidence in the ability of the State’s tribunals to guarantee a fair trial. The principles of 
accessibility to the courts as well as the ones of certainty, generality equality and the 
impartiality of justice tribunals are tapped by this question. The second question is a more 
general one, measuring overall trust in the justice system. This question taps the 
principles of government under law and the congruence of law with the social values that 
citizens treasure. The third question looks at trust towards the Office of the Prosecutor. 
Public prosecutors have a crucial role in the rule of law, because they are the ones who 
initiate the processes that bring charges against people who committed criminal actions. 
By criminal actions, I mean actions legally punishable by the penal codes in most 
countries with civil law tradition. Prosecutors are most effective when their office is not 
linked to the executive office, since it is sometimes the role of the prossecutor to initiate 
cases against government abuses, especially human rights violations (D'Alessio 1993, 
Rios-Figueroa 2006). The fourth question measures citizen trust in the police. This 
institution is society’s first defense against attacks on the rule of law, and public 
confidence in it is crucial. Achieving public confidence in the police, however, has been a 
difficult task, especially in countries with a history of abuses by this institution, such as 
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Mexico, Brazil and Argentina (Chevigny 1999). The final question looks at the 
legitimacy of the quintessential institution of the rule of law, the Supreme Court. This is 
the agent of horizontal accountability. Without a strong, independent Supreme Court to 
adjudicate justice and maintain the constitutional order, there are no limits to what an 
authoritarian government or even a democratic one with a fairly strong executive can do. 
Together, the five questions have a Cronbach’s alpha reliability index of .821 for the 
pooled 2006 Americas Barometer survey, which means that the item is a good theoretical 
fit. Removing any of the individual questions that compose the index would not have 
increased its reliability. 
Figure IV-1. Support for the Institutions of the Rule of Law in Latin America 
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Figure IV-1 shows the country averages for the index of support for the institutions of 
the rule of law.  While the questions were originally measured on a scale from 1 to 7, I 
have recoded them to fit a scale that goes from 0 to 100, making it easier to look at when 
presenting graphs. It is not a surprise to see some of the usual suspects both at the top and 
at the bottom of the graph. Countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica, with long traditions of 
steady democracy, very little history of State repression and a stable, independent 
judiciary are at the top of the graph. At the other end of the graph are countries with 
political instability, constant external interferences in the work of the judiciaries, like the 
case of Ecuador, and some of them with a history of State repression, such as Haiti and 
Paraguay. What is somewhat worrisome, however, is that in only five countries the 
average citizen support for the institutions of the rule of law attains over the half point of 
the scale. This means that in average, citizen evaluation of the institutions and processes 
that stand for the rule of law in the region are more negative than positive. 
Predictors of support for the institutions of the rule of law: 
 
 This section will consider the analysis of the individual and contextual predictors 
of support for the institutions of the rule of law. First, I will see if judicial independence 
measured in four different ways, has any effect on individual attitudes towards the 
institutions of the rule of law. This will be done while comparing various socio-
demographic variables, such as age, years of education, wealth measured by the 
ownership of capital goods, size of the city were respondents live, urban or rural areas, 
gender and number of children. The second part of the analysis will include multi level 
regression models that assess the effect of judicial independence on support for the 
institutions of the rule of law while controlling for other attitudes and experiences of 
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respondents at the individual level that might also have a direct effect on their evaluation 
of these institutions. 
 Prior to the regression analysis, I conducted a test of variance to see if the 
variation in the dependent variable [support for the institutions of the rule of law] occurs 
only at the individual level or if it also occurs between countries. The test of variance 
revealed that approximately 8.5% of the variation of the dependent variable is explained 
by country level factors, and that the percentage is statistically significant. Table IV-1 
shows the results of the four different models regressing support for the institutions of the 
rule of law on socio-demographic variables and the four separate measures of judicial 
independence.  
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Table IV-1. Support for the Institutions of the Rule of Law Regressed on Judicial 
Independence, Age, Education, Wealth, Urban/Rural, Size of Town and Number of 
Children (Multilevel model) 
Support for the Rule of Law Regressed on Judicial Independence and Control Variables 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Coef. Std. 
error 
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error 
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error 
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error 
P>|z|
Age .122 .111 .272 .122 .111 .271 .119 .111 .285 .117 .111 .294 
Education -.096 .036 .008 -.096 .036 .008 -.097 .036 .008 -.096 .036 .008 
Wealth -.144 .082 .082 -.143 .082 .082 -.145 .082 .079 -.150 .082 .068 
Urban/rural -.282 .491 .565 -.282 .491 .566 -.282 .491 .566 -.276 .0491 .574 
Size of 
town 
1.094 .146 .000 1.094 .146 .000 1.094 .146 .000 1.090 .146 .000 
Number of 
children 
.051 .072 .478 .051 .072 .478 .051 .072 .474 .052 .072 .466 
Female .207 .265 .434 .207 .265 .434 .206 .265 .437 .204 .265 .441 
Indep. RF .090 .805 .911          
Indep. Tate    .303 .411 .461       
Indep. 
HRR 
      5.156 1.810 .004    
Indep. 
WEF 
         4.34 .872 .000 
Const. 43.00 3.40 .000 39.79 5.141 .000 39.33 2.131 .000 31.58 2.70 .000 
N 28422 28422 28422 28422 
 
 There are two important socio-demographic predictors of support for the 
institutions of the rule of law, according to the regression results. The first one is 
education. Although at the aggregate level countries with better education indicators are 
usually those with a longer tradition of respect for the rule of law and democracy, at the 
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individual level, the relationship between education and institutional legitimacy is 
different. The data show that those individuals with higher levels of education trust the 
institutions that represent the rule of law less than their lesser educated counterparts. 
Another important predictor is the size of the city of the respondent. The regression 
analysis suggests that respondents in smaller cities are more trusting of the institutions of 
the rule of law than respondents in large cities and country capitals.34  
 When it comes to judicial independence, the results of regression analysis are 
similar to the one obtained in Chapter III, when I looked at the effect of independence on 
corruption victimization. The two formal measures of judicial independence prove to be 
statistically insignificant, meaning that the autonomy of the judiciary measured according 
to formal and constitutional provisions does not have an effect on individual attitudes 
towards the institutions of the rule of law, when introducing socio-demographic controls. 
On the other hand, the two practical measures of independence do have a positive and 
statistically significant effect, meaning that citizens living in countries with independent 
judiciaries, not only on paper but in practice, are on average more trusting of the 
institutions that represent the rule of law than respondents in counties where judiciaries 
are weak. 
 However, is the effect of judicial independence strong enough to hold when 
controlling for other individual level attitudes or experiences that have a more tangible 
and direct impact on system support? For the second part of the analysis, I have 
introduced several control variables that have been shown to have a powerful impact on 
                                                            
34 The sign of the relationship is positive because the variable “size of town” is coded from 1 being “big 
city” to four being “small town”.  
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institutional legitimacy from the citizens’ perspective. These variables have been 
included in several studies that have used the Americas Barometer data to predict 
institutional support in Latin America (Corral 2008, Schwarz Blum 2007, Seligson 2004). 
• Corruption Victimization: My assumption is that citizens that have been victims 
of corruption will show lower levels of trust in the institutions of the rule of law. 
This is the same dichotomous variable that I used as my dependent variable for 
the analysis in Chapter III. 
• Crime Victimization: Like it is in the case of corruption, crime victimization is 
also expected to erode the legitimacy of the institutions of the rule of law. 
Victimization by crime is also measured dichotomously. 
• Tolerance: At the beginning of this chapter I briefly described several elements 
that comprise the rule of law. According to Walker, one of the most important 
elements was what he called “attitude of legality”, a sort of dimension of feeling. I 
believe tolerance for the political rights of the minorities is a big part of the 
attitude of legality that the citizenry must hold in order for the rule of law to stay 
in place. For this particular case, tolerance is measured in an index that taps the 
respondents approval of minorities to exercise basic political rights, such as their 
right to give a speech, protest publicly and peacefully, and to elect and be elected 
for public office. 
• Presidential approval: The executive has always been a powerful figure in Latin 
American politics, especially in the last decade or so. For example, a recent study 
conducted in Ecuador using data from the Americas Barometer showed that 
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approval of the President’s job is the most powerful predictor of support for the 
institutions of the rule of law in that country (Donoso 2008). However, in a 
context of political instability, a strong and excessively popular executive could 
be a double edge sword. This is especially true when it comes to the rights of 
minorities in the opposition, since the arbitrariness of the majority may lead to 
hasty decisions that produce institutional outcomes incapable of establishing 
controls over the will of that majority, therefore creating a breakdown in the rule 
of law (Gargarella 2003). 
• Perception of the government’s economic performance: I hypothesize that a 
positive perception of the government’s economic performance will boost 
individual confidence in the institutions of the rule of law. This variable is 
measured as an index that combines the citizens’ evaluation of the government’s 
effectiveness in combating poverty and unemployment. 
• Perception of individual economic situation: It has been said many times that as 
long as the government does not mess with people’s pockets, they will put up 
with a lot. Previous public opinion studies have shown that is the case. Citizens 
that have a positive perspective of their economic situation tend to have feelings 
of trust for the institutions that represent and protect them. Conversely, those who 
perceive their personal economic situation as being problematic will tend to 
blame the State for its shortcomings, which will be reflected on low levels of 
confidence for the institutions of the rule of law. 
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• Preference for democracy: While delivering his famous Iron Curtain speech, 
Winston Churchill proclaimed that “democracy is the worst form of government, 
except for all the other ones that have been attempted by some”. This variable 
attempts to tap that Churchillian sentiment among the citizens of Latin America. 
Those who prefer democracy over any other form of government, will exhibit 
higher levels of trust in the institutions that make up the rule of law in their 
countries. 
Table IV-2 displays the results of the multilevel regression models used to assess 
the effect of judicial independence on individual level support for the institutions of 
the rule of law. Not surprisingly, every control variable ended up having a statistically 
significant relationship with the dependent variable and the hypothesized direction of 
those relationships were confirmed. The table shows that those respondents who were 
victimized by crime or who had to pay a bribe in the year prior to answering the 
survey have a significantly lower trust for the institutions that make up the rule of law 
than those respondents who were not forced to pay bribes in public or private settings 
of those who were subject to crimes against their property or physical integrity. 
Regarding the effect of tolerance, analysis suggests that the intangible requisite he 
called “attitude of legality” does indeed affect support for the rule of law. Those who 
are respectful of the rights of others to express themselves politically are also more 
trusting of the institutions and principles of the rule of law in their country.   
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Table IV-2. Support for the Institutions of the Rule of Law Regressed on Judicial 
Independence, crime, corruption, tolerance, perception of government’s economic 
performance, presidential approval, perception of own economic situation and 
preference for democracy (Multilevel model) 
Support for the Rule of Law Regressed on Judicial Independence and Control Variables 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 Coef. Std. 
error 
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error
P>|z| Coef. Std. 
error
P>|z|
Crime  Vic. -.036 .002 .000 -.036 .002 .000 -.036 .002 .000 -.036 .002 .000 
Corruption 
Vic 
-.026 .003 .000 -.026 .003 .000 -.026 .003 .000 -.026 .003 .000 
Tolerance .029 .004 .000 .029 .004 .000 .029 .004 .000 .029 .004 .000 
Presidential 
Approval 
.097 .006 .000 .097 .006 .000 .097 .006 .000 .097 .006 .000 
Preference 
for 
Democracy 
.074 .004 .000 .074 .004 .000 .074 .004 .000 .074 .004 .000 
Gov. 
Economic 
Evaluation 
.307 .005 .000 .307 .005 .000 .307 .005 .000 .306 .005 .000 
Personal 
Economic 
Evaluation 
.046 .006 .000 .046 .006 .000 .046 .006 .000 .046 .006 .000 
Indep. RF -.089 .497 .857          
Indep. Tate    .077 .275 .779       
Indep. 
HRR 
      1.47 1.41 .297    
Indep. 
WEF 
         1.82 .830 .028 
Const. 22.5 2.20 .000 21.2 3.41 .000 21.03 1.63 .000 17.15 2.54 .000 
N 27667 27667 27667 27667 
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Personal evaluations of the economy are also important in shaping individual 
attitudes towards the rule of law in Latin America. The regression results indicate that 
citizens with a positive evaluation of the government’s performance in the economic area 
and citizens with a positive outlook on their own economic situation show higher levels 
of confidence in the institutions of the rule of law than their counterparts. Figure IV-2 
shows the magnitude of the impact that the evaluation of the government’s economic 
performance has on personal attitudes towards the institutions of the rule of law. 
 
Figure IV-2. Predictors of Individual support for the institutions 
of the rule of law 
Judicial Independence WEF
Porcentaje de la población que han sido víctimas de la corrupción al menos una v
Entrevistado que han sido víctima de un acto de delincuencia
Tolerancia
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente
Apoyo a la democracia
Desempeño económico del gobierno
Situación económica personal
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
 
 
Finally, the approval rate of the incumbent president has a direct and positive 
effect on the legitimacy of the institutions of the rule of law. A higher approval rating 
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will mean increasing levels of confidence in institutions like the police and the Supreme 
Court. Conversely, lower approval ratings will result in a decrease in confidence in these 
key institutions. 
The impact of judicial independence: 
 
 The multilevel regression analysis revealed that judicial independence can have 
an effect on individual attitudes towards the institutions of the rule of law, but it depends 
on how it is measured. Once again, formal measures of independence proved to be 
insignificant when trying to predict individual attitudes. There were two formal indicators 
of independence used in the regression models, one created by Rios-Figueroa and the 
other created by Tate et al. The first one unpacked the concept of independence into three 
separate dimensions, institutional autonomy, external independence, meaning personal 
independence of Supreme Court Justices and internal independence, which looks at the 
relationship between lower court judges and their superiors. I regressed each of these 
dimensions separately and none of them had a statistically significant effect on the 
dependent variable; neither did the full indicator, which actually turned out to have a 
negative coefficient in the regression. This indicates that more judicial independence 
would actually hurt confidence in the institutions of the rule of law. The magnitude of the 
coefficient, however, tells us that that we should have no confidence on the sign either, 
since there is really no substantive influence of this indicator on the dependent variable. I 
also looked at every component of the second formal measure of independence 
individually, with the same results every time. None of the nine constitutional provisions 
analyzed [guaranteed terms, finality of decisions, exclusive authority, ban of military 
courts, judicial review, judicial qualifications, fiscal autonomy, separation of powers and 
  136
a hierarchical system] had a substantive statistical effect on individual confidence in the 
institutions of the rule of law. 
  Two practical measures of independence were included in the regression models. 
The first one was obtained by coding the US State Department’s Human Rights Reports 
and assigning each country a level of judicial independence based on a three point scale. 
When inserted into the regression equation, this variable, which had been a significant 
predictor of the probability of an individual being victimized by corruption, had a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect on the trust in the institutions of the rule of 
law. The second practical measure of independence, provided by the World Economic 
Forum, was based on the subjective evaluation of elites that have had to deal with the 
judiciary in Latin American countries, usually as the representatives of the corporations 
for which they serve. The regression analysis showed that this measure of independence, 
in contrast with the other three, did have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the dependent variable. This means that in countries where the judiciary is not only 
independent on paper but behaves independently, citizens pick up on that fact. This 
creates feelings of trust in these institutions, and a more favorable environment for the 
subsistence of the rule of law. The conclusion that one can obtain from these results is 
that when judicial independence is tangible and observable, it becomes a positive agent 
for the creation of democratic attitudes and behaviors in Latin America. On the other 
hand, when independence is just a complex legal construct, left only to rest on the pages 
of laws and proclamations, and does not go beyond them, it remains only an important 
principle of the rule of law. Its influence is not felt by those who would reap the benefits 
of a strong and autonomous judiciary that enforces horizontal accountability, or that 
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suffer the consequences of having a judiciary that can be stepped on by the executive, the 
legislature or other private interest holders.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 The rule of law is a fundamental pillar of liberal democracy. I cannot conceive 
that a political regime that does not apply the law of the land equally, appropriately and 
effectively across a territory can be considered a democratic one. However, it is 
impossible to construct the rule of law if the institutions that represent it are not 
considered legitimate by the people that those institutions are supposed to serve.  This 
chapter looked at judicial independence as a possible contextual predictor for individual 
citizen support for the institutions that represent the rule of law in Latin America.  
 At the beginning of this chapter, I looked at independence only in combination 
with socio-demographic variables and their effect of confidence for the rule of law. The 
analysis presented in the chapter shows that de facto measures of judicial independence 
have an observable effect on support for the institutions of the rule of law, while formal 
provisions of independence are not related to individual attitudes.  The second part of the 
analysis introduced theoretical variables that have been shown to have an effect on the 
support for the institutions of the rule of law by several previous studies conducted using 
the data obtained by the Americas Barometer. The results, although similar, did vary 
slightly. Formal constitutional provisions for judicial independence once again were 
ineffective in the creation of positive or negative attitudes towards the institutions of the 
  138
rule of law in Latin America.  Neither combinations of these provisions nor them 
individually produced any observable statistical influence in the dependent variable.  
 On the other hand, the analysis of practical measures of judicial independence 
showed that one of the two indexes of independence did have a substantive effect on 
individual trust in the institutions of the rule of law. This index was a subjective 
evaluation of the independence of the judiciary made by citizens that had interacted with 
the judicial sector and had a sense of what possible public or private sources had an 
influence in it. The multilevel regression models used to assess the effect of a contextual 
variable like independence on individual level attitudes showed that context indeed 
matters and countries with observable independent judiciaries produce citizens who trust 
their institutions more than countries with weak judiciaries that answer to external 
interests. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation had two general objectives. The first was to advance the 
discussion on what judicial independence is and how scholars understand and measure it. 
The second objective was to show that the importance of independence goes beyond the 
scope of the judicial function. I attempted to show that independence is not necessarily an 
end, but that it can also be the means to an end. In this case, that independence can 
contribute to a reduction in corruption and the creation of favorable attitudes towards the 
institutions that represent the rule of law in Latin America. Each objective was addressed 
by a chapter with theoretical propositions, and in the case of the second objective, with 
empirical analyses on 20 countries across Latin America.  
 In Chapter II, I looked at judicial independence as a social science concept. 
Judicial independence is the essence of justice; it is the principle that proclaims the 
impartiality and political insularity of a judge. I discussed the several ways in which 
independence has been defined and measured. I focused on four indexes of judicial 
independence, two formal or de iure and two practical or de facto. The formal measures 
looked at various constitutional provisions that are supposed to ensure judicial 
independence within a country. The first measure, by Rios-Figueroa (2006), creates 
separate indexes for three separate dimensions of independence; the autonomy of the 
Supreme Court as an institution with respect to the other branches of the State, the 
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independence of the individual judges with respect to external pressures from public and 
private sources, and the internal independence of lower court judges with regards to their 
hierarchically superior counterparts. The second formal measure of independence, 
created by Tate el al (2006) also groups several constitutional provisions that are 
designed to enhance the independence of a judiciary. Those provisions include guarantees 
for the finality of the decisions of the Supreme Court, enumerated qualifications for 
Supreme Court Justices, constitutional guarantees for the separation of powers and the 
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary and the ban of military court procedures for civilians. 
The practical measures of judicial independence were comprised of subjective 
evaluations of the autonomy of the Supreme Court and the judiciary in general, made 
separately by the US State Department and by CEO’s working in these Latin American 
countries. The chapter also looks at the similarities and differences between these four 
measurements and how the 20 Latin American countries rank according to each one of 
them. 
 Chapter II also describes the recent history of the judiciary in Ecuador, a 
politically unstable country with a judiciary that has been notoriously manipulated by 
State and private sources over the last few years. Through interviews with several 
Supreme Court judges, lower court judges, legislators and judicial experts, I assess the 
“real world” validity of the measurements of judicial independence that I use in the 
empirical analysis contained in the following chapters. I also looked at several other 
factors that influence the independence of the judiciary and that were not contemplated in 
any of the measures used in this dissertation. 
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 In Chapter III, I dealt with the relationship between judicial independence and 
corruption in Latin America. After discussing several ways corruption is measured in the 
region. I presented a corruption victimization measure that is based on personal 
experiences of citizens with corruption in both public and private instances. I then created 
a multilevel regression model to assess the effects of context on the probability of citizens 
being victimized by corruption in their countries. Along with individual level variables, 
such as sex, education, age and wealth, the analysis demonstrated that judicial 
independence has a direct effect on corruption victimization when it is measured de facto, 
while its effect is not statistically significant when it is measured using formal 
constitutional provisions.  
 Finally, in Chapter IV, I looked at the effect of those same four measures of 
judicial independence on individual support for the institutions of the rule of law in Latin 
America. I devised an index of support for the institutions of the rule of law that included 
confidence on institutions like the Supreme Court, the National Police and the Office of 
the Prosecutor, as well as confidence in the justice system in general, and on its capacity 
to provide a fair trial to its citizens.  Like on the previous chapter, the empirical analysis 
showed that judicial independence had no effect on individual feelings of trust when it 
was measured using constitutional provisions. On the other hand, one of the two practical 
measures of independence proved to be positively related to institutional trust, meaning 
that in countries with higher levels of observable judicial independence, citizens trust the 
institutions that represent the rule of law more than in countries were the judiciary is 
weak and influenced by other political interest holders. 
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 The results yielded by the empirical analyses conducted throughout this 
dissertation led me to two separate conclusions. First, judicial independence matters. 
Scholars and policy makers in Latin America need to start looking at independence as a 
valuable tool to achieve other political and social objectives, and ultimately as a 
necessary requisite for the consolidation of liberal democracy in the region. Second, 
judicial independence is a dynamic concept. Formal measures of judicial independence 
are not enough when scholars want to use independence as an independent variable. 
There is a need for a more comprehensive measure of judicial independence. The 
discrepancies between formal and practical measures of independence, as well as the 
tangible effect of independence on corruption reduction and institutional trust in Latin 
America, lead me to believe that a broader measure of independence would help social 
scientists to better understand the consequences of an independent judiciary in 
consolidating democratic regimes.  
Judicial Independence Matters: 
 
 At the beginning of this dissertation I wrote that judicial independence should not 
be considered as an end in of itself but a means to an end. The previous chapters have 
presented empirical evidence that supports that statement.  However, one should not 
underestimate the importance of independence by itself. A Supreme Court Justice I met 
with during the process of writing this dissertation once told me that independence is to 
justice what elections are to democracy, it is not sufficient, but one cannot exist without 
the other.  Judicial independence is a fundamental principle of justice. It is based on the 
idea that two parties, be them of public or private nature, can resolve their conflicts 
through the intervention of a third party that is completely impartial and insulated from 
  143
their interests and preferences. An efficient adjudication of justice would not be possible 
without the element of judicial independence.  
The evidence gathered during the course of this study, along with the information 
gathered regarding the Ecuadorian case, however, has also led me to the conclusion that 
independence is important to the consolidation of liberal democracy in Latin America. It 
would be impossible for the State to guarantee and safeguard the civil liberties of its 
citizens without an independent judiciary capable of enforcing those rights, and the 
ability to hold the government accountable when it is attempts to abuse its authority. 
In chapters III and IV, I have shown that there is an empirical relationship 
between judicial independence and the reduction of corruption victimization, as well as 
the individual support for the institutions of the rule of law in Latin America. These 
findings alone demonstrate the importance of independence on democracy. However, the 
conversations I had with judges, legislators and legal experts about the situation of the 
judiciary in Ecuador helped me in painting a realistic picture of what can happen to a 
democracy when judicial independence does not exist. Ecuador has had eleven Presidents 
in twelve years. Ever since Abdala Bucaram was overthrown illegally by Congress on 
February of 1997, no elected President has been able to finish the four year period 
established in the Constitution as the presidential mandate. The Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Tribunal should have played a vital role on those days. A former Supreme 
Court Justice, who claimed to be opposed to be Bucaram regime told me:  “An 
independent Constitutional Tribunal, one mandated only by the letter of the law would 
have declared the unconstitutionality of the decision taken by Congress, which declared 
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President Bucaram mentally unstable and therefore unfit to fulfill his duties”.35 In the 
years to come, the judiciary had to stand by helplessly while the Constitution was 
interpreted freely by the legislature any time that public opinion turned against the 
incumbent.  
The eleven month absence of a Supreme Court caused by the illegal sacking of all 
its judges by the legislature and later by executive decree also had extremely damaging 
effects for democracy in Ecuador. Without the high court, the legal rights of millions of 
citizens were unprotected for almost a year. Hundreds of processes prescribed, leaving 
crimes unpunished and citizens without a chance to appeal lower court sentences that 
could have been overturned by the Supreme Court. This meant that the rule of law did not 
exist in the country during that period of time.  
A little over a year has passed since I had those conversations with judicial 
experts in Ecuador. In those days Ecuador had a Supreme Court composed of the 31 most 
qualified judges in the country, selected after a public and transparent examination 
process which was overseen by international observers. Since then, Ecuador once again 
underwent a process of constitutional reform. The new constitution took away much of 
the power from the Supreme Court and gave it to a Constitutional Court, whose members 
were selected by the Constitutional Assembly, where the ruling party has an absolute 
majority. After being stripped of their independence once again, every judge of the 
Supreme Court except for one resigned. A new high court, now called National Court of 
Justice was quickly put together by using the one judge who did not resign and adding 
                                                            
35  Quote from an interview conducted by the author in Quito, on November 13th 2007. 
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twenty of the thirty alternates from the old court. As a result, Ecuador once again, has a 
judicial power that is subservient to the executive. Although this does not guarantee that 
the State will use this advantage to abuse its power, the damage to the consolidation of 
democracy in the country has already been done, as the mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability have been broken. 
 
Towards a Comprehensive Measure of Judicial Independence 
 
 Judicial independence matters, as this dissertation has shown. However, its effects 
are better observed when it is measured dynamically rather than statically. The reason for 
the success of practical measures of judicial independence as predictors of other 
dependent variables, however, is not only the conception of the measures but the nature 
of the concept. Independence is not static. It is affected not only by formal provisions, but 
by political actors and actions. Let’s take the case of Ecuador once again. Even though it 
ranked very low in formal measures of judicial independence, judicial experts told me 
that the Constitution of 1998, used for the purpose of this study, had made significant 
advancements in the protection of judicial independence in the country. Although it did 
not contain all of the provisions established in the measures I used chapters III and IV, 
the Constitution explicitly proclaimed the independence of the judiciary and the 
protection of the judicial career. Those significant legal changes, however, could not stop 
Congress from sacking all 31 Supreme Court Justices in late 2004, nor could they stop 
President Gutierrez from sacking the new magistrates again only a few months later. 
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Finally, the significant constitutional advancements in judicial independence were 
rendered insignificant when Ecuador spent eleven months without a Supreme Court 
because of the political manipulation of the judiciary by the hands of the other branches 
of the State. A year later, however, a new court was created under a transparent process 
monitored closely by international observers. This new court operated under the same 
constitutional rules as its predecessors, but it was able to stand on its own feet and fend of 
political influence, as well as depurating itself when accusations of corruption were made 
against its members.  Therefore, if a researcher had to assess the independence of the 
judiciary in Ecuador over the last few years, would it be logical to claim that 2005 and 
2007 were the same? The answer is no. Even though the same constitutional rules 
operated in the country during those two years, the Supreme Court was much more 
independent in 2007 than it was two year before. Formal measures of judicial 
independence fail to capture the political changes in a country and the effect that those 
changes have on the administration of justice. Furthermore, if one wants to measure 
judicial independence over time, formal measures are inefficient, since they assume that 
independence is only affected by constitutional changes, which are unusual in the most 
countries.  By recognizing independence as a dynamic concept, one gains not only a 
broader understanding of it but also analytical leverage on it.  
 The existing practical measures of judicial independence are not without their 
flaws. Although better equipped to deal with changes in the political environment and the 
effect that such changes have on the independence of the judiciary, these measures fail to 
acknowledge the importance of constitutional norms as a starting point for independence. 
Also, the subjective nature of these measurements can have a negative impact on the 
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resulting assessment. Take, for example, the practical measure of judicial independence 
based the US State Department’s Human Rights Reports used on this dissertation. This 
measure, although widely used, is based on a single paragraph containing an assessment 
of the judiciary by a single officer in the State Department. Even though these 
evaluations are generally fair, they can also fail to account for political changes that 
affect judicial independence. In the 2007 report, for example, the description of the 
situation of the judiciary in Ecuador was similar to the one on 2005. That small paragraph 
failed to account for the favorable changes that had taken place during that year; so had I 
coded independence in Ecuador for 2007 based on that report, I would have had to code it 
as low.  Something similar happens with the other practical measure used in this 
dissertation, based on elite evaluations of the independence of the judiciary obtained by 
the World Economic Forum. Although these evaluations were made by people who had 
dealings with the judicial system in 2006, it is hard to ignore that the people interviewed 
represent large corporations in these countries and undoubtedly have a marked political 
ideology. Therefore, it is possible that these evaluations were based not only in the 
experiences of these people with the judicial system of their own countries, but also on 
their perception of the incumbent regimes. In conclusion, practical indexes of judicial 
independence recognize it as a dynamic concept and are better equipped to measure it, 
but their subjective nature impacts the way independence is evaluated and can have a 
negative impact on the results of the measurements. 
 
 
  148
Measuring judicial independence: 
 
 The second overarching objective of this dissertation was to assess the importance 
of judicial independence for the consolidating democracies of Latin America. The 
empirical analysis conducted in the previous chapters as well as the opinions of judicial 
experts, show that independence is indeed a key ingredient for the reduction of corruption 
in the region, as well as for the legitimacy of the institutions of the rule of law. However, 
I believe that a more precise measure of independence, one that combines elements from 
formal and practical indexes, would not only enhance the theoretical understanding of 
judicial independence, but also become a more valuable tool for empirical analysis in the 
field of comparative politics.   
1. Formal provisions of independence: Although these provisions are not a guarantee 
of judicial independence in practice, it is impossible to construct an independent 
judiciary without a solid constitutional base that serves a starting point. The 
problem with some of the existing formal measures is that they include too many 
provisions, which are not always included in the constitution of a country, but can 
be found in other secondary laws regarding to the judicial sector. A 
comprehensive measure of independence should consider only those 
constitutional provisions that are essential to the safeguarding of judicial 
autonomy; the protection of the Supreme Court as an institution and the protection 
of judges from outside influence. The most important are; a) An explicit 
proclamation of the principle of judicial independence. b) Protection of the 
judicial career. c) Specific methods of appointment and removal for Supreme 
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Court Justices. d) Tenure of Supreme Court Justices. e) Fiscal autonomy of the 
judiciary; and f) Enumerated qualifications for Supreme Court Justices.   
2. Violation of formal provisions of independence: If one considers formal requisites 
important for independence, then explicit violations of these requisites should also 
be included in a measure of judicial independence. Events such as the 
unconstitutional appointment of a Supreme Court judge due to lack of 
qualifications or an illegal procedure, as well as the early termination of a judge 
for reasons not included in the constitution, should be coded as elements against 
the consolidation of an independent judiciary in a country. 
3. Apparent interference from external parties on judicial decisions:  Attempts to 
influence a Supreme Court decision are usually covert. However, there are cases 
in which the outside pressure on the high court is evident. The most obvious ones 
are bribery attempts made public. There are also cases in which the media and 
public opinion show a clear preference for a determined outcome. Also, there are 
occasions in which the executive makes public his expectations about a judicial 
decision. These public statements can be considered threats to independence, 
especially with powerful and popular executives. If the decision made by the 
Supreme Court in these cases goes against the clear preference of public opinion 
or against the State, one can assume the independence of that court. On the other 
hand, there is the possibility that the Supreme Court may rule in favor of the 
State, or in accordance with what the media and public opinion expect. When 
these decisions, favorable to the State or in accordance with public opinion, 
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violate a legal or constitutional norm, or go against prior legal precedents, one can 
assume that the independence of the judiciary has been violated.  
The measure proposed in this section will generate some problems of 
operationalization at the beginning, especially with respect to its third component. On the 
other hand, apparent attempts to interfere with the independence of the judiciary are 
usually easy to identify, since they come from public sources and capture national 
attention. In the end, however, I believe that this comprehensive measure of judicial 
independence will help researchers in two fundamental ways. First, by capturing the 
dynamic essence of the concept of independence; and second, by providing a reliable and 
replicable assessment of judicial independence that will be better suited for understanding 
its usefulness and its importance in a democratic regime.  
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APENDIX A 
US STATE DEPARTMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS FOR THE YEAR 
200536 
 
MEXICO 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, government authorities 
occasionally influenced court decisions, particularly at the state and local level. 
Corruption, inefficiency, and lack of transparency continued to be major problems in the 
justice system.  
The federal court system consists of the Supreme Court, 91 circuit courts of appeal, 49 
courts of appeal, and 185 district courts. 
 
GUATEMALA 
While the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system often failed to 
provide fair or timely trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient personnel and 
funds, and intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses. The majority of serious 
crimes were not investigated or punished. Many high-profile criminal cases remained 
pending in the courts for long periods as defense attorneys employed successive appeals 
and motions. 
During the year there were numerous reports of corruption and manipulation of the 
judiciary. Judges, prosecutors, plaintiffs, and witnesses also continued to report threats, 
intimidation, and surveillance. The special prosecutor for crimes against justice sector 
workers received 79 cases of threats or aggression against judges, compared with 61 in 
2004. During the year eight judicial sector workers were killed by unknown assailants. 
For example, on March 21, Justice of the Peace Jose Antonio Cruz Hernandez was killed 
in San Pedro Ayampuc. On April 25, High Impact Court Judge Jose Victor Bautista 
Orozco was killed in San Marcos in front of his house. At year's end each of these cases 
was under investigation. There were credible reports of killings of witnesses. Less than 3 
percent of reported crimes were prosecuted, and significantly fewer received convictions. 
There were no significant developments regarding the July 2004 killing of Jesus 
Mendoza, cousin of Bamaca case witness Otoniel de la Roca Mendoza. 
                                                            
36 Only the paragraphs dealing exclusively with the independence of the judiciaries are included. 
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The Supreme Court of Justice continued to seek the suspension of judges and to conduct 
criminal investigations for improprieties or irregularities in cases under its jurisdiction. 
During the year the Judicial Discipline Unit investigated and held hearings for 147 of 597 
complaints of wrongdoing, with the result that 60 claims were found to be baseless, 45 
magistrates received written or verbal warnings including suspensions, 7 judges were 
fired, and the remaining cases were still under investigation at year's end.  
Prosecutors remained susceptible to intimidation and corruption. The law's failure to 
delineate between the PNC and the Public Ministry in taking responsibility for 
investigating crimes led to organizational rivalries and the duplication of investigative 
efforts. An estimated 3 percent of approximately 250 thousand complaints filed with the 
Public Ministry during the year were prosecuted.  
The judiciary consisted of the Supreme Court of Justice, appellate courts, trial courts, and 
probable-cause judges [with a function similar to that of a grand jury], as well as courts 
of special jurisdiction, including labor courts and family courts. More than 350 justices of 
the peace were located throughout the country. Some of the justices specialized in 
administering traditional and indigenous law in community courts, which were under the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Justice. The Constitutional Court, which reviews 
legislation and court decisions for compatibility with the constitution, is independent of 
the rest of the judiciary.  
Between January and August, the Public Ministry had approximately 50 persons in its 
witness protection program. 
 
EL SALVADOR 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judiciary suffered from 
inefficiency and corruption. Corruption in the judicial system contributed to impunity 
from the country's civil and criminal laws. Impunity remained a significant problem, 
undermining respect for the judiciary and the rule of law. A September CID-Gallup poll 
revealed citizens' belief that judicial system inefficiencies allowed criminals to escape 
from justice. Many judges allowed unjustified trial delays, but few were ever sanctioned 
for this practice. NGOs such as the Foundation for Studies in Legal Application 
[FESPAD], the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development, and the 
Human Rights Institute of the University of Central America [IDHUCA] claimed that the 
Supreme Court did not respond adequately to public criticism and did not make a 
comprehensive effort to remove unqualified and corrupt judges. 
The PNC, prosecutors, public defenders, and the courts continued to have problems with 
criminal investigations. Inadequate government funding of the PNC and intimidation of 
victims and witnesses made it difficult to identify, arrest, and prosecute criminals, thus 
diminishing public confidence in the justice system. 
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During the year the attorney general's office received 117 complaints of prosecutorial 
irregularities, including bribery, negligence, and failure to attend legal proceedings. 
In August the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court affirmed an October 2004 court 
decision dismissing charges of child pornography against Nelson Garcia, former 
president of the Salvadoran Bar Association and former candidate for the Supreme Court. 
There were no new developments regarding the criminal court's October 2004 releasing 
from police custody and dismissing of charges against criminal court legal clerk Graciela 
Roque, in connection with the 2004 flight from justice of Raul Garcia Prieto. 
There were no developments regarding an appellate court's August 2004 decision to 
uphold a lower court ruling to transfer defendant Fernando Palacios Luna, convicted of 
kidnapping and organized crime, from a maximum-security to a medium-security prison. 
At year's end Palacios Luna, who was given a sentence of 40 years, remained in 
maximum security at the Zacatecaluca prison. 
The court system has four levels: justices of the peace, trial courts, appellate courts, and 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's oversees the budget and administration of the 
court system, and selects justices of the peace, trial judges, and appellate judges from a 
list of nominees proposed by the National Judicial Council [CNJ], an independent body 
that nominates, trains, and evaluates justices. There are separate court systems for family 
matters and juvenile offenders. The law requires that minors from 12 to 17 years of age 
be tried in juvenile courts. 
Although juries were used for specific charges, including environmental pollution, and 
certain misdemeanors, judges decided most cases. By law juries hear only cases that the 
law does not assign to sentencing courts. After the jury's determination of innocence or 
guilt, a tribunal decides the sentence. 
Defendants have the right to be present in court and to question witnesses and present 
witnesses and evidence. Although the law further provides for the presumption of 
innocence, protection from self-incrimination, the right to legal counsel, freedom from 
coercion, and government-provided legal counsel for the indigent, these legal rights and 
protections were not always respected in practice. Although a jury's verdict is final, a 
judge's verdict can be appealed. Trials are public. 
 
HONDURAS 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system was poorly 
funded and staffed, inadequately equipped, often ineffective, and subject to patronage, 
corruption, and political influence. 
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Low wages and lack of internal controls rendered judicial officials susceptible to bribery, 
and powerful special interests still exercised influence in the outcomes of court 
proceedings.  
During the year 74 percent of approximately 221,000 cases pending under court 
procedures organized in 2004 were purged. The law requires backlogged cases to be 
resolved by 2006.  
There are 12 appeals courts, 77 courts of first instance with general jurisdiction, and 330 
justice of the peace courts with limited jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Justice names 
all lower court judges. The media and various civil society groups expressed concern that 
the 8-7 split between the National and Liberal parties on the court resulted in politicized 
rulings by the Supreme Court of Justice.  
 
NICARAGUA 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system was 
susceptible to corruption and political influence. Judges' political sympathies or 
acceptance of bribes or influence from political leaders often influenced judicial actions 
and findings. While civil and criminal courts continued to expedite the judicial process 
for those in prison awaiting a final verdict, human rights and lawyers' groups continued to 
complain about judicial inaction and delay.The PLC and FSLN manipulated the judiciary 
for political purposes. The FSLN utilized its political control of the judiciary to impede 
the resolution of property claims. Both lower courts and the Supreme Court rendered 
controversial judgments dismissing evidence and convictions against international drug 
traffickers. 
On March 3, FSLN leader Daniel Ortega used personal connections with judicial officials 
to obtain a court order permitting him to hold a rally in Masaya on March 6 to block a 
campaign rally by a rival for the 2006 FSLN presidential candidacy, former Managua 
mayor Herty Lewites. The media and human rights organizations, including the pro-
Sandinista Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights [CENIDH], criticized the action as a 
politically motivated threat to the freedoms of expression and assembly. 
In March the Supreme Court named Oscar Loza, formerly of the state security directorate 
and a documented human rights abuser during the 1980s Sandinista regime, as a 
Managua appeals court judge. In March and April the court system continued to erase all 
corruption charges and convictions against Byron Jerez, former director of taxation 
during the government of Arnoldo Aleman. 
In April the National Assembly elected four magistrates to the Supreme Court, ensuring 
that the institution remained evenly divided between PLC and FSLN caucuses with 
political loyalties either to Arnoldo Aleman or Daniel Ortega. Despite promises that 
FSLN leader Daniel Ortega had made to President Bolanos that independent candidates 
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would be given fair consideration, the National Assembly ignored lists of experienced 
and politically neutral candidates proffered by civil society and the Bolanos 
administration. 
In July PLC-affiliated Judge Roxana Zapata granted to former President Aleman what the 
government and media described as an illegal medical parole that freed him from house 
arrest following 2003 convictions for money laundering, fraud, and corruption. 
According to the media and the government, the arrangement was part of a political deal 
between Aleman and Daniel Ortega. Although the attorney general's office appealed 
Aleman's release to an appeals court, sending Aleman back to house arrest for several 
weeks, on August 30, the Supreme Court, controlled by Aleman and Ortega supporters, 
approved the "medical parole" and ordered the government to release Aleman. The 
government released Aleman on September 22. Although Aleman's convictions 
technically remained in effect, press reports indicated that he and Ortega continued to 
negotiate a deal to erase the convictions. 
The Supreme Court took partisan positions on legal issues in the institutional conflict 
between the Bolanos government and its FSLN and PLC opponents in the National 
Assembly. The court ignored the constitutional principle of separation of powers and 
ruled in favor of the assembly in every constitutional dispute that arose out of the 
assembly's reforms intended to strip powers from the presidency (see section 3). The 
Supreme Court's proposal during the year to create a body of judicial police that would 
follow its orders alone was dropped when the government and National Assembly 
reached a settlement. 
The judicial system comprises both civil and military courts. The 16-member Supreme 
Court is the system's highest court, and it administers the judicial system and nominates 
all appellate and lower court judges. The Supreme Court is divided into specialized 
chambers on administrative, criminal, constitutional, and civil matters. The law requires 
that the attorney general investigate crimes committed by and against juveniles. The 
military code requires that the civilian court system try members of the military charged 
with common crimes.  
There were no new developments in the case of Henry Ruiz and other members of the 
Augusto Cesar Sandino Foundation charged in 2003 with document fraud and illicit 
association to commit a crime. Observers noted that the charges were politically 
motivated. 
 
COSTA RICA 
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected 
this provision in practice. The legal system faced many challenges, including significant 
delays in the adjudication of civil disputes and a still growing workload. 
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The judicial branch of government includes the upper and lower courts, the Judicial 
Investigative Police, the Office of the Prosecutor, the Office of the Public Defender, 
forensic laboratories, and the morgue. The lower courts include the courts of first 
instance and the circuit courts. The Supreme Court is the highest court, with 22 justices 
known as magistrates. The Legislative Assembly elects those magistrates for eight-year 
terms, which are renewed automatically unless two-thirds of the assembly opposes such 
renewal.  
 
PANAMA 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system was 
susceptible to corruption and outside influence, including manipulation by other branches 
of government. The president appoints 9 supreme court of justice magistrates to 10-year 
terms, subject to national assembly ratification. Supreme court magistrates appoint 
appellate [superior tribunal] judges, who appoint circuit and municipal court judges in 
their respective jurisdictions. Although judicial appointments were supposed to be made 
under a merit-based system, the system was undermined by political influence and 
interference by higher-level judges.  
At the local level, mayors appoint administrative judges [corregidores], who exercise 
jurisdiction over minor civil cases and who hold wide powers to arrest and impose fines 
or jail sentences of up to one year. Outside of Panama City, this system had serious 
shortcomings. Defendants lacked adequate procedural safeguards. Administrative judges 
usually were not attorneys, had not completed secondary education and in some cases, 
were corrupt. In practice, appeal procedures were nonexistent. Affluent defendants often 
paid fines while poorer defendants went to jail, contributing to prison overcrowding. 
 
COLOMBIA 
While the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system was 
overburdened, inefficient, and hindered by the suborning and intimidation of judges, 
prosecutors, and witnesses. Impunity remained a serious problem. According to the 
Supreme Council of the Judiciary, a perpetrator was punished in less than 1 percent of 
crimes. The administrative chamber of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary [CSJ] 
reported that the civilian judiciary suffered from a backlog of cases to be processed. 
These backlogs led to large numbers of pretrial detainees. 
Judicial authorities frequently were subjected to threats and acts of violence. According 
to the National Association of Judicial Branch Employees and the Corporation Fund of 
Solidarity with Colombian Judges, 14 judicial branch employees were killed and 53 
received threats against their lives. One employee was kidnapped, one was "disappeared," 
and four left the country in self-imposed exile because of death threats. Some judges and 
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prosecutors assigned to small towns worked out of departmental capitals because of 
security concerns. Witnesses were even more vulnerable to intimidation and many 
refused to testify. 
There were reports that judicial workers were killed during the year. For example during 
a March investigation into the February San Jose de Apartado massacre, a commission of 
investigators from the offices of the prosecutor general, the human rights ombudsman, 
and the inspector general were attacked with mortar shells and machine gun fire, killing 
the police escort accompanying the commission. 
In April suspected paramilitaries killed a police captain and prosecutor general's office 
investigator Susana Castro. The pair was conducting an investigation in La Hormiga, 
Putumayo Department. 
In September five members of a judicial commission conducting an investigation in 
Tumaco, Narino Department disappeared after members of the FARC attacked and sunk 
their river transport boat. The bodies of a prosecutor and a technical investigator on the 
commission were found three days later. 
There were no new developments in the investigations of two cases from 2004 involving 
judicial workers: the August killing by unknown assailants of former superior court judge 
and La Guajira Department magistrate Ronaldo David Redondo and the November 
killing of state attorney Mario Canal. 
The civilian justice system is composed of four functional jurisdictions: civil, 
administrative, constitutional, and special. The civil jurisdiction is the largest and handles 
all criminal, civil, labor, agrarian, and domestic cases involving nonmilitary personnel. 
The Supreme Court of Justice is the highest court within the civil jurisdiction and serves 
as its final court of appeal.  
The administrative jurisdiction handles administrative actions such as decrees and 
resolutions, which may be challenged in the administrative jurisdiction on constitutional 
or other grounds. The Council of State is the highest court in the administrative 
jurisdiction and serves as the final court of appeal for complaints arising from 
administrative acts.  
The Constitutional Court is the sole judicial authority on the constitutionality of laws, 
presidential decrees, and constitutional reforms. The Constitutional Court also may issue 
advisory opinions on the constitutionality of bills not yet signed into law and acts within 
its discretion to review the decisions of lower courts on tutelas, or writs of protection of 
fundamental rights, which can be filed before any judge of any court at any stage of the 
judicial process. 
The special jurisdiction of the civilian justice system consists of the Justices of the Peace 
program and the indigenous jurisdiction. The CSJ is responsible for the administration 
and discipline of the civilian justice system. 
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The Supreme Court, the Council of State, the Constitutional Court, and the CSJ are 
coequal supreme judicial bodies that sometimes issued conflicting rulings and frequently 
disagreed about jurisdictional responsibilities.  
The Office of the Prosecutor General is responsible for investigations and prosecutions of 
criminal offenses. Its Human Rights Unit, which included 15 satellite offices in 7 
regional capitals, specialized in investigating human rights crimes. The unit's 48 
prosecutors were handling 2,320 cases at year's end. 
An internal affairs unit was created in the prosecutor general's office. The prosecutor 
general's office fired 31 employees for corruption based on the work of this unit. 
The office of the inspector general, also known as the public ministry, investigates 
allegations of misconduct by public employees, including members of the state security 
forces. The inspector general's office referred all cases of human rights violations 
received during the year to the human rights unit of the prosecutor general's office. 
Through August the office of the inspector general charged 22 members of the armed 
forces with human rights offenses, which were referred to the prosecutor general for 
criminal investigation. According to the Ministry of Defense, during the year authorities 
sentenced several members of the army who were found to be guilty of the 1994 murder 
of Elcias Munoz and 6 other people in Neiva, Huila Department, to prison terms ranging 
from between 16 and 40 years. In addition authorities found 7 other members of the army 
guilty of murders, massacres, and kidnappings and sentenced them to prison terms 
ranging between 20 and 38 years. For example Lieutenant Sandro Quintero Carreno was 
found guilty for his role in the 1998 La Cabuya massacre and sentenced to 38 years in 
prison. 
 
ECUADOR 
While the law provides for an independent judiciary, in practice, the judiciary was 
susceptible to outside pressure and corruption.  
The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, superior circuit courts, other courts and 
tribunals that hear cases in accordance with the constitution and other laws, and the 
Judicature Council, which is charged with administering the court system and 
disciplining judges. There also are military and police tribunals that have the same status 
as circuit courts, as well as criminal, provincial, and cantonal [county] courts. The 
Supreme Court supervised the selection by open competition of all appellate judges. 
In February the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held a general hearing on 
the appeal brought by 27 justices of the Supreme Court who were replaced by Congress 
in December 2004. The commission did not reach a decision on the petition's 
admissibility, and there were no further developments by year's end. President Gutierrez 
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dissolved the court days before his ouster in April following the court's decision to drop 
corruption charges against two former vice presidents and former President Abdala 
Bucaram. In May Congress passed legislation to select a commission to designate a new 
court and in November the commission named a new Supreme Court in a process widely 
viewed as transparent. The Constitutional Tribunal has been dissolved since December 
2004. 
 
BOLIVIA 
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected 
this provision in practice; however, corruption and inefficiency in the judicial system 
remained major problems. Poor pay and working conditions made judges and prosecutors 
susceptible to bribes. 
The judicial system has three levels of courts: trial court, superior court, and the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court hears appeals in general, while the constitutional tribunal has 
original and appellate jurisdiction on constitutional matters. 
The CCP provides for a system of transparent oral trials in criminal cases; requires that 
no pretrial detention exceed 18 months; provides for a maximum period of detention of 
24 months in cases in which a sentence is being appealed; and mandates a 3-year 
maximum duration for a trial. 
The law provides that the prosecutor is in charge of the investigative stage of a case. The 
prosecutor instructs the police regarding witness statements and evidence necessary to 
prosecute. Counternarcotics prosecutors lead the investigation of narcotics cases. The 
prosecutor pursues misdemeanor cases [with possible sentences of less than four years] 
before a judge of instruction and felony cases [with possible sentences of more than four 
years] before sentencing courts, both of which features a five-member panel that includes 
three citizen members and two professional judges. During the year the Forensic Medical 
Institute opened, although the attorney general's office did not have the proper chemicals 
to begin conducting investigations. 
Superior court review is restricted to a review of the application of the law. Supreme 
Court review is restricted to cases involving exceptional circumstances. During the 
superior court and Supreme Court reviews, the courts may confirm, reduce, increase, or 
annul sentences or provide alternatives not contemplated by lower courts. 
 
PERU 
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected 
this provision in practice.  
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The three-tier court structure consists of lower and superior courts, and a Supreme Court 
of Justice of 30 judges. A constitutional tribunal of seven members operates 
independently of the judicial branch. The independent National Judicial Council [CNM] 
appointed, disciplined, and evaluated all judges and prosecutors who have served in their 
position for seven years or more. Failure to be certified by the CNM disqualified a judge 
or prosecutor from working in that capacity again. 
In May the government presented a report recognizing that the CNM's procedures 
violated the due process criteria of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
[IACHR]. Consequently, the government agreed to the following remedial measures: an 
indemnity of $5 thousand [17,200 soles], the establishment of a new evaluation procedure 
that would take place within five months of settlement of the dispute, and the 
reincorporation of formerly disqualified justices into their former positions or those of a 
similar level. 
Judicial reform remained a government priority, but implementation was irregular. 
During the year some of CERIAJUS' recommendations were put into practice. Congress 
approved 13 of 52 legal proposals put forward by CERIAJUS, among these a proposal to 
create a special commission dedicated to following up on the proposed reforms. The 
judiciary created the first seven judgeships for a special commercial court and continued 
to post an estimated nine thousand Supreme Court of Justice decisions on its Web site. 
Superior court justices and their administrators also received special training in public 
administration. 
In addition the CNM approved new regulations [including suggestions from civil society] 
for the selection of judges and prosecutors. 
Witness protection remained a significant weakness of the justice system. The National 
Coordinator for Human Rights, an umbrella Human Rights NGO, documented 45 cases 
of attacks on witnesses during the year. In February a witness in the case of accused 
narcotics trafficker Fernando Zevallos was attacked, and on June 1, for the third time in 
15 months, unknown assailants attempted to kill Luis Alberto Ramirez, the key witness in 
the trial of General Luiz Perez. 
 
PARAGUAY 
While the law provides for an independent judiciary, courts remained inefficient and 
subject to corruption and political influence. Politicians and other interested parties 
blocked or delayed investigations and often pressured judges, although the judiciary was 
not allied with any political group.  
The nine-member Supreme Court appoints lower court judges and magistrates, based 
upon recommendations by the magistrate's council. There are five types of appellate 
tribunals: civil and commercial, criminal, labor, administrative, and juvenile. Minor 
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courts and justices of the peace come within four functional areas: civil and commercial, 
criminal, labor, and juvenile. The military has its own judicial system, which is 
subordinate to the civilian justice system. 
 
CHILE 
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected 
this provision in practice. 
The judiciary has civil, criminal, juvenile, family, and labor courts of first instance 
throughout the country. There are 16 courts of appeal. The 21-member Supreme Court is 
the court of final appeal. A constitutional tribunal decides whether laws or treaties present 
conflicts with the constitution. There are also military courts martial. 
 
URUGUAY 
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally 
respected this provision in practice. 
The Supreme Court heads the judiciary system and supervises the work of the lower 
courts. Criminal trials are held in a court of first instance. Aggrieved parties have a right 
of appeal to the appellate court but not to the Supreme Court. A parallel military court 
system operates under a military justice code. Two military justices sit on the Supreme 
Court but participate only in cases involving the military. Military justice applies to 
civilians only during a state of war or insurrection. 
 
BRASIL 
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected 
this provision in practice; however, the judiciary was underfunded, inefficient, and often 
subject to intimidation and political and economic influences, particularly at the state 
level, a situation that occasioned vigilante action. A number of senior judges remained 
under investigation nationwide on a variety of charges.  
Although the law requires that trials be held within a set period of time from the date of 
the crime, the nationwide backlog in state and federal cases frequently led courts to 
dismiss old cases unheard. This practice reportedly encouraged corrupt judges to delay 
certain cases so that they eventually could be dismissed, although there were no reports 
of this during the year.  
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The judicial system ranges from courts of first instance and appeals to the Federal 
Supreme Court. States organize their own judicial systems within the federal system and 
must adhere to the basic principles of the constitution. There are specialized courts for 
police, military, labor, election, juvenile, and family matters.  
 
VENEZUELA 
While the law provides for an independent judiciary, it was increasingly less so. The 
judiciary also was highly inefficient, sometimes corrupt, and subject to political 
influence, particularly from the attorney general's office, which in turn was pressured by 
the executive branch. 
The judicial sector consists of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and lower courts, the 
attorney general's office, and the Ministry of Interior and Justice. The Supreme Tribunal 
of Justice is the country's highest court and directly administers the lower courts through 
the Executive Directorate of the Judiciary. 
According to government statistics, provisional and temporary judges constituted an 
estimated 50 percent of the approximately 1,900 judges. The Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice's Judicial Committee may hire and fire temporary judges without cause and 
without explanation, and it did so. Provisional judges legally have the same rights as 
permanent judges. In May the Supreme Tribunal of Justice's Judicial Committee removed 
approximately 50 judges [some tenured and some provisional] in several states and 
Caracas, accusing them of complicity with drug traffickers and other irregularities. In 
May the Supreme Tribunal of Justice began administering competitive exams to 
provisional judges as a basis for granting tenure. As of December approximately 480 
judges had been granted tenure. 
The law provides that the Moral Council [attorney general, human rights ombudsman, 
and comptroller general] may suspend judges and allows the National Assembly to 
revoke the appointment of supreme tribunal of justice judges by a simple majority vote. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW] noted that the law threatens the independence of the 
judiciary by subjecting it to political control. 
Lower court judges oversee pretrial motions, including prosecution and defense motions, 
prior to criminal cases going to trial judges. Executive judges oversee the application of 
sentences. Appeals courts, consisting of three-judge panels, review lower court decisions. 
The attorney general oversees the prosecutors who investigate crimes and bring charges 
against criminal suspects. 
Corruption and susceptibility to political pressure were widespread, particularly from the 
attorney general's office, which in turn was responding to pressure from the executive 
branch. In February the Supreme Tribunal of Justice suspended three judges for lifting 
travel restrictions prohibiting persons investigated for involvement in the attempted 
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removal of President Chavez in 2002. The magistrates who assumed the duties of the 
suspended judges subsequently reversed the decision to lift the ban. In March the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice annulled a 2002 supreme 
tribunal of justice ruling that the events of April 2002 constituted a power vacuum and 
not a coup. The 2002 ruling had previously prevented the prosecution of four high-
ranking military officers accused of military rebellion. 
Human rights NGOs and judicial observers criticized the attorney general's office for 
corruption and the politicization of prosecutors. In June judicial NGO Foro Penal 
reported that a small group of prosecutors was given the lead on nearly all high-profile 
prosecutions. In July the Andean Commission of Jurists criticized the attorney general's 
use of his office to investigate and prosecute opposition figures on political grounds. 
On April 14, the Penal Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice revoked the October 
2004 ruling throwing out all criminal charges against National Guard General Carlos 
Alfonzo Martinez and ordered the case reheard. On July 12, an appeals court upheld the 
original August 2004 conviction of General Martinez to five years probation for violating 
security zones. The court found Martinez not guilty of instigating rebellion or abandoning 
his command. 
In May the Penal Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice revoked the October 2004 
appeals court ruling dismissing the case against Baruta mayor Henrique Capriles 
Radonski on charges relating to a violent demonstration in front of the Cuban Embassy in 
2002 and ordered the case reheard 
In November the attorney general's office issued arrest warrants for four alleged 
"intellectual authors" of the November 2004 killing of prosecutor Danilo Anderson. 
Businessman Nelson Mezerhane and 2 others were held for 46 days in DISIP custody for 
allegedly masterminding the killing based on the testimony of an alleged former 
Colombian paramilitary member whose credibility was questioned by various press 
reports. In December a Caracas judge convicted three former police officers as the 
material authors of the killing. 
In May a judge ruled that General Felipe Rodriguez must stand trial on charges of 
rebellion and conspiracy for his alleged role in the 2003 bombings of the Spanish and 
Colombian consulates in Caracas and for his role in a military protest at Altamira.  
On March 14, prosecutors accused former Miranda State governor and Democratic 
Coordinating Committee leader Enrique Mendoza of conspiracy and rebellion for his 
alleged involvement in the closure of a television station in 2002. Mendoza was not 
subject to any court-ordered restrictions, and the court had yet to rule whether he would 
stand trial by year's end. 
In April prosecutors opened an investigation into Carlos Ayala Corao, President of the 
Andean Commission of Jurists and former president of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, for conspiracy related to his alleged participation in the 2002 coup. 
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Human rights groups criticized the charge as an example of political prosecution without 
legal foundation. In October the prosecution did not cite Ayala as one of those formally 
charged in the case, thereby discontinuing the investigation. 
In November the controller general suspended from political activity Leopoldo Lopez, an 
opposition party mayor of a Caracas municipality, for a period of six years after he leaves 
office in 2008. The controller alleged that Lopez mishandled municipal funds in 2002. 
Lopez claimed the move was unconstitutional and part of a strategy by the Chavez 
government to eliminate the political opposition.  
 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, public and private entities 
continued to undermine judicial independence. The judiciary received training in the 
Criminal Procedures Code to help create and maintain professional standards, but undue 
influence remained a problem. 
The judiciary includes a 16-member Supreme Court, appeals courts, courts of first 
instance, and justices of the peace. There are specialized courts that handle tax, labor, 
land, and juvenile matters. The Supreme Court is responsible for naming all lower court 
judges according to criteria defined by law. The government established 17 of the 25 
tribunals provided for by law and 5 courts of appeals for children and adolescents. The 
Code for Minors outlines the judicial system for criminal cases involving juveniles and 
family disputes. 
 
HAITI 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judiciary was 
subject to significant influence by the executive and legislative branches. Years of 
extensive corruption and governmental neglect left the poorly organized judicial system 
largely moribund. Judges assigned to politically sensitive cases complained about 
interference from the executive branch. Then Minister of Justice Bernard Gousse made 
minimal efforts at reforming the justice system, such as relieving corrupt judges of their 
caseloads. In May the IGOH replaced Gousse with Justice Minister Henri Dorleans, who 
enacted tough judicial reform measures, particularly on pretrial detention. The new 
minister introduced system-wide changes aimed at strengthening the system's capacity. 
Although some immediate improvements were made, such as special judicial sessions to 
adjudicate the cases of detainees held in prolonged pretrial detention, the system 
remained weak and had limited capacity at year's end.  
Systemic problems--including underfunding and a shortage of adequately trained and 
qualified justices of the peace, judges, and prosecutors--created a huge backlog of 
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criminal cases, with many detainees waiting months or in pretrial detention for a court 
date. For persons acquitted or who had charges dismissed, there was no legal redress for 
their prolonged pretrial detention.  
In December the IGOH issued a presidential decree involuntarily retiring five judges 
from the Supreme Court. The action resulted from the interim government's outrage over 
two Supreme Court decisions affirming Haitian-American Dumas Simeus' right to appear 
on the presidential ballot. 
In most regions judges lacked the basic resources and professional competence. The 
qualifying year-long course at the magistrates' school requires no previous legal training. 
Judges increasingly conducted legal proceedings exclusively in Creole rather than 
French, but language remained a significant barrier to full access to the judicial system. 
The UN Development Program [UNDP], supported by the government, provided 
additional training for many segments of the judicial system, including new judges and 
attorneys.  
On April 25, former Port-au-Prince police chief Jackson Joanis appealed his conviction 
for his role in the murder of Father Jean-Marie Vincent in 1994. On June 10, the appeals 
court overturned Joanis' conviction for lack of sufficient evidence against him and set 
him free.  
Former paramilitary leader Louis-Jodel Chamblain was released from prison on August 
11. Chamblain appealed his 2000 conviction in absentia for the 1994 Raboteau massacre, 
and the appeals court overturned it in late May, citing irregularities within the original 
trial. Although he remained in prison to face additional charges related to a 1993 incident 
in Cite Soleil, on June 7, his lawyers filed a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was 
being held without due process, and the court ordered his release on July 26.  
The release of Chamblain and Joanis, despite their alleged roles in other human rights 
violations, called into question the IGOH's commitment to respect the rule of law and to 
strengthen democratic institutions in the country.  
At the lowest level of the justice system, justices of the peace issue warrants, adjudicate 
minor infractions, mediate cases, take depositions, and refer cases to prosecutors or 
higher judicial officials. Investigating magistrates and public prosecutors cooperate in the 
development of more serious cases, which are tried by the judges of the first instance 
courts. Thirty appeals court judges hear cases referred from the first instance courts, and 
the 11-member Court of Cassation, the country's highest court, addresses questions of 
procedure and constitutionality.  
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JAMAICA 
The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected 
this provision in practice. However, the judicial system was overburdened and operated 
with inadequate resources. 
The judiciary's lack of sufficient staff and resources hindered due process, and the BSI 
also had a large backlog. Trials in many cases were delayed for years, and other cases 
were dismissed because files could not be located or had been destroyed. A night court 
had some success in reducing the backlog of cases. The Supreme Court used mediation 
through the Dispute Resolution Foundation as an alternative to traditional trials, which 
alleviated some of the backlog in that court. The resident magistrate's courts also used 
alternative dispute resolution in limited cases.  
There was a general lack of confidence in the police's witness protection program, which 
led to the dismissal of a number of cases involving killings. In a culture where it was 
widely believed that "informers will die," some criminal trials were dismissed because 
witnesses failed to come forward as a result of threats and intimidation. Some of those 
who came forward qualified for the witness protection program, but many either refused 
protection or violated the conditions of the program. 
The court system consists of justices of the peace at the lower end. Resident magistrate's 
courts handle civil and criminal cases, while the Supreme Court has unlimited 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. Defendants have the right to appeal a conviction 
in any of the three trial courts to the court of appeal, which is the highest court in the 
country. The Privy Council in the United Kingdom is the final court of appeal.  
 
GUYANA 
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary and the government generally 
respected this provision in practice, some law enforcement officials, prominent lawyers, 
and others accused the government of occasional judicial intervention. The general 
perception was that the judiciary was influenced by the executive, and that corruption 
existed at the magistrate level.  
Delays and inefficiencies in the judicial process undermined due process. Delays in 
judicial proceeding were caused by shortages of trained court personnel and magistrates, 
inadequate resources, postponements at the request of the defense or prosecution, 
occasional allegations of bribery, poor tracking of cases, and the slowness of police in 
preparing cases for trial. The delays resulted in a backlog of more than 10 thousand cases, 
some dating back 10 years. 
The court system is composed of magistrate's courts, the High Court, and the Court of 
Appeals. There is also the right of final appeal to the new Caribbean Court of Justice. The 
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magistrate's courts deal with both criminal and civil matters. Specially trained police 
officers serve as prosecutors in lower magistrate's courts. The DPP is statutorily 
independent, may file legal charges against offenders, and handles all criminal cases.  
The Judicial Services Commission [JSC] has the authority to appoint judges, determine 
tenure, and appoint the DPP and his deputy. The president, on the advice of the JSC, may 
temporarily appoint judges to sit in magistrate's courts and on the High Court.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
 
Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and 
endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 
13 December 1985 
 
Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples of the world affirm, inter alia, 
their determination to establish conditions under which justice can be maintained to 
achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination,  
Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines in particular the principles 
of equality before the law, of the presumption of innocence and of the right to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,  
Whereas the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on 
Civil and Political Rights both guarantee the exercise of those rights, and in addition, the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further guarantees the right to be tried without 
undue delay,  
Whereas frequently there still exists a gap between the vision underlying those principles 
and the actual situation,  
Whereas the organization and administration of justice in every country should be 
inspired by those principles, and efforts should be undertaken to translate them fully into 
reality,  
Whereas rules concerning the exercise of judicial office should aim at enabling judges to 
act in accordance with those principles,  
Whereas judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties 
and property of citizens,  
Whereas the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, by its resolution 16, called upon the Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control to include among its priorities the elaboration of guidelines 
relating to the independence of judges and the selection, professional training and status 
of judges and prosecutors,  
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Whereas it is, therefore, appropriate that consideration be first given to the role of judges 
in relation to the system of justice and to the importance of their selection, training and 
conduct,  
The following basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in their task of 
securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary should be taken into account 
and respected by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and 
practice and be brought to the attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and 
the legislature and the public in general. The principles have been formulated principally 
with professional judges in mind, but they apply equally, as appropriate, to lay judges, 
where they exist.  
Independence of the judiciary  
1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the 
Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other 
institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.  
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in 
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.  
3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have 
exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its 
competence as defined by law.  
4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial 
process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is 
without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent 
authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.  
5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using 
established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of 
the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary 
courts or judicial tribunals.  
6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to 
ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are 
respected.  
7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the 
judiciary to properly perform its functions.  
Freedom of expression and association  
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8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, members of the 
judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and 
assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct 
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality 
and independence of the judiciary.  
9. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to 
represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their judicial 
independence.  
Qualifications, selection and training  
10. Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with 
appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall 
safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of judges, 
there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, 
except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the 
country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.  
Conditions of service and tenure  
11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, 
conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by 
law.  
12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory 
retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.  
13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective 
factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.  
14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal 
matter of judicial administration. Professional secrecy and immunity  
15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations 
and to confidential information acquired in the course of their duties other than in public 
proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters.  
16. Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of appeal or to 
compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, judges should enjoy 
personal immunity from civil suits for monetary damages for improper acts or omissions 
in the exercise of their judicial functions.  
Discipline, suspension and removal  
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17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and professional 
capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The 
judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The examination of the matter at its initial 
stage shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise requested by the judge.  
18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or 
behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.  
19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be determined in 
accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.  
20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should be subject to an 
independent review. This principle may not apply to the decisions of the highest court 
and those of the legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings. 
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